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The human memory system must resolve a critical tension, ensuring that knowledge endures
over time (persistence), whilst simultaneously retaining a capacity for updating when knowl-
edge is outdated or erroneous (plasticity). In this thesis, I examine the provocative idea
that memory traces can be overwritten with new information, especially during transient
periods of retrieval-induced plasticity that occur when a trace undergoes reconsolidation. A
systematic review of human reconsolidation studies finds that the evidentiary support for
this claim is remarkably tenuous. Furthermore, the theory fails to survive several strong
empirical tests. In Experiments 1-7, I do not replicate a previous finding that is widely
cited as a convincing demonstration of human reconsolidation. In Experiments 8-10, I revisit
the ‘destructive updating’ account of the classic ‘misinformation e ect’ in the context of
reconsolidation theory. These experiments show that the e ect can be eliminated when an
appropriate recognition test is used, demonstrating that event traces are not irrecoverably
lost, and therefore cannot have been overwritten during reconsolidation. In Experiment 11,
I examine whether prior retrieval will help or hinder the correction of naturally occurring
semantic misconceptions. Contrary to reconsolidation theory, I find that knowledge updating
is not contingent on memory retrieval, nor does it result in the overwriting of prior knowledge.
Finally, in the context of media ‘breaking news’ reports (Experiment 12), I find that the
provision of an explicit retraction message, coupled with an alternative account with high
causal coverage, is insu cient to eliminate reliance on false information. Finally, I contend
that the widespread proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses, and the absence of systematic direct
replication, has caused the field of reconsolidation to descend into a theoretical quagmire.
I make several recommendations based on the principles of open science that may help to
restore mechanisms of self-correction and foster genuine theoretical progress.
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“There is no such thing as forgetting possible to the mind; a thousand accidents may, and
will interpose a veil between our present consciousness and the secret inscriptions on the
mind; accidents of the same sort will also rend away this veil; but alike, whether veiled or
unveiled, the inscription remains for ever.”
— Thomas De Quincey, 1821
We begin our lives as naïve biological entities precariously situated in a world that we do not
understand. The medley of information that surrounds us is complex and overwhelming, and
yet there is also a semblance of structure and order that we can exploit to our advantage. We
begin to extract these regularities and imprint them, however imperfectly, upon our minds,
and eventually, over the course of our lifetimes, we accumulate vast knowledge of people,
places, events, and objects that we can identify, locate, anticipate, and interact with.
So deceptively e ortless are these abilities that it rarely occurs to us to consider the challenges
that must be overcome in order to achieve them. Learning is rarely a straightforward process
because our surroundings do not remain static whilst we methodically parse and encode them.
The world is constantly in flux: forests grow, rivers divert, climates change, words become
archaic, politicians resign, and technologies fall into obsolescence. As a result, information
stored in memory can quickly become erroneous or outdated, disrupting our ability to calibrate
our behaviours to the demands of the environment. An adaptive organism must therefore
retain a capacity for updating its knowledge in order to ensure that its internal representations
are an accurate reflection of the external world (R. A. Bjork, 1978; Dudai, 2009; Kraemer &
Golding, 1997).
Although the need for memory updating is clear, the mechanism that underlies it is not. It
might seem ideal that whenever existing memory representations conflict with new information
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in the environment we should simply replace the former with the latter, a process analogous
to a computer overwriting information on its hard drive. However, a recent change in
the environment may not necessarily be representative of more global regularities that
emerge across longer time scales (Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010). Local inconsistencies
(‘noise’) could easily obscure useful patterns (‘signals’) that can only be detected when we
gradually accumulate information over time. Consider for example, the features of our natural
environment that reliably vary with the seasons, such as fluctuations in temperature, the
presence of berries in a hedgerow, or migrating swallows in the sky. It would certainly be
tiresome if we had to begin each summer anew by relearning that shorts and t-shirts are more
appropriate outerwear than scarfs and woolly hats. In the dynamic urban societies many of
us inhabit, we frequently need to retain information that loses its utility on a short-term basis.
For instance, road works may necessitate a temporary detour from our regular commute.
Often knowledge that initially appeared inaccurate may later turn out to be useful once
again. For the scientist, it would be inconvenient to say the least if we completely revised
our beliefs based on evidence presented in a new paper, only to find out later that the study
was deeply flawed. In light of such events, it would appear sub-optimal or even disastrous to
simply overwrite existing knowledge whenever our internal memory representations hold some
discrepancy with the external world. Consequently, the memory system must resolve a critical
tension, ensuring that memory traces endure in order to preserve information accumulated
over a lifetime (persistence), whilst simultaneously maintaining a capacity for updating when
existing knowledge is genuinely erroneous or outdated (plasticity)1.
The question of how we update is inherently interwoven with the question of how we forget.
Although we often view forgetting as a troublesome phenomenon, many theorists recognise
1The terms plasticity and persistence are used across multiple levels of analysis (Bruer, 2007). Broadly
speaking, persistence refers to the continued retention of information in the memory system, whereas plasticity
refers to the capacity for an organism to change. Both persistence and plasticity can have specific definitions
in particular contexts. For example, an experimental psychologist might investigate behavioural plasticity and
a neuroscientist might investigate synaptic plasticity. Both situations broadly refer to the capacity for an
entity to change, however the two situations are not necessarily synonymous: it is not (logically) inevitable
that behavioural plasticity is determined by synaptic plasticity. Unless otherwise noted, the terms will be
used in the broad descriptive sense throughout this thesis.
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that it could have adaptive value as a mechanism for memory updating, diminishing the
influence of old knowledge in order to make way for the new (R. A. Bjork, 1978; Dudai,
2009; Kraemer & Golding, 1997). However, for such a ubiquitous phenomenon, there is little
consensus as to what forgetting actually entails. Colloquially, we use the term ‘forget’ to refer
to an inability to recall something that we have previously learned. But this definition makes
no commitment as to the fate of the old information. Some have suggested that memory
updating is a destructive process that involves the overwriting of existing memory traces
with new information (Dudai, 2009; Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010; J. L. Lee, 2009; Loftus,
1979b). For example, Nader, Hardt, Einarsson, and Finnie (2013) suggest that ‘memory
may be maintained in a permanently modifiable form that permits the updating of each
trace when relevant new information is encountered.’ This is forgetting in its strongest form:
the permanent loss of information from the memory system. However, others argue that
forgetting is, in a sense, illusory. When information does not come to mind, this does not
necessarily require that it has been permanently lost, and could instead reflect a problem
(which may be temporary) retrieving that information from the memory store (R. A. Bjork
& Bjork, 1992; Hintzman, 1986; Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988; Morton, Hammersley, &
Bekerian, 1985). Furthermore, because responses on a memory test can be influenced by
a number of factors unrelated to either storage or retrievability, behavioural performance
cannot be taken as a direct indicator of the contents of memory (Bouton & Moody, 2004;
Cahill, McGaugh, & Weinberger, 2001; M. J. Watkins, 1990). Empirical investigation of
this topic has provoked a historic debate spanning multiple fields of enquiry, experimental
paradigms, and species. The crux of the issue is this: when we fail to remember, has the
memory trace really been lost forever?
In this thesis, we will examine the claim that memory updating is achieved through a process
of overwriting. Specifically, we will focus on the theory of memory reconsolidation that
has initiated considerable excitement in recent years. According to reconsolidation theory,
retrieval of existing memory traces induces a state of instability from which the trace must
re-stabilise (or ‘reconsolidate’) in order to persist. The time taken for this reconsolidation
process to complete represents a transient period of plasticity during which the trace is open
to modification. As such, the accuracy and relevance of memory traces could be routinely
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maintained through exposure to new environmental input that overwrites existing information
during repeated ‘reconsolidation windows’. Reconsolidation, therefore, may be a process
that is capable of ensuring both the persistence and plasticity of the memory trace. In
subsequent chapters, we will interrogate this theory through a systematic evaluation of the
extant evidence used to support it, and through empirical investigations designed to provide
strong tests of its predictions. We begin in the present chapter with a review of the enduring
endeavour to elucidate the mechanisms of forgetting, updating, and overwriting.
1.1 A descriptive framework for investigations of memory updating and forgetting
Throughout this thesis we will use a simple descriptive framework (or “stage analysis”;
Crowder, 1976) to guide our investigation of persistence and plasticity in the human memory
system (Figure 1.1). The framework is loosely based on a model called the General Abstract
Processing System developed by Endel Tulving (Tulving, 1983b) and related ideas originally
proposed by Richard Semon (Semon, 1921; see Schacter, Eich, & Tulving, 1978). The purpose
of its inclusion here is solely to create a shared frame of reference for writer and reader, not
to provide formal theoretical predictions.
A common goal of the memory researcher is to infer from their subject’s overt behaviour
what information has been learned and retained from the environment. The framework
illustrates that this is not a straightforward task because a number of intermediary factors
prevent any direct access to the contents of memory. Starting at the top of the diagram (and
ignoring the coloured shapes for the moment), we initially assume that some information in
the environment has been perceived and encoded by the organism such that it now exists
in a form of electrophysiological activity within the circuitry of the brain. We will call this
state ‘ecphoric memory’ for reasons that will soon become apparent. For the information (in
whatever representational form it now exists) to persist in memory, some storage processes
are required to make a physical impression in the nervous system known as a memory
trace (Bower, 1967; Tulving & Watkins, 1975; Semon, 1921; Underwood, 1969). Although
the precise nature of the trace (or ‘engram’) is largely unknown, assuming its existence is
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Figure 1.1: A descriptive framework for investigations of memory updating. Coloured symbols
represent the loci of factors that could potentially cause forgetting. See main text for details.
present. Candidate storage processes will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter,
but they are generally thought to involve a cascade of molecular events that eventually lead
to structural changes at the level of neural synapses (Dudai, 2002; McGaugh, 2000).
For the contents of memory to influence behaviour, latent memory traces must be activated
through a process of retrieval (Lewis, 1979; Tulving, 1983b). Retrieval is assumed to be
dependent on the presence of su cient internal and/or external retrieval cues (Spear, 1973;
Tulving, 1974, 1983b). A retrieval cue is thought to be e ective because it shares some
similarity (or “resonance”, Semon, 1921; see Schacter et al., 1978) with the informational
content of any given memory trace (Semon, 1921; Tulving, 1983a). Critically therefore, a
given cue could be capable of activating multiple traces. Some retrieval cues have direct
relevance to the task an individual is performing. For example, an individual’s free recall of
miscellaneous items from a list can be improved when they are provided with the category
names for those items (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Tulving & Psotka, 1971). Other potential
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retrieval cues include the spatial (Capaldi & Neath, 1995) or temporal context (M. W. Howard
& Kahana, 2002), and the internal state of the organism (e.g., mood, arousal, drug-induced
state; Eich, 1980). Retrieval cues will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The synergistic interaction of incoming environmental information (including retrieval cues)
and memory traces, results in a state of activity known as an ecphoric memory (Tulving,
1974, 1983a; Semon, 1921). Although often overlooked, this distinction between a latent
memory trace and an active (ecphoric) memory has appeared in the writing of several
theorists (Hintzman, 1986; Lewis, 1979; Moscovitch, 2007; Tulving, 1983a; Semon, 1921),
and cautions us against the assumption that recollective experience can provide a direct and
undiluted indication of the contents of memory storage. Moscovitch (2007, p.18) captures
the distinction cogently: “The engram or memory trace is the representation of an encoded
event or experience. It is not yet a memory, but provides the necessary (physical) condition
for memories to emerge, just as an external stimulus provides the occasion for a percept to
emerge. . . A memory emerges when the engram interacts with retrieval cues or information
derived from particular environmental conditions.”
Tulving (1983a) argued that the act of retrieval alone is not su cient for the contents of the
memory trace to influence an individual’s overt behaviour. He suggested that an additional
stage of ‘conversion’ was required. Conversion does not refer to a single process, but highlights
that the transition from successful retrieval to overt behaviour is not direct or inevitable. For
example, Tulving (1983a) suggests that part of conversion may involve the individual making
a judgement or decision based on their recollective experience. If their decision was to, say,
withhold a response on a memory test, the attending researcher would be none the wiser
as to whether they had learned anything or not. Additionally, a long history of empirical
investigation has furnished memory scientists with a substantial list of non-memory factors,
such as motivation, attention, or injury, that can readily influence participants’ behaviour on
a memory test (Bouton & Moody, 2004; Cahill et al., 2001). Consider for example, a young
pianist in a packed concert hall who successfully retrieves the memory traces that represent
her well-honed ability to play the Moonlight Sonata. Unfortunately, to the dismay of her
audience, she fails to perform the piece with any degree of expertise. Nevertheless, it is also
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apparent that she is feeling extremely nervous, distracted by her mother in the front row, and
has a broken finger. Clearly it would be premature to conclude that the pianist has forgotten
the Moonlight Sonata.
In summary, the framework clarifies several basic assumptions and concepts, and highlights
the plight of the memory researcher. As Thomas De Quincey alludes to in the opening
quotation, a number of intermediary stages intervene between the memory trace and overt
(i.e., measurable) behaviour. As such, the existence of a memory trace is necessary, but not
su cient, for the successful generation of trace-dependent performance. In the event that
the expected trace-dependent performance does not occur, one cannot be entirely certain
whether the target information was (1) successfully stored and successfully retrieved, but
not converted into overt behaviour; (2) successfully stored but not retrieved (3) successfully
stored initially, but lost in the meantime (i.e., forgotten, in the strong sense); or (4) never
stored in the first place. It falls to the researcher to control, to the greatest possible extent,
the multiple factors that can influence performance, in an e ort to isolate the critical variables
of interest. In this chapter we will use the framework as a ‘pin-board’ (see coloured shapes,
Figure 1.1) to keep track of the key factors that have been proposed to account for the
absence of trace-dependent performance on a memory test: the loci of forgetting.
1.2 The loci of forgetting
At the turn of the 19th century, a series of experiments conducted by Müller and Pilzecker
(1900; see Dewar, Cowan, & Della Sala, 2007; Lechner, Squire, & Byrne, 1999) laid the
foundations for a debate about the loci of interference and forgetting e ects that still continues
to this day. In one experiment (ExperimentMP 322; see Figure 1.2) participants learned a list
(List 1) of cue-target pairs consisting of nonsense syllables (e.g., rit-zir, mur-geim. . . etc),
then either learned a new list (List 2; Interference Condition) or did not (No Interference
Condition). On a subsequent test, participants were presented with the List 1 cues and asked
2Throughout this thesis, specific experiments from external studies will be identified using a subscript
(indicating the surnames of the first and last author, and, if necessary, the year that the study was published)
in order to di erentiate them from experiments belonging to this thesis.
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to provide the relevant targets. The findings clearly indicated lower recall in the Interference
Condition (27%) relative to the No Interference Condition (55%), an e ect that Müller and
Pilzecker described as ‘retroactive inhibition’ and what is now generally known as ‘retroactive
interference’.
In a second important experiment (ExperimentMP 34; see Figure 1.2), participants learned
List 2 either after a brief delay (17s; Short-Delay Interference Condition) or a long delay
(6m; Long-Delay Interference Condition). Recall of List 1 was substantially more impaired
after a brief delay (28%) compared to after a long delay (49%)3. Müller and Pilzecker
(1900) attributed these e ects to the disruption of continuing physiological activity necessary
for the List 1 representation to become fixated in the memory system, a process they
referred to as ‘consolidirung’ (‘consolidation’, from the Latin ‘consolidare’ meaning to make
firm). The reduced impairment in the Long-Delay Interference Condition suggested that this
consolidation process was time-dependent, and implied a brief ‘consolidation window’ during
which a newly acquired memory trace would be vulnerable to interference. In terms of our
stage analysis (Figure 1.1, red pentagon) consolidation reflects a storage process that must be
allowed to resolve in order for a newly acquired memory trace to persist in the memory store.
In subsequent years, the debate about interference and forgetting appears to have fragmented
across research communities (Hardt et al., 2010; Lechner et al., 1999; Wixted, 2004). Following
a number of empirical investigations by John McGeoch (J. A. McGeoch & McDonald, 1931;
J. A. McGeoch, 1933a, 1942), many psychologists pivoted away from the consolidation
hypothesis to focus on other potential causes of retroactive interference, including unlearning
(Melton & Irwin, 1940) and response competition (J. A. McGeoch, 1932, 1942). By contrast,
consolidation theory remained highly influential within neuroscientific circles (and amongst
biologically-oriented psychologists), stubbornly resisting several challenges during the 1960s
(cf. Lewis & Maher, 1965, 1966; McGaugh & Petrinovich, 1966) and early 1970s (cf. McGaugh
& Dawson, 1971; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973), and eventually emerging as the dominant
3Ideally this experiment should also have included ‘No Interference Conditions’ to ensure the e ect could
be attributed to the interaction of delay and interference rather than a just an e ect of delay. However,
performance in the Long-Delay Interference Condition appears to be comparable to the No Interference

























Figure 1.2: Design of ExperimentMP 34 in Müller and Pilzecker (1900; see Lechner et al.,
1999). A: Interference Condition; B: No Interference Condition; C: Short-Delay Interference
Condition; D: Long-Delay Interference Condition. See main text for details.
neurobiological explanation of amnesia (Dudai, 1996; McGaugh, 2000; Wixted, 2004).
We will now follow each divergent path of the two research communities4 in turn, first tracing
the arc navigated by many psychologists, and then returning to the arc predominantly taken
by more biologically-oriented researchers. Towards the end of the chapter, we will see these
two arcs converge: at the turn of the 20th century, 100 years after Müller and Pilzecker first
sparked interest in consolidation, the new theory of memory reconsolidation dramatically took
center stage in the neuroscientific community (Dudai, 2000; López, 2000; Nadel & Land, 2000;
Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000b; Sara, 2000b) and o ered to bridge the historical divide
with psychology (Hardt et al., 2010). That is where the empirical investigation reported in
this thesis begins.
4Naturally there was some degree of cross-talk between disciplines (e.g., Crowder, 1976; Melton, 1963;
Spear, 1973) but the theoretical and empirical zeitgeists can clearly be di erentiated (Lechner et al., 1999;




Many studies that followed Müller and Pilzecker (1900) adopted a similar procedure that
became known as the paired-associates paradigm (Figure 1.3, for review see M. C. Anderson
& Neely, 1996; Crowder, 1976). During the Training Phase, participants learned a list of
multiple cue-target word pairs (the standard notation to refer to these items is A-B, where A
refers to the cue and B refers to the target). Horse – Leaf, Car – Pizza, or Baseball – Fountain
could all be examples of A-B pairs. During a subsequent Test Phase, participants were
provided with the cues (A), and ask to recall the targets (B). For example, when presented
with the cue ‘Horse’, the correct response would be ‘Leaf’. This type of test was known
as ‘Modified Free Recall’ (MFR, Underwood, 1948) because unlike standard free-recall, the
participant was directed to give a specific response (target B) to a specific cue (A).
A critical feature of this paradigm was the nature of an interpolated New Learning Phase that
fell between the Training and Test Phases. During this New Learning Phase, participants
were asked to memorise a second list of cue-target pairs which often shared components of
the first list. For example, an A-C list would include the cues (A) from the Training list
paired with new targets (C), for example, Horse – Chair. Alternatively, a researcher might
use di erent cues and di erent targets (C-D), for example, Mug – Brick. Typical control
groups required participants to complete a distractor task, asked them to ‘rest’, or simply
involved participants skipping the New Learning Phase entirely.
The consolidation account began to look unsatisfactory after a series of studies did not obtain
the predicted temporally graded decline in retroactive interference (Archer & Underwood,
1951; J. A. McGeoch, 1933a, 1933b; J. A. McGeoch & Nolen, 1933; Newton & Wickens,
1956; E. S. Robinson, 1920). In addition, interference e ects could be obtained when the
interpolated material was introduced after an especially long delay, for example 6 weeks. It did
not seem likely that organised patterns of neural activity activated during the original training
episode would persevere over such a long period of time (J. A. McGeoch, 1942). Finally, the
data indicated that the magnitude of interference varied as a function of the similarity of the
original and interpolated learning material, a phenomenon not anticipated by consolidation
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Figure 1.3: Designs of typical paired-associates paradigms. Letters (A, B, C, D) represent
the standard notation used to refer to cue-target pairs. Words in italics represent examples of
cue-target pairs. MFR = Modified Free-Recall test. MMFR = Modified Modified Free-Recall
test. See main text for details.
examine both conclusions in more detail later in this chapter (see subsubsection 1.2.7.4),
but at the time these findings appeared to provide a compelling case against consolidation
theory and contributed to the field turning its focus to new explanations of the retroactive
interference phenomenon.
To account for the findings, McGeoch proposed that retroactive interference was “a function of
competition among responses, with a resultant momentary dominance. . . of one response over
another. Responses. . . are not necessarily lost from the subject’s repertoire, but are kept by
other responses from appearing” (J. A. McGeoch, 1942, p. 495). This response competition
theory explicitly excluded a storage-based forgetting process and suggested that A-B and A-C
associations coexisted independently in the memory store (also see Martin, 1971). In terms
of our stage analysis (Figure 1.1) the contrast between consolidation theory (red pentagon)
and response competition theory (red square) is stark. Consolidation theory suggests that
post-acquisition new learning disrupts the stabilisation of memory traces, preventing the
adequate storage of target information. Conversely, response competition theory suggests
that the target information persists in memory storage, and is successfully retrieved, but
may not be expressed in overt behaviour because the newly acquired response is dominant.
Furthermore, whereas consolidation theory implies that interventions will only be e ective
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during a brief post-acquisition ‘consolidation window’, response competition theory suggests
that new learning can potentially cause interference at any time, assuming it bears some
similarity to target information stored in memory.
The A-B, A-C paradigm provides an empirical model of a simple real-world memory updating
scenario. For example, consider an individual who learns that in situation A (e.g., using
a cash machine), they will be best served by performing response B (e.g., entering the pin
number ‘1234’). However, the external world changes: following a series of security breaches
the bank decides to issue all of its customers with new pin numbers (C). The individual must
now learn to associate situation A with response C (e.g., entering the pin number ‘5678’).
Would this also lead to forgetting of response B? McGeoch’s theory suggests that both A-B
and A-C associations will co-exist in the memory store but one response (say C) will come
to out-compete the other response (say B) at the point of retrieval. In such a scenario, the
apparent forgetting of response B would be illusory.
1.2.2 Unlearning
McGeoch’s theory made (at least) two important empirical predictions: (1) because retroactive
interference is caused by List 2 items blocking List 1 items on the recall test, an increase in
retroactive interference should be accompanied by a concomitant increase in the number of
intrusion errors (List 2 items being provided instead of List 1 items); (2) because retroactive
interference is the result of the momentary dominance of List 2 items over List 1 items, it
should be alleviated if participants are allowed to provide both responses. The first prediction
was found wanting in a study by Melton and Irwin (1940) and the second in a study by
Barnes and Underwood (1959).
In Melton and Irwin (1940; also see a partial replication using an A-B, A-C paradigm by
Thune & Underwood, 1943) participants (n = 24) learned a series of lists consisting of 18
nonsense syllables each presented for 5 repetitions. They then learned a series of second lists
prior to test. The number of repetitions of the second list was manipulated within-subjects
such that there were either 0 (i.e., ‘rest’), 5, 10, 20, or 40 repetitions. The findings are
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Figure 1.4: Findings of Melton and Irwin (1940). Mean retroactive interference (RI, i.e.,
the di erence between performance in a resting control group relative to the experimental
groups) as a function of degree of interpolated learning. Adapted from Crowder (1976).
number of List 2 repetitions (black circles). However, after a moderate degree of interpolated
learning, the increase in interference was not accompanied by a corresponding increase
in the frequency of List 2 intrusions (white circles). After accounting for the retroactive
interference that could be caused by List 2 intrusions, Melton and Irwin were left with an
unexplained performance impairment (dashed line). The researchers proposed a two-factor
theory comprising of McGeoch’s response competition (to account for interference that could
be attributed to intrusions) and a mysterious ‘Factor X’ (to account for interference that
could not be attributed to intrusions). Tentatively, they suggested that Factor X could be an
‘unlearning’ mechanism that involved weakening of the List 1 information: “It may be that
there is a direct weakening of the original responses at the time the interpolated responses
are being learned, and that this unlearning factor accounts for the discrepancies noted”
(Melton & Irwin, 1940, p. 197). Therefore, two-factor interference theory consisted of both
conversion-based (response competition, Figure 1.1, red square) and storage-based (unlearning,
Figure 1.1, diamond) forgetting mechanisms (for review see Postman & Underwood, 1973).
In a subsequent study, Barnes and Underwood (1959) also sought evidence for the ‘fate’
of the original learning material in an A-B, A-C paradigm. The researchers noted that in
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Figure 1.5: Findings of Barnes and Underwood (1959). Mean correct responses on an MMFR
test in an A-B, A-C paired associates learning paradigm. In the control condition, participants
did not learn List 2 and instead completed puzzles during the delay between training and
test. Adapted from Barnes and Underwood (1959).
previous experiments (e.g., Underwood, 1948; Briggs, 1954) participants were only asked to
provide a single response for each item at the test stage (an ‘MFR’ Test, see Figure 1.3).
Therefore, it could be the case that both original and interpolated items are successfully
retrieved by participants, but their behaviour only reveals the most dominant amongst
competing responses. Barnes and Underwood (1959) altered the standard MFR test by
asking participants to provide both responses (i.e., B and C in an A-B, A-C paradigm) rather
than just a single response. This adjustment was critical because it could eliminate the
contribution of response competition. If both responses are available to the participant (i.e.,
successfully retrieved), it is irrelevant whether one is dominant over the other when they
can both be provided on the test. This type of test entered into regular use, and earned
the imaginative name ‘modified modified free-recall’ (MMFR, see Figure 1.3, Postman &
Underwood, 1973). Barnes and Underwood (1959) found (Figure 1.5) that as the degree of
interpolated learning increased, List 2 recall also increased but List 1 recall declined. Because
the role of response competition had been removed, this was taken to indicate compelling
support for the role of unlearning.
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Nevertheless, evidence that seems inconsistent with unlearning began to emerge as several
studies observed retroactive interference e ects diminishing with the passage of time. Such
‘spontaneous recovery’ e ects have been reported on numerous occasions in the paired-
associates paradigm using the MFR (e.g., Briggs, 1954; Underwood, 1948) and MMFR tests
(e.g., Forrester, 1970; Silverstein, 1967), although in some studies the e ects were small or
absent (e.g., Birnbaum, 1965; Koppenaal, 1963; Slamecka, 1966). An early review of the
literature indicated that the presence or absence of a recovery e ect was to some extent
dependent on the researchers’ method of statistical analysis (A. S. Brown, 1976), and a more
recent study Wheeler (1995) employing a within-subjects design observed robust spontaneous
recovery e ects across a range of task parameters. Because spontaneous recovery e ects imply
that the original material is at least partially intact in the memory store, the unlearning
hypothesis cannot provide a full account of forgetting in the A-B, A-C paradigm.
1.2.3 Extinction, counter-conditioning, and recovery in non-human animals
Interestingly, some researchers, such as Underwood (1948), regarded cases of spontaneous
recovery as evidence for unlearning rather than against it. They noticed that the phenomenon
of ‘extinction’ widely reported in the non-human animal literature, provided a useful analogy
for retroactive interference e ects observed in the A-B, A-C paradigm (Underwood, 1948).
However, this explanation by analogy does not provide evidence for unlearning because
extinction itself could have multiple theoretical interpretations. The concept of unlearning did
have some influence in the non-human animal literature as a candidate account of extinction
(for reviews of translational research in humans see Bouton, 2014; Haaker, Golkar, Hermans,
& Lonsdorf, 2014; Vervliet, Craske, & Hermans, 2013). Most prominently, an unlearning
process was formally instantiated in the influential Rescorla-Wagner model as a decrease in
associative strength between two stimuli (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; for review see R. R. Miller,
Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). However, as outlined below, extensive empirical investigation
strongly suggests that extinction does not involve storage-based memory impairment (Bouton,
2002).
Extinction is most clearly demonstrated in the Pavlovian conditioning paradigm (Bouton
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& Moody, 2004; Pavlov, 1927). The researcher first identifies a motivationally significant
event known as the ‘unconditioned stimulus’ (US, e.g., a foot shock) which reliably elicits a
reaction from the animal known as the ‘unconditioned response’ (UR, e.g., a fear response).
During the Training Phase, a neutral event known as the ‘conditioned stimulus’ (CS, e.g., a
tone) is presented in conjunction with the US, often on repeated trials (although learning
is sometimes observed after a single trial). If conditioning has been successful, the animal
will exhibit the UR (now called the ‘conditioned response’, CR) when the CS is presented on
its own, implying that the animal has learned an association between the CS and the US
(e.g., tone and foot-shock). If the animal is now repeatedly presented with the CS on its
own (Extinction Phase), performance typically declines to the point where the CS no longer
reliably elicits the CR.
It is tempting to conclude that the conditioning process has been reversed and the association
between the CS and the US ‘unlearned’ (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Indeed, the name
extinction implies destructive loss. However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that
the original CS-US association is (at least partially) intact (for reviews see Bouton, 2002;
Falls, 1998; Rescorla, 2001). Firstly, extinction e ects appear to be context-dependent. If
the animal receives Training trials in Context A, and then Extinction trials in Context B,
responding to the CS can be restored if the animal is returned to Context A for a Testing
Phase (“renewal”, e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979a; Bouton & King, 1983). Secondly, it has been
observed that reminder presentations of the US following the Extinction Phase can restore
responding to the CS (“reinstatement”, e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979b; Rescorla & Heth, 1975).
It may also be significant (see below) that reinstatement e ects tend to be dependent on the
reminder US being presented in the same context as used during the Training and Testing
Phases (Bouton & Bolles, 1979b; Bouton & King, 1983). Finally, it has been observed that
the mere passage of time can allow for restoration of responding to the CS (Pavlov, 1927;
Robbins, 1990), a ‘spontaneous recovery’ e ect akin to that observed in the paired-associates
learning paradigm (A. S. Brown, 1976; Wheeler, 1995).
Recovery e ects are also repeatedly observed in counter-conditioning studies (CS-US1, CS-
US2) which more closely resemble the structure of the paired-associate learning paradigm
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(A-B, A-C) relative to extinction studies (CS-US, CS-noUS). In a typical counter-conditioning
study, the animal might first (Training Phase) experience pairings of a tone (CS) with a foot
shock (US1) and then (Transfer Phase) experience pairings of the same tone (CS) with food
(US2). By the end of the Training Phase, the CS elicits an aversive response (e.g., ‘freezing’
in anticipation of shock). However, by the end of Transfer Phase the CS instead elicits an
appetitive response (e.g., ‘headjerks’ in anticipation of food). Based on this outcome alone,
one might be led to conclude that an association between CS-US1 formed during the Training
Phase had been overwritten by a new CS-US2 association formed during the Transfer Phase.
However, as with extinction studies this does not appear to be the case. The fear response
can be ‘renewed’ if the context changes from Training (Context A), to Transfer (Context
B), and reverts for Testing (Context A, Peck & Bouton, 1990). Similarly, the fear response
can be ‘reinstated’ if rats are exposed to US1 in the same context as the subsequent Testing
Phase (D. C. Brooks, Hale, Nelson, & Bouton, 1995). Finally, spontaneous recovery can be
observed when there is a delay (e.g., 28-days) between the Transfer and Test Phases (Bouton
& Peck, 1992).
How can these recovery e ects be accounted for? One intriguing proposal is that the physical
and temporal context (Figure 1.1, purple triangle and orange triangle respectively) act as
special retrieval cues that ‘set the occasion’ for behavioural responding (Bouton, 1993; R.
R. Miller & Oberling, 1998). The idea is that by the Final Test Phase the initial cue (A or
CS) has become associated with two di erent ‘meanings’ (for paired-associates: B and C; for
extinction: US and noUS; for counter-conditioning: US1 and US2). Consequently, the cue
alone only provides an ambiguous signal about the behaviour that the animal should perform.
The context ‘sets the occasion’ in the sense that it disambiguates the cue, and signals to the
animal which of the competing responses is the most appropriate in the present situation.
In the case of the renewal e ect for instance (see above), the animal appears to learn that
in Context A (Training Phase), the CS signals the US (or US1 for counter-conditioning);
whereas in Context B (Extinction/Transfer Phase), the CS signals noUS (or US2 for counter-
conditioning). A similar explanation can be applied to reinstatement e ects which also appear
to be context-dependent (see above). Following the Extinction/Transfer Phase, Context A
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indicates that the CS signals noUS (or US2). However, the reminder presentation of the US
(or US1) in Context A indicates to the animal that the CS now signals the US (or US1) again.
Spontaneous recovery can also be considered a specific instance of the renewal e ect that
focuses on temporal rather than physical context. According to this account, the association
formed during the Extinction/Transfer Phase is also associated with a specific temporal
context. As the delay until the Testing Phase increases, the similarity to the temporal
context of Extinction/Transfer decreases, reducing the likelihood that the CS-noUS/CS-US2
association will be retrieved (Bouton, 1993). Clearly however, the same situation applies
to the temporal context associated with the original CS-US/CS-US1 association formed
during Training. Similarly, although renewal e ects are most robust when the Training and
Testing contexts are matched (i.e., ABA), they are also observed when the Testing context
is neutral (i.e., ABC, see J. A. Harris, Jones, Bailey, & Westbrook, 2000). Therefore, the
‘occasion setting’ account requires us to assume that the Training association is considered as
the ‘default’ behaviour associated with the cue, allowing it to generalise more freely across
contexts. Conversely, the Extinction/Transfer association is considered an exception, and
therefore more dependent on contextual cues (see Bouton, 2002).
1.2.4 Cue-dependent forgetting in humans
The evidence from non-human animal studies reviewed above clearly indicates an important
role for various retrieval cues in the phenomenon of forgetting and interference. They also
indicate that memory updating does not necessarily involve storage-based loss of information,
and can be achieved via retrieval-based mechanisms. In many situations that might otherwise
suggest the loss of information from memory, provision of appropriate retrieval cues reveals
that the target memory traces have persisted. The role of retrieval cues has also received
considerable attention in the human literature. In fact John McGeoch, originator of the
response competition theory, also recognised that retrieval cues have an important role:
“forgetting, in the sense of functional inability or loss, may result from a lack of the proper
eliciting stimulus” (J. A. McGeoch, 1932, p. 365). McGeoch’s evidence at this point was
entirely anecdotal, and requires some historical context to appreciate: “The missionary, after
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being for some time in this country, loses his command of Chinese, but regains it, with
almost no relearning, upon return to the stimulating environment in which he had learned
and habitually used the language” (J. A. McGeoch, 1932, p. 366).
McGeoch’s speculations anticipated some of the most important empirical developments in
the loci of forgetting debate. In a series of studies, Endel Tulving and his colleagues obtained
compelling evidence for the crucial role of retrieval cues in the process of remembering (e.g.,
Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Tulving & Psotka, 1971; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). In one
prominent study by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966), participants were first instructed to
memorise lists of words organised into semantic categories and presented auditorily. For
example, under the category heading FOUR-FOOTED ANIMALS, one might hear the words
COW, RAT, PIG, and HORSE. The number of words in a list (12, 24, 48), and the number
of items per category (1, 2, 4) was varied in a fully crossed fashion between participants,
giving rise to 9 conditions. For example, in the 12 word list, items were either all from a
single category, two di erent categories, or four di erent categories. The additional, critical
manipulation, was the type of testing. Participants were either given a free-recall test or
a cued-recall test (consequently there were 18 conditions in total, n ¥ 52 per condition).
On the free-recall test, participants were given 2 minutes to write down as many training
items as possible in whatever order they preferred. On the cued-recall test, participants were
presented with each category name in turn, and given a short period of time to write down
the training items belonging to that category.
The critical outcome was facilitated recall performance in the cued-recall condition relative to
the free-recall condition (Figure 1.6). To account for this, Tulving and Pearlstone introduced
an important distinction between the availability and accessibility of information in memory.
As both cued-recall and free-recall groups were treated identically up until the point of testing,
it is reasonable to assume that they had learned an approximately equivalent number of
words. In other words, they had the same amount of information available in memory storage.
However, the higher performance in the cued-recall groups relative to the free-recall groups
suggests that the accessibility of information was facilitated by the provision of additional
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Figure 1.6: Findings of Tulving and Pearlstone’s (1966) study illustrating the availabil-
ity/accessibility distinction. Mean number of words recalled are shown as a function of items
per category and total list length. Adapted from Tulving and Pearlstone (1966).
This experiment also illustrates another important principle related to the retrieval cue.
Notice that the e ectiveness of the retrieval cues appears to decline as the number of words
per category increases (Figure 1.6). One way to explain these findings is in terms of the
cue-overload principle (M. J. Watkins & Watkins, 1976). According to this idea, the more
information (i.e., memory traces) associated with a single retrieval cue, the less e ective that
cue will be at facilitating access to any specific trace in memory storage5. Thus in Tulving
and Pearlstone’s (1966) experiment, when more items were associated with a category label
it was less e ective at facilitating retrieval of those items.
Following Tulving and Pearlstone (1966), and in parallel with work in the non-human
animal literature (Spear, 1973), researchers began to explore the role of retrieval cues that
were seemingly unrelated to the target information, but happened to be correlated with it.
These included external cues, such as the physical context (Figure 1.1, purple triangle) and
5A similar concept is the ‘fan e ect’ which refers to the idea that the more facts that are known about
a particular concept, the longer the time taken to retrieve any specific fact (J. R. Anderson, 1974; J. R.
Anderson & Reder, 1999).
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internal cues, such as the organism’s state of alertness (Figure 1.1, green triangle). In one
study demonstrating the role of physical context (for review see Capaldi & Neath, 1995; S.
M. Smith & Vela, 2001), Godden and Baddeley (1975) observed a remarkable interaction
between the learning and testing environment. The researchers asked divers to learn a list
of 36 words either on land or underwater, and then recall those words, either on land or
underwater6. Recall was markedly improved when the learning and testing environments
were congruent (dry-dry/wet-wet) compared to when they were incongruent (dry-wet/wet-
dry). Studies adopting a similar design have demonstrated that the subject’s internal state
can also influence recall (for review see Eich, 1980). For example, in Eich, Weingartner,
Stillman, and Gillin (1975) participants were asked to learn lists of words either under
the influence of marijuana or placebo, and then recall those words under the influence of
marijuana or placebo. The findings mirrored those of Godden and Baddeley (1975): free recall
performance was facilitated when participants’ internal state was congruent between learning
and testing (marijuana-marijuana/placebo-placebo) compared to when it was incongruent
(marijuana-placebo/placebo-marijuana).
Findings such as these led Tulving and colleagues to propose the encoding specificity principle
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Tulving, 1983b), which reinforced McGeoch’s ideas from four
decades previously (see above, J. A. McGeoch, 1932). According to the encoding specificity
principle, retrieval cues are only e ective if they were encoded at the same time as the target
item. More broadly, the concept of encoding-retrieval match (see Nairne, 2002) suggests
that maximising the similarity between the encoding and retrieval conditions will facilitate
trace-dependent performance. As any type of retrieval cue could contribute to this process,
the concept of encoding-retrieval match could potentially explain a broad range of cue-
dependent forgetting e ects, including the role of context and state (Roediger & Guynn,
6Godden and Baddeley’s rationale for using divers was apparently due to dissatisfaction with previous
manipulations of environmental context which they described as “extremely artificial”. Although their own
study is unlikely to win any awards for ecological validity, it was certainly an improvement relative to a
rather unusual study (Rand & Wapner, 1967) cited in their introduction in which the researchers “strapped
their subjects to a board which was then rotated so as to keep the subject either supine or erect” (Godden &
Baddeley, 1975, p. 326).
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1996). However, there is an important caveat which was alluded to earlier in the context of
Tulving and Pearlstone’s study (see above): the cue-overload principle (M. J. Watkins &
Watkins, 1976). If the e ectiveness of a retrieval cue decreases as the number of traces it is
associated with increases, then encoding-retrieval match cannot be the only determinant of
successful retrieval.
Recognising the importance of both principles, Nairne and colleagues (Nairne, 2002; Poirier
et al., 2012) have taken the position that memory retrieval is fundamentally a discrimination
problem. They proposed that the apparent e ectiveness of increasing encoding-retrieval
similarity is largely due to the fact that it is typically associated with a concomitant increase
in the cue’s ability to discriminate the target trace from competitor traces. However, this
will not always be the case. Consider, for example, a situation in which there are two traces,
A, B, and two retrieval cues, X and Y. Cue X is uniquely associated with trace A, which also
happens to be our target. Cue Y is also associated with target trace A, and associated with
an additional competitor trace B. The provision of cues X and Y together would therefore
maximise the encoding-retrieval match for trace A. However, because cue Y is associated
with trace B, this also increases competition, or ‘cue overload’. Provision of cue X alone, in
contrast, yields lower encoding-retrieval match, but does not elicit competition from trace B.
Therefore, according to the memory-as-discrimination hypothesis (Nairne, 2002; Poirier et
al., 2012), retrieval of the target trace A will be facilitated by the provision of only cue X
relative to cues X and Y together, despite the fact that in the latter case there is greater
encoding-retrieval match.
Poirier et al. (2012) obtained evidence for this hypothesis in a series of experiments. In the
training phase, participants learned associations between targets (e.g., nonsense syllables)
and cues (e.g., symbols). Targets were associated with multiple cues, some of which uniquely
predicted the target, and some of which were shared with other targets. For example, the
target ‘jek’ might be associated with the star, square, and triangle symbols, and the target
‘cef’ might be associated with the oval, rhombus, and triangle symbols. In this case the
triangle is a shared cue that predicts both targets, whilst the other cues uniquely predict
their associated targets. In the test phase, participants were presented with various cue
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combinations and asked to select a single target. The critical comparison was between two
conditions: when a single unique cue was presented (low encoding-retrieval match, high
discriminability; MLDH) and when a unique and shared cue were presented together (high
encoding-retrieval match, low discriminability; MHDL). Consistent with the memory-as-
discrimination view, and contrary to the encoding-retrieval match view, response times were
slower in the MHDL condition relative to the MLDH condition. In summary, it would seem
that increasing encoding-retrieval similarity only facilitates performance if it increases the
ability of the retrieval cue to discriminate between competing memory traces (Nairne, 2002;
Poirier et al., 2012). Additional implications of these findings will be discussed in a subsequent
section (subsection 1.2.6).
1.2.5 The misinformation e ect and the overwriting hypothesis
Despite growing recognition for the role of ‘retrieval-failure’ as a cause of forgetting, it was
not long before a new storage-based hypothesis took center stage. After decades of research
dominated by list-learning experiments, Elizabeth Loftus introduced a new approach inspired
by situations involving eye-witness testimony (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus, 1979b).
Nevertheless, Loftus’ experiments and those that followed, adhered to essentially the same
core structure as the classic paired-associates paradigms of the previous era (for review see
Titcomb & Reyna, 1995; Roediger & Guynn, 1996). The original ‘misinformation paradigm’
consisted of three phases (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978). Participants first ‘witnessed’ an event by
viewing a series of slides depicting a tra c collision. In the second phase, some participants
(‘misled’ group) were exposed to misinformation about the event whereas others were not
(‘control’ group). For example, the misled group heard a reference to a ‘stop sign’ when the
original slide sequence actually contained a ‘yield sign’. By contrast, the control group heard
the ‘stop sign’ correctly referred to as a ‘stop sign’ (or in some studies, a neutral reference
to a ‘sign’). In the final test phase, participants completed a forced-choice recognition test
which included the event item and the misleading item as options. The key finding was
that individuals were much more likely to respond with the misleading item when they had
been exposed to misinformation compared to when they had not. Loftus concluded that
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the misinformation had caused the ‘destructive updating’ or ‘overwriting’ of the memory
trace formed during the original event (Loftus, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus, Schooler, & Wagenaar,
1985, see Figure 1.1, red circle-slash). This striking ‘misinformation e ect’ appeared to cast
serious doubt on the veracity of eye-witness testimony (Loftus, 1979b) and sparked a fervent
industry of empirical inquiry (for review see Ayers & Reder, 1998; Loftus, 2005; Zaragoza,
Belli, & Payment, 2006).
Although there were clear parallels with the classic paired-associates paradigm (i.e., sign-Stop,
sign-Yield ¥ A-B, A-C), these were rarely acknowledged explicitly (although see Chandler,
1989; Bowman & Zaragoza, 1989). The overwriting hypothesis seems highly similar to the
unlearning hypothesis, although the latter posits a gradual weakening of memory associations
whereas the former seems to imply more robust and immediate destruction. This has serious
implications for theories of memory updating and it is unclear how persistence and plasticity
could be e ectively balanced if such a process were in operation (a point we will return to in
Chapter 7).
The disconnect with the preceding interference literature could explain why relevant findings
from a paired-associates study by R. C. Anderson and Watts (1971) appear to have been
initially overlooked (also see Postman & Stark, 1969). Critically, R. C. Anderson and Watts
showed that retroactive interference in an A-B, A-C design could be almost eliminated on a
recognition test that did not include the interpolated item as a distractor (the distractors were
all items from List 1). By contrast, when the recognition test did include the interpolated
item as a distractor (as in Loftus et al., 1978), retroactive interference e ects were obtained.
This outcome provides further evidence against the unlearning hypothesis in the paired-
associates paradigm, and places the loci of the interference e ect firmly in the post-storage
(i.e., retrieval/conversion) stages of analysis (Figure 1.1). Loftus (1979b) had suggested that
the misinformation e ect involved overwriting of the original event memory traces, but that
conclusion would not hold if the e ect were absent when a recognition test without the
interpolated item is employed.
Although it was not clear if they were aware of the R. C. Anderson and Watts study, M.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) conducted misinformation experiments that mirrored key
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aspects of their design. Firstly, the researchers replicated the misinformation e ect using
the same recognition test (the ‘Original Test’) employed by Loftus et al. (1978). However,
when the recognition test (‘the Modified7 Test’) excluded the misled item (i.e., the options
were the event item and a novel distractor) the e ect was eliminated. This study provided
compelling evidence against the overwriting hypothesis because it showed that information
acquired during the event was intact in the memory store. Potential reasons for the di erent
outcomes on the two types of test and other aspects of the misinformation literature will be
reviewed in more detail in a subsequent chapter (Chapter 4).
1.2.6 Retrieval competition
The research examined thus far suggests that forgetting is not necessarily attributable to
storage-based factors. Apparently lost information can often be recovered through the
provision of e ective retrieval cues (Bouton, 2002; Tulving, 1983b), or return spontaneously
with the passage of time (Rescorla, 2004; Wheeler, 1995). The finding that retroactive
interference e ects can be attenuated or even eliminated on appropriately designed recognition
tests (R. C. Anderson & Watts, 1971; M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a; Postman & Stark,
1969) is a compelling demonstration that the original learning material has not been unlearned
or overwritten.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how to account for the retroactive interference e ects observed
using the MMFR test in a paired-associates learning paradigm. Note that the encoding-
retrieval match hypothesis proposes that cues facilitate the retrieval process (Figure 1.1)
by enabling access to target memory traces (Tulving, 1983b). By contrast, the occasion
setting account suggests that retrieval cues facilitate the conversion process by helping the
individual make an appropriate choice between competing responses (Bouton, 2002). The
memory-as-discrimination perspective on the other hand (discussed above, subsection 1.2.4;
7The reader may have noticed that memory researchers have a habit of creating ‘modified’ tests. For
clarity, McCloskey and Zaragoza’s ‘Modified Test’ is a recognition test and not be confused with the Modified
Free Recall Test (MFR; Underwood, 1948), or the Modified Modified Free Recall Test (MMFR; J. M. Barnes
& Underwood, 1959) which are both cued-recall tests.
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Poirier et al., 2012), does not appear to draw a distinction between the retrieval and conversion
stages. In the experiments outlined above (Poirier et al., 2012) all of the potential responses
were available to the participants on a recognition test, and the manipulation of target
discriminability only a ected response times and not accuracy levels. As such, it is unclear
whether the slower response times reflected poorer retrieval e ciency, or time taken actively
choosing between available responses (i.e., a conversion issue).
These factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but even together they do not seem
to provide an adequate explanation for interference e ects on the MMFR test. Firstly,
because the various parameters of the encoding and retrieval situation are typically the
same for both the interference and control groups, an absence of e ective retrieval cues
cannot account for the apparent forgetting of B targets. Secondly, because the MMFR
test allows multiple responses to be provided, and unlimited time to do so, the interference
cannot be attributed to the response competition envisioned by the occasion-setting and
memory-as-discrimination accounts (indeed this was the reason for introducing MMFR in
the first place, see subsection 1.2.2). In earlier decades, a satisfactory explanation continued
to evade theorists and the two-factor interference theory fell into “a state of ferment if not
disarray” (Postman, 1975, p. 327; also see Tulving & Madigan, 1970).
Modern interference-based theories however, have fallen back on a refined version of J. A.
McGeoch’s response competition principle, and dispensed with the unlearning assumption.
The ‘Search of Associative Memory’ (SAM, Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988) model for instance,
emphasises that retrieval is a cue-dependent process that involves competition amongst
co-activated memory traces. Recall that McGeoch’s response competition theory suggests
that in an A-B, A-C paradigm both responses are available and the dominant response is
expressed behaviourally. Hence, it was assumed that the MMFR would eliminate response
competition because participants had unlimited time to produce both responses, and this
would not be a problem if both target memory traces had been successfully retrieved (J. M.
Barnes & Underwood, 1959). However, SAM suggests that traces compete during retrieval to
the extent that some may be rendered temporarily inaccessible. In other words, both theories
assign a role to competition, but SAM localises it within the retrieval process (Figure 1.1,
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red star), whereas McGeoch’s theory suggests it is a conversion phenomenon (Figure 1.1,
red square). More specifically, in SAM the probability of successfully retrieving a target
memory trace is determined by its associative strength with all available retrieval cues (as
in encoding-retrieval match, Tulving, 1983b), relative to competing traces that are also
associated with the same cues (as in cue-overload theory, M. J. Watkins & Watkins, 1976).
Note that there are strong similarities with the memory-as-discrimination account here, but
with a clearer emphasis on the role of competition during retrieval rather than conversion.
Because the potential interference occurs before all possible responses become available in
memory, allowing the participant to provide multiple responses on an MMFR test does not
alleviate the competition. According to SAM, the outcome of the Barnes and Underwood
(1959) study (see Figure 1.5) occurs because the associative strength between cues and List
2 targets increases with the degree of List 2 repetitions. This simultaneously reduces the
probability of List 1 target retrieval and increases the probability of List 2 target retrieval.
As such, SAM can explain key interference phenomenon without recourse to storage-based
impairment mechanisms such as unlearning or overwriting (Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988).
1.2.7 Consolidation
We will now return to pick up the arc taken by biologically-oriented researchers following the
inception of consolidation (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900). Consolidation is important from the
perspective of memory updating because it implies that following a brief stablisation period,
memory traces acquire a robust immunity to interference. This suggests that it would not be
possible to simply overwrite old memory traces with new information. Although rejected
by many psychologists, consolidation gained considerable traction within the neuroscience
community (Glickman, 1961; McGaugh, 1966, 2000). These researchers were impressed by
several lines of biologically-oriented evidence that appeared to o er converging support for
the concept. We will outline the key aspects of this evidence first, before considering whether




Recall that the contrast between Short-Delay Interference and Long-Delay Interference
conditions in the experiments of Müller and Pilzecker (1900) was taken to indicate that
newly acquired traces experience a time-dependent decline in vulnerability to interference
(Figure 1.2). It was quickly recognised that this temporally graded pattern was highly similar
to clinical observations of patients who had su ered retrograde amnesia induced by brain
injury (Burnham, 1903; McDougall, 1901; also see Russell & Nathan, 1946). For example,
in a series of clinical case reports pre-dating the experiments of Müller and Pilzecker, the
French psychiatrist Ribot documented that following brain injury, individuals tended to have
poorer memory of the recent past relative to the distant past (Ribot, 1881, 1883). Ribot
proposed “la loi de regression” (commonly know as “Ribot’s Law”), which holds that older
memory traces are more resistant to traumatic injury relative to more recently acquired
memory traces. Although Ribot himself remained agnostic as to the locus of the forgetting8,
contemporary researchers tend to favour the interpretation that trauma-induced amnesia
reflects disruption of a time-dependent consolidation process (A. S. Brown, 2002; Squire,
1992).
1.2.7.2 Electroconvulsive shock
Intensive investigations began in non-human animal laboratories to delineate the biological
substrates of the consolidation process (for review see R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; McGaugh,
1966; McGaugh & Dawson, 1971). Working with non-human subjects allowed for greater
experimental control relative to clinical case studies, and enabled the deliberate use of
invasive interventions that could directly influence the putative biological substrates of the
consolidation process. When forgetting e ects are observed under such circumstances they
are broadly referred to as ‘experimentally-induced amnesia’.
8Ribot (1883, p. 475) stated that “Two suppositions are equally warranted, viz., that either the registration
of the prior states has been e aced; or that the retention of the anterior states persisting, their aptitude for




In a prominent early study using electroconvulsive shock (ECS), Duncan (1949) first placed
rats into an environment consisting of a ‘dangerous’ compartment and a ‘safe’ compartment.
After a 10s period, a floor grid in the dangerous compartment delivered a mild electric
foot shock, causing the rats to run into the safe compartment (an ‘active avoidance’ task).
One of these learning trials occurred each day for a period of 18 days. The number of
‘anticipatory runs’ - when the rats ran into the safe compartment before the floor shock
was delivered - was taken to indicate that the rats had learned a simple compartment-shock
contingency. In the experimental groups, rats were subjected to a severe cerebral ECS after
each trial. This was intended to perturb any organised physiological activity related to
memory consolidation. Di erent groups of rats received the ECS at di erent time delays
following learning (20s, 40s, 60s, 4m, 15m, 1h, 4h, and 14h). A control group received
no ECS. Consistent with the notion of a time-dependent consolidation process, Duncan
observed a temporally graded pattern of retroactive interference (Figure 1.7). The number
of anticipatory runs, which was very low in the 20s-delay ECS group, gradually improved
with an increase in the delay, and eventually plateaued in the 1h, 4h, and 14h groups, who
had comparable performance to the no-ECS control group. Duncan concluded that ECS
disrupted the progressive consolidation of information acquired during training, echoing the
earlier findings of Müller and Pilzecker (1900). The time-dependent e ectiveness of the ECS
appeared to indicate that the consolidation process resolved somewhere in the period between
15m and 1h post-acquisition.
Further impetus for ECS research on consolidation came with the publication of an influential
paper by Donald Hebb in the same year as Duncan’s experiments were reported (Hebb,
1949). Hebb outlined a dual-trace theory in which newly acquired information was initially
represented by transient reverberating activity in local neural circuits (short-term memory;
STM). If left undisturbed for a period of time, this activity would lead to the structural
changes associated with long-term memory (LTM). Hebb did not explicitly discuss the
concept of consolidation, or cite Müller and Pilzecker (1900). Nevertheless, the concept of
consolidation was analogous to the transfer of information from an STM to LTM format,
and the two ideas became relatively synonymous (see McGaugh & Dawson, 1971). ECS was











0 1 2 3 4 5



















Figure 1.7: Findings of Duncan (1949). Mean anticipatory runs across 18 training trials as a
function of trial-ECS delay. Adapted from Duncan (1949).
disruption of any organised brain activity, which, according to Hebb, must be allowed to
persevere if the memory trace is to persist.
1.2.7.3 Protein-synthesis inhibitors
Hebb’s theory also led researchers to explore the structural changes that might be necessary
for the persistence of information as LTM. A popular approach involved the systemic infusion
of pharmacological protein-synthesis inhibitors (PSIs; for review see Barraco & Stettner, 1976;
Davis & Squire, 1984), such as anisomycin (ANI), and cycloheximide (CXM).
From amongst hundreds of studies, several key findings appear to have emerged (Davis &
Squire, 1984), two of which are depicted for an illustrative case (Squire & Barondes, 1972)
in Figure 1.8. Firstly, cerebral protein synthesis can be disrupted to a high degree (90%+)
without having any major influence on ongoing behaviour (note the similarity of the learning
curves for saline rats and CXM rats during the training stage). Secondly, during the test
stage, performance in the CXM group was initially intact or only mildly impaired relative to
the saline control group, but became progressively worse over time.
46
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Trials Hours after learning















Figure 1.8: Findings of Squire and Barondes (1972). See main text for details. Adapted from
Davis and Squire (1984).
In summary, several decades of biologically-oriented investigations across multiple species,
paradigms, and intervention types converged on the same basic outcomes. Post-acquisition
interventions (ECS, PSIs; also hypothermia, hypoxia, convulsant drugs, and brain lesions,
for review see McGaugh & Dawson, 1971) cause amnesia that decreases as the time interval
between training and intervention increases, to the point that they eventually become
ine ective. The prevailing theoretical interpretation of these findings suggests that they
reflect the progressive consolidation of memory traces into a fixed long-term memory format
(Glickman, 1961; McGaugh, 1966, 2000).
1.2.7.4 Non-specific retroactive interference
As outlined earlier in this chapter, there was increasing disillusionment with the consolidation
hypothesis amongst many psychologists as findings that appeared to conflict with those
of Müller and Pilzecker (1900) began to accumulate. Retroactive interference e ects did
not appear to follow a temporally graded decline (e.g., J. A. McGeoch, 1933a), and varied
as a function of the similarity of the interpolated learning materials (e.g., J. A. McGeoch
& McDonald, 1931). However, recently both conclusions have been re-evaluated (Dewar
et al., 2007; Wixted, 2004; also see Skaggs, 1933). Wixted (2004) for example, makes
a distinction between specific retroactive interference (S-RI) and non-specific retroactive
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interference (NS-RI). S-RI arises during retrieval when two targets compete for a shared cue
(as in an A-B, A-C paradigm). NS-RI arises when mental activity that involves the formation
of new memory traces disrupts a post-acquisition consolidation process (as in an A-B, C-D
paradigm). By this distinction, the experiments of Müller and Pilzecker (1900) involved
NS-RI, as the interpolated task required learning new pairs of nonsense syllables that bore
no direct relation to the original learning (in the standard notation of a paired-associates
paradigm this was an A-B, C-D design). Similarly, in another experiment (ExperimentMP 35),
retroactive interference e ects were obtained when the interpolated task involved learning
images of landscapes. Wixted (2004) argues that NS-RI e ects will follow the temporally-
graded pattern predicted by consolidation theory (as in Müller & Pilzecker, 1900), whereas
S-RI e ects will not. Therefore, because subsequent studies focused on S-RI (e.g., using an
A-B, A-C paradigm) they may have overlooked important evidence in favour of consolidation
theory.
As support for this hypothesis, Wixted (2004) re-evaluated a number of early A-B, A-C
studies in which the temporal position of the interpolated task was varied over three time
points (see Figure 1.9, Archer & Underwood, 1951; Newton & Wickens, 1956; Postman &
Alper, 1946; Sisson, 1939). We will refer to these conditions as Immediate, Delayed, and
Pre-Test. He noted that although several studies did not report statistically significant
di erences across time-points, a consistent ‘inverted U’ shaped pattern could be discerned
in all of them (Figure 1.9 shows representative data from Newton & Wickens, 1956). This
pattern is suggestive of two discrete forgetting processes. Firstly, in the Immediate condition,
the close proximity of List 2 learning to List 1 learning leads to disruption of the consolidation
of A-B associations (i.e., storage-based impairment through NS-RI). Secondly, in the Pre-
Test condition, the close proximity of List 2 learning to the final test leads to temporary
retrieval-based impairment of List 1 associations (i.e., S-RI). The Delayed condition benefits
from being minimally a ected by either of these processes.
Wixted’s two-factor theory appears to capture two key aspects of the extant evidence.
However, it is clear that considerably more empirical e ort is needed. Firstly, given that many
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Figure 1.9: Design (bottom) and findings (top) of Newton and Wickens (1956). A: Immediate
interference condition. B: Delayed interference condition. C: Pre-Test interference condition.
Adapted from Wixted (2004).
in the manner of minutes (e.g., Duncan, 1949) or less (R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973), the
reviewed experiments have poor temporal resolution. In other words, a more precise estimate
of the temporal gradient needs to be obtained by systematically introducing new learning
at short intervals post-acquisition. Secondly, as noted by Wixted (2004), the A-B, A-C
design is not optimal for evaluating the theory because it conflates specific and non-specific
interference e ects. Thirdly, the robustness of the ‘inverted-U’ pattern is not firmly established
because in some of the reviewed studies the e ect of temporal interval was not statistically
significant and sample sizes were typically rather small (e.g., Postman & Alper, 1946, n =
7 per condition; Archer & Underwood, 1951, n = 10 per condition). Limited reporting of
statistical information and the absence of readily available raw data will also hinder any
attempts at meta-analysis. Finally, it seems plausible that the performance ‘dip’ observed
in the Immediate condition could be attributed to interruption of an active-rehearsal or
retrieval-practice (self-testing) strategy rather than disruption of consolidation. In other
words, performance in the Delayed condition could be higher because participants have had
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an opportunity to spontaneously practice the original learning material (even if that was
not intended by the researchers). If such behaviour is occurring then it may not be obvious
to the experimenter, and covert retrieval practice can be an e ective method of improving
subsequent recall (M. A. Smith, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2013).
Another explanation for poorer performance in the Immediate Delay vs. Intermediate De-
lay conditions (Figure 1.9, A vs B) is based on the concept of temporal distinctiveness
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, Farrell, & Brown, 2012a; also see Sisson, 1939), formalised in the
scale-independent memory, perception, and learning (SIMPLE) model (Brown, Neath, &
Chater, 2007). The idea is that the retrievability of memory traces is a function of the
degree to which they are ‘isolated’ along a relevant in psychological dimension such as time
(similar to the notion of ‘temporal context’, see Figure 1.1, orange triangle). When traces
are encoded in close temporal proximity, and further in the past, they are less distinctive,
and consequently less retrievable. Critically, the model proposes that relative rather than
absolute time is important: the degree of interference will depend upon the ratio of temporal
distances for competing traces. For example, consider a memory trace ‘X’ that was encoded
20s ago. Retrievability of Trace X will be higher when a competing trace ‘Y’ was encoded
10s ago (ratio 2:1) compared to when Y was encoded 15s ago (ratio 4:3, example from Brown
et al., 2007). According to SIMPLE, the temporally graded pattern of interference depicted
in Figure 1.9 (A vs B), occurs because in the Immediate condition the two word lists are
encoded in closer temporal proximity relative to the Delayed condition. Consequently, the
lists are less discriminable, and retrievable, at the time of test (Lewandowsky et al., 2012a). In
summary, the temporally-graded pattern of retroactive interference attributed to disruption
of consolidation by Wixted (2004) can be accounted for by the SIMPLE model without
recourse to any form of storage-based memory impairment.
An additional issue with Wixted’s theory is the mechanism by which non-specific interference
might disrupt the stabilisation process. Wixted (2004) suggests that “new learning draws
on a limited pool of resources that may have otherwise been available to consolidate the
original learning” (p.247). However, a recent experiment suggests that retroactive interference
occurs even when no intentional learning is required (Dewar et al., 2007). Dewar et al.
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first asked participants to learn 15 nouns. Following this, each participant completed one
of six post-acquisition tasks (n = 24 per condition) that either did not involve intentional
learning (spot-the-di erence, mathematics, tone-detection) or involved an explicit instruction
to memorise material (radio show, visual images). The sixth condition, in which participants
were told to ‘rest’ and ‘try not to think of the presented wordlists’ (p.9) acted as the control
condition. Performance was lower in all of the interpolated tasks relative to control and
did not di er as a function of intentional learning. This demonstrates that retroactive
interference can be caused by a task that does not require participants to form new memories,
and thus would presumably have limited impact on the hypothetical pool of resources
available for consolidation. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent the intentional learning
manipulation actually suppressed processes involved in memory formation. It seems unlikely
that participants would completely stop encoding information just because there is no
intentional learning component to the task.
1.2.7.5 Multiple temporal gradients
Investigations of experimentally-induced amnesia appeared to place consolidation theory on a
firm footing. However, a number of problematic findings started to emerge (Lewis & Maher,
1965). Firstly, although the findings of early studies (Duncan, 1949; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900)
appeared to converge on an approximate time-frame (< 1h) in which consolidation processes
reached completion, estimates diverged considerably in subsequent studies (for review see
McGaugh, 2000), ranging from milliseconds (R. R. Miller, 1970) through to years (Squire,
Slater, & Chace, 1975). Clinical reports also observed retrograde gradients extending over
long delays, even decades (A. S. Brown, 2002; Russell & Nathan, 1946). This was di cult to
reconcile, as it seemed highly unlikely that information would be maintained in an active
(i.e., electrophysiological) state for such a long period of time (Crowder, 1989). In order to
accommodate these findings, theorists drew a distinction between ‘fast’ cellular consolidation
processes and ‘slow’ systems consolidation processes (Dudai, 2004; McGaugh, 2000). The
‘cellular’ process is thought to capture the transition of transient electrophysiological activity
(STM) into structural synaptic changes that enable information storage (LTM), and is
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dependent on protein-synthesis. The standard account of the ‘systems’ process suggests that
newly acquired information is temporarily stored in the hippocampus before being gradually
distributed across neocortical sites. However, accounts vary considerably as to exactly what
this ‘reorganisation’ involves, and whether information ever truly becomes hippocampal-
independent (cf. McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997;
Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011).
1.2.7.6 Intact short-term memory
A consistent outcome of PSI studies was of intact performance on STM tests (i.e. shortly
after the intervention) but impaired performance on LTM tests (see above, Davis & Squire,
1984). This finding can be accomodated by consolidation theory because the PSI presumably
does not disrupt the electrophysiological activity associated with the STM trace, but disrupts
the protein-synthesis dependent structural changes necessary for the trace to persist in the
longer-term (McGaugh & Dawson, 1971). Therefore, intact performance on a short-term test
simply shows that the STM is still intact. However, the same pattern has also been observed
in ECS studies: performance is generally intact when tested shortly after ECS delivery (e.g.,
15m delay) and impairments are only apparent on delayed tests (e.g., 60m delay; Geller
& Jarvik, 1968b; McGaugh & Landfield, 1970; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1971). Because
ECS likely eliminates the STM trace9 before the putative structural changes that support
LTM can be formed, it is not clear how this finding can be accommodated under standard
consolidation theory. Instead, these findings suggest that the structural changes necessary
to secure information in a latent state, and thus avoid obliteration via ECS, must already
have taken place prior to ECS. In R. R. Miller and Springer (1971), ECS delivered just
10s after acquisition resulted in intact performance on a test taken 15m later, but impaired
performance on a test taken 30m later. This indicates that (a) the processes (which could
still be referred to as consolidation) necessary for formation of a structural memory trace
occurred in less than 10s; and (b) the emergence of amnesia on a delayed test will require an
9ECS has a dramatic e ect on extant neural activity triggering “massive neural firing followed by profound
electrical silence throughout the brain” (R. R. Miller & Matzel, 2006, p. 492).
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explanation other than disruption of consolidation.
1.2.7.7 Negative reinforcement
Invasive interventions are widely used because they are known to disrupt the putative
substrates of the consolidation process. However, they also have a number of other side-e ects
that complicate interpretation. For example, when a rat is given an ECS, it seems plausible
that it could act as a negative reinforcer (punishment). In the aforementioned study by
Duncan (1949) for instance, in addition to learning that the ‘dangerous compartment’ was
associated with a foot shock, rats in the experimental groups could also have learned to
associate the ‘safe compartment’ with ECS. Naturally, this contingency would be more
salient when the learning trial and ECS delivery occurred in close proximity, explaining the
progressively higher performance levels with an increase in ECS delay. Duncan did attempt
to address this point in a control experiment in which the rats received a shock (of equivalent
intensity) to the hind legs in place of ECS. He reasoned that if the leg shock led to a similar
pattern of retroactive interference as the ECS, then this would imply that ECS had no special
influence on physiological processes occurring in the brain, and the negative reinforcement
explanation would be more likely.
The findings of this control experiment were mixed. The 60s, 4m, and 45m delayed leg shock
groups had similar performance to the no-shock control group, suggesting that the shocks
were not acting as negative reinforcement. However, a 20s delayed leg shock group did show
a substantial performance impairment (albeit not as pronounced as in the 20s delayed ECS
group). Although Duncan does not give this finding much attention, it clearly leaves open
the possibility that the delayed shock (ECS or foot shock) could be acting as a negative
reinforcer. Although retroactive interference was not apparent in leg shock groups at longer
delays, this could simply be because leg shock is not as unpleasant as the ECS. This seems
plausible, given that ECS, as its name implies, typically induces the animal to convulse, and
can even result in fatalities, as it did in this very study.
Indirect support for the negative reinforcement explanation can also be derived from studies
that have used ECS whilst the experimental subjects are under anaesthetic (for review see
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Lewis & Maher, 1965). The logic here is that when ECS is delivered under anaesthetic,
the subject will not experience any punishing e ects but any reverberatory activity should
still be disrupted. In a study by Porter and Stone (1947) for example, rats completed a
maze learning task and were then subjected to ECS either under anaesthetic (A+ condition)
or unanaesthetised (A- condition). Larger performance impairments were observed in the
A- condition compared to the A+ condition suggesting that the ECS could be acting as a
negative reinforcer. However, as there was no condition where ECS was not applied, it is
unclear if the ECS had any e ect in the A+ condition. Therefore, it was not possible to rule
out some e ect of ECS on a consolidation process.
1.2.7.8 Recovery from experimentally-induced amnesia
In an earlier section (subsection 1.2.3) we outlined a number of recovery e ects obtained under
various conditioning protocols. These findings have generally been taken to provide compelling
evidence against a storage-based interpretation of extinction and counter-conditioning (Bouton,
2002; Bouton & Moody, 2004). Below we examine a number of similar recovery e ects that
have been observed in studies where amnesia is induced through brain injury or invasive
interventions such as ECS and PSIs (for review see Lewis & Maher, 1965; R. R. Miller &
Springer, 1973; R. R. Miller & Matzel, 2006; Riccio & Richardson, 1984; Spear, 1973).
1.2.7.8.1 Spontaneous recovery
Clinical case studies showing that brain injury can lead to temporally graded amnesia have
been interpreted as important evidential support for consolidation theory (A. S. Brown, 2002;
Squire & Alvarez, 1995). However, it is also common to observe that the ‘forgotten’ time
period occurring prior to injury ‘shrinks’ with the passage of time (e.g., Russell & Nathan,
1946; also see Kritchevsky, Zouzounis, & Squire, 1997). This is similar to ‘spontaneous
recovery’ e ects reported in extinction, counter-conditioning (Bouton, 2002), and paired-
associate learning studies (A. S. Brown, 1976). Often recovery is almost complete, and only
a brief residual amnesia remains (e.g., 30 minutes pre-injury). Similar findings have been
obtained in clinical studies using ECT. For example, in a study by Squire et al. (1975; also
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see Squire, Slater, & Miller, 1981), patients who were receiving electroconvulsive treatment
in an e ort to relieve depression were asked before and after treatment to recall the names of
various popular television programmes broadcast in preceding decades. A temporally-graded
amnesia was observed, stretching back to around 3 years prior to treatment. However, recall
performance had recovered considerably within 1-2 weeks following treatment, suggesting that
the e ect was only temporary. Together these findings indicate that a substantial amount of
the amnesia observed in clinical studies cannot be attributed to storage deficits, as expected
by consolidation theory.
Clinical observations can be di cult to interpret because of potential confounds, such as
patients ‘filling the gaps’ in their memory with information from external sources. But
spontaneous recovery has also been reported in more controlled non-human animal studies
involving ECS-induced amnesia (Cooper & Koppenaal, 1964; Young & Galluscio, 1971; Zinkin
& Miller, 1967). For example, Zinkin and Miller (1967) found that ECS delivered to rats after
one-trial avoidance learning resulted in marked performance impairments after a 24h delay,
but substantial recovery was observed on tests at 48h and 72h delays. However, this e ect was
not replicated in either of two subsequent attempts (Herz & Peeke, 1968; Luttges & McGaugh,
1967) and may have been driven by the use of repeated tests which provided opportunity for
relearning (delayed tests were conducted within- rather than between-subjects). Nevertheless,
a number of studies una ected by this potential confound have also reported substantial
spontaneous recovery when using PSIs as an intervention (e.g., Quartermain, McEwen, &
Azmitia, 1972; Serota, 1971; Squire & Barondes, 1972; for review see Davis & Squire, 1984).
It would seem that spontaneous recovery e ects in investigations of experimentally-induced
amnesia parallel the situation with the paired-associates learning paradigm used in human
studies (see above, A. S. Brown, 1976). The e ects have been observed a su cient number of
times to consider them genuine phenomena, however it is clear that the parameters under
which they do and do not occur are not well understood. It could be that the ‘spontaneous’ in
spontaneous recovery merely reflects the fact that the relevant retrieval cue has not yet been
identified. As discussed earlier, the e ect could be a specific example of ‘contextual renewal’
where the temporal context guides the animal as to which behaviour is most appropriate
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(Bouton, 1993). Alternatively, more rudimentary cues such as the presence of the same
experimenter during the training and testing phases could be su cient to aid recovery.
Recovery could also be dependent on a number of factors which are generally not under
experimental control, such as whether the animal attends to and encodes rudimentary cues
during training, recognises the same cues during testing, and successfully retrieves the relevant
representations from its memory store.
1.2.7.8.2 Reinstatement and renewal
As shown in extinction and counter-conditioning studies (Bouton, 2002), a reinstatement
protocol in which the subject is presented with the US as a ‘reminder’ treatment prior to the
test session can often lead to recovery from experimentally-induced amnesia. This is the case
for both ECS (e.g., Geller & Jarvik, 1968a; Koppenaal, Jagoda, & Cruce, 1967; R. R. Miller
& Springer, 1972) and PSIs (e.g., Quartermain, McEwen, & Azmitia, 1970; Radyushkin &
Anokhin, 1999; Squire & Barondes, 1972). Other aspects of the training situation have also
proven to be e ective reminders, such as the CS (e.g., W. C. Gordon & Mowrer, 1980) and
even the amnesic treatment itself (Hinderliter, Webster, & Riccio, 1975; Thompson & Neely,
1970). Re-exposure to the training context can also facilitate recovery (e.g., Sara, 1973) in a
similar manner to ‘renewal’ e ects following extinction training (Bouton, 2002).
Some researchers have argued that recovery e ects do not necessarily rule out storage-
based impairment e ects (Cherkin, 1972; Gold & King, 1974; Squire, 2006). It could be
that experimentally-induced amnesia is not an ‘all-or-none’ phenomenon and the reminder
treatment provides a learning opportunity that summates with a residual memory trace
(also see Rescorla & Heth, 1975). Although this may be plausible when a US-only reminder
is employed, it is less clear how a CS-only reminder (e.g., Mowrer & Gordon, 1983) or
context-only reminder (e.g., Sara, 1973) would work in this way. Indeed, presentation of an
unpaired CS is equivalent to an extinction trial, which would normally lead to performance
impairment rather than performance enhancement. Moreover, ECS-induced amnesia can be
alleviated via pre-test delivery of psychostimulant drugs such as strychnine (W. C. Gordon &
Spear, 1973; Sara & Remacle, 1977) and amphetamine (Quartermain, Judge, & Jung, 1988),
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which are unrelated to the CS-US contingency, and therefore cannot be said to summate
with any residual information retained in memory storage.
1.2.7.8.3 Cue-dependent amnesia
A finding of central importance to consolidation theory is the consistent observation that the
e ectiveness of an amnesic agent decreases with the passage of time (McGaugh, 1966, 2000).
Once the agent ceases to have an impact (i.e., performance is comparable to a no-intervention
control), the memory trace can be considered robust to any subsequent intervention by that
same agent. However, findings started to emerge that did not fit with this pattern. Misanin,
Miller, and Lewis (1968) first replicated the typical finding of temporally graded amnesia in a
tone-shock fear-conditioning paradigm: immediate post-acquisition ECS led to amnesia and
ECS delivered after a 24h delay did not. However, when a retrieval cue (the CS) was provided
24h after training, immediately prior to ECS, a profound amnesia occurred. The e ect could
not be attributed to extinction induced by the CS reminder because a reactivation without
intervention group showed only a small decline in performance.
The finding that a retrieval cue could ‘reactivate’ a presumably consolidated memory trace
and render it vulnerable to an amnesic agent once again came to be known as ‘cue-dependent
amnesia’ (Lewis, Bregman, & Mahan, 1972; Lewis, 1979). Cue-dependent amnesia was
reported in several subsequent studies across a range of paradigms and intervention types
(e.g., Bregman, Nicholas, & Lewis, 1976; DeVietti & Holliday, 1972; Gerson & Hendersen,
1978; Judge & Quartermain, 1982; Lewis et al., 1972; Mactutus, Ferek, George, & Riccio,
1982; A. M. Schneider & Sherman, 1968). Various aspects of the training situation proved to
be e ective cues, including the US, and CS-US re-pairing (Richardson, Riccio, & Mowrey,
1982). Notably, cue-dependent amnesia also appeared to be temporally graded (e.g., Judge
& Quartermain, 1982; Mactutus et al., 1982), as with the post-acquisition amnesic e ects
associated with memory consolidation (Glickman, 1961; McGaugh, 1966).
This important finding suggested that the unidirectional transition from STM to LTM
outlined under consolidation theory was not accurate. Lewis (1979) argued that it was the
activity state of a memory trace, rather than the time since acquisition that determined its
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susceptibility to amnesic e ects. He proposed a distinction between ‘active memory’ and
‘inactive memory’: at any given time, most memory traces will be in an inactive state, and
have no e ect on behaviour, however, various environmental cues will cause a subset of traces
to transition to an active state. During this active state, traces can influence behaviour, but
are also more vulnerable to interference. Over time, traces revert from an active to inactive
state, explaining why the e ectiveness of amnesic interventions is time-dependent (Judge
& Quartermain, 1982; Mactutus et al., 1982). This is partly analogous to the distinction
between memory traces and ecphoric memory outlined in Figure 1.1. Latent memory traces
are equivalent to ‘inactive memory’. Ecphoric memory refers to the state of activity created
by the synergistic interaction of multiple retrieved memory traces (‘active memory’) and
environmental input.
However, Lewis’s theory failed to gain any considerable traction. A number of research
teams had di culty replicating cue-dependent amnesia e ects (Banker, Hunt, & Pagano,
1969; Dawson & McGaugh, 1969; Gold & King, 1972; Jamieson & Albert, 1970; Squire,
Slater, & Chace, 1976) and, unable to identify a reason for the discrepancy in findings, these
authors rallied around consolidation theory. Consequently, the initial reports of cue-dependent
amnesia had relative little impact on the prevailing zeitgeist (Riccio & Millin, 2003; Sara &
Hars, 2006; Squire, 2006). The storage-retrieval debate also seemed unresolvable with the
available empirical techniques and technologies, and entered into a period of prolonged inertia
(Gold & King, 1974; Gold, 2006; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; R. R. Miller & Matzel, 2006).
1.2.8 Reconsolidation
Sporadic reports of cue-dependent amnesia continued to appear but were largely ignored (e.g.,
Przybyslawski & Sara, 1997; W. A. Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Phillips, & Martinez, 1993; Roullet
& Sara, 1998; for review see Sara, 2000a). W. A. Rodriguez et al. (1993) and Przybyslawski
and Sara (1997) attempted to accommodate the findings within the consolidation framework












































Figure 1.10: Schematic comparing consolidation theory and reconsolidation theory. Red
arrows illustrate an idealised pattern of temporally-graded amnesia (the height of the arrows
represents the e ectiveness of a post-acquisition or post-reactivation intervention). A:
Consolidation theory. B: Reconsolidation theory.
which they need to restabilise or ‘reconsolidate’10. However, it was not until the publication of
a study by Nader, Schafe, and Le Doux (2000a) that the field began to take the phenomenon
seriously (Dudai, 2000; López, 2000; Nadel & Land, 2000; Nader et al., 2000b; Sara, 2000b).
Perhaps cue-dependent amnesia e ects seemed more appealing at this time because they
were not being presented as a direct challenge to consolidation theory (as in Lewis & Maher,
1965; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; Riccio & Richardson, 1984), but merely required that it
be partly adjusted and extended under the rubric of reconsolidation theory (see Figure 1.10).
The core features of consolidation theory were retained11: a newly acquired memory trace is
10The phrase ‘reconsolidate’ appears to have first been used by Spear (1973, p. 188), almost in passing, in
a paper that critiqued consolidation theory, specifically its inability to account for cue-dependent amnesia
and recovery e ects. However, the idea was not given any clear specification until the later work of Sara and
colleagues (Przybyslawski & Sara, 1997; Sara, 2000a).
11Note that most authors use reconsolidation to refer to a cellular-level restabilisation processes (e.g.,
Nader & Hardt, 2009) that bears similarities to cellular consolidation rather than systems consolidation
(Dudai, 2004). However, several authors have considered a potential role for systems-level reconsolidation
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initially unstable and progressively stabilises (‘consolidates’) over time, eventually becoming
resistant to amnesic agents (McGaugh, 1966, 2000). However, according to reconsolidation
theory a previously consolidated memory trace can be destabilised via memory retrieval,
rendering it once again vulnerable to interference until is has restabilised (“reconsolidated”,
see Nader, 2003a; Nader & Hardt, 2009).
The study by Nader et al. (2000a) was especially compelling because it involved direct
infusion of a PSI into sites assumed to eventually harbour the target memory traces (previous
studies tended to involve systemic infusion, see Davis & Squire, 1984), and included a number
of critical control groups. The study built on Schafe and LeDoux (2000) who reported
evidence for consolidation in an auditory fear conditioning paradigm. In that study, rats
were trained to associate a tone (CS) with a foot-shock (US). Learning was indexed by the
proportion of time animals exhibited a fear response (‘freezing’) following presentation of the
tone in isolation. Infusion of the PSI anisomycin into the lateral and basal amygdala (LBA)
shortly after training, led to the typical finding that amnesia was absent on a short-term
test (STM), and present on a delayed test (LTM). Additionally, performance was intact if
the PSI was delivered 6h after training, indicating that the e ectiveness of the intervention
was time-dependent. These findings implied that the memory trace representing the CS-US
association was consolidated within 6h, and should therefore be resistant to subsequent
interference.
However in Nader et al. (2000a), rats who were exposed to the tone (CS) 24h after training,
and then received the PSI infusion, also showed amnesia at test, echoing previous findings of
cue-dependent amnesia (see paragraph 1.2.7.8.3). Critically, the amnesia was dependent on
both the intervention (see Figure 1.11, panel A), and the reactivation (see Figure 1.11, panel B)
components of the procedure. Furthermore, as in the Schafe and LeDoux (2000) consolidation
study, the e ectiveness of the intervention was time-dependent: amnesia was substantially
reduced when anisomycin was infused after a 6h delay (see Figure 1.11, panel C). Similarly,
(e.g., Debiec, LeDoux, & Nader, 2002; McKenzie & Eichenbaum, 2011). Our focus will be on the cellular-level
interpretation as it is the dominant rationale for empirical investigations in both the non-human animal
(Nader & Hardt, 2009) and human (Schiller & Phelps, 2011) literatures.
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performance was intact on a STM test (4h after reactivation), but amnesia was observed on
a LTM test (24h after reactivation; see Figure 1.11, panel D). In summary, the emergence
of an amnesic e ect on a delayed test was contingent on the time-dependent interaction of
the reactivation and intervention, consistent with the key tenets of reconsolidation theory
(Nader et al., 2000b; Nader, 2003a; Nader & Hardt, 2009), and previous demonstrations of
cue-dependent amnesia (e.g., Lewis et al., 1972; Mactutus et al., 1982; Misanin et al., 1968).
Over the subsequent decade and a half, and up to the present time of writing, there has been a
rapid proliferation of empirical and theoretical reports related to memory reconsolidation (see
Figure 1.12, for general reviews see Alberini, 2011; Besnard, Caboche, & Laroche, 2012; Dudai,
2004, 2012; Nader & Hardt, 2009; Nader, 2015; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). Reconsolidation
e ects have been reported across a wide range of species (e.g., rats, Nader et al., 2000a;
crabs, Pedreira, Pérez-Cuesta, & Maldonado, 2004; honeybees, Stollho , 2005; medaka fish,
Eisenberg, Kobilo, Berman, & Dudai, 2003; humans, Hupbach et al., 2007), experimental
paradigms (e.g., auditory fear conditioning, Nader et al., 2000a; spatial water maze, Morris et
al., 2006; inhibitory avoidance, Milekic & Alberini, 2002; list-learning, Hupbach et al., 2007;
motor-sequence learning, Walker, Brakefield, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2003), and amnesic agents
(PSIs, Nader et al., 2000a; RNA synthesis inhibition, Sangha, Scheibenstock, & Lukowiak,
2003; anaesthesia, Eisenberg et al., 2003; new learning, Hupbach et al., 2007). Based on this
large body of evidence, it has been proposed that reconsolidation represents a fundamental
memory process (J. L. Lee, 2009; Nader & Hardt, 2009).
1.2.8.1 Reconsolidation and memory updating
Reconsolidation theory suggests that there are two periods of transient plasticity during which
a memory trace is open to modification: shortly after acquisition and shortly after reactivation.
According to this idea, the accuracy and relevance of information stored in memory traces
is routinely maintained by incorporating new environmental input during recurring cycles
of reconsolidation that are triggered by memory retrieval. Thus, reconsolidation could be a
process that enables both the persistence and plasticity of the memory trace.
This proposal may seem surprising when the majority of the evidence-base for reconsolidation
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consists of studies in which amnesia is induced through invasive pharmacological agents that
an animal would be unlikely to encounter in its natural environment. Nevertheless, theorists
argue that reconsolidation-mediated memory updating can explain the ‘dynamic nature of
memory’, and place great emphasis on classic findings in the cognitive psychology literature,
such as retroactive interference in the paired associates paradigm, and the misinformation
e ect (Dudai, 2009; Hardt et al., 2010; Hupbach et al., 2007; Schiller & Phelps, 2011). For
example, in reference to the misinformation e ect Hupbach et al. (2007, p. 51) state, “the
idea that episodic memory traces can be modified by post-event information has long been
accepted in cognitive psychology” (cf. subsection 1.2.5).
Critically, these authors are assuming that dynamic behaviour necessitates dynamic memory
traces. This conflates behavioural plasticity (the capacity of an organism to modify its
behaviour over time in response to changes in its environment) with physiological plasticity
(the capacity of memory traces to be modified with new information). In fact, the general
picture that emerges from the evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that behavioural
plasticity is not necessarily contingent on modification of existing memory traces. For instance,
retroactive interference e ects in the paired associates learning paradigm can largely (or even
entirely) be attributed to retrieval dynamics rather than storage-based trace alterations (see
subsection 1.2.6, Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988). There is also compelling evidence that
misinformation e ects do not involve overwriting of event memory traces, but reflect the
influence of non-memory related factors operating during conversion (see subsection 1.2.5
and Chapter 4, M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). Similarly, behavioural interference
paradigms in the non-human animal literature, such as extinction and counter-conditioning,
do not appear to involve destructive updating of previously acquired memory traces (see
subsection 1.2.3, Bouton, 2002).
Nevertheless, the reconsolidation-updating theory makes an important testable prediction: If
a consolidated memory trace is retrieved prior to an incidence of new learning, then it becomes
temporally vulnerable to overwriting. Although the use of new learning as a post-retrieval
intervention is relatively rare in non-human animal studies (but see Monfils, Cowansage, Klann,
& LeDoux, 2009; Richardson, Riccio, Jamis, Cabosky, & Skoczen, 1982), it is the typical
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approach employed in reconsolidation investigations with human participants (for review see
Agren, 2014; Schiller & Phelps, 2011). This is partly because ethical limitations restrict the
use of invasive amnesic agents in humans (although see Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009; Kroes
et al., 2014), but also because of the potential clinical benefits that reconsolidation-mediated
memory updating appears to o er (R. D. Lane, Ryan, Nadel, & Greenberg, 2015; Schwabe,
Nader, & Pruessner, 2014). This literature will be reviewed extensively in Chapter 2.
1.3 Overview of thesis
Over the course of a century a recurring debate has been borne out across multiple fields of
scientific enquiry in an enduring search for the loci of forgetting (Figure 1.1). The outcome
of this debate speaks to a broader question of how the memory system can allow stored
information to persist whilst simultaneously maintaining a capacity for plasticity. Is it
necessary that old information be destroyed or overwritten in order to accommodate updating
and plasticity? Or can individuals learn new information whilst allowing existing memory
traces to persist?
In this thesis, we will examine the claim that memory reconsolidation enables memory updat-
ing through a process of overwriting. Chapter 2 provides a general critique of reconsolidation
theory and a comprehensive review of existing investigations of reconsolidation-mediated
memory updating in humans. Chapter 3 outlines several attempts to replicate a key demon-
stration of this phenomenon (Experiments 1-7). Chapter 4 reports a study (Experiments
8-10) designed to evaluate whether a hybrid reconsolidation-misinformation paradigm will
elicit memory impairment e ects consistent with the overwriting hypothesis, or whether
event memory traces continue to persist despite post-retrieval exposure to contradictory
misinformation. Chapter 5 evaluates whether a reconsolidation-overwriting mechanism might
facilitate correction of semantic misconceptions (Experiment 11). In Chapter 6, we will move
away from reconsolidation and explore the consequences of memory persistence in the context
of the continued influence e ect (Experiment 12). Finally, Chapter 7 will provide a summary






























































Figure 1.11: Design and findings of Nader et al. (2000a). Training consisted of a single
presentation of the CS (tone, 30s) which coterminated with the US (foot shock, 1s). Reac-
tivation consisted of a single presentation of the CS. Interference involved infusion of ANI
(anisomycin) into the lateral and basal amygdala (LBA). No Interference involved infusion
of ACSF (artificial cerebrospinal fluid, i.e., vehicle) into the LBA. STM-Test (short-term
memory test) and LTM-Test (long-term memory test) consisted of three presentations of
the CS. Percentages shown in Test boxes refer to the mean time spent immobile (freezing)
during the first 30s CS trial of test. ú = statistically significant at the .05 level. ns = not
statistically significant. The e ect was A: Intervention dependent; B: Reactivation dependent;






























memory AND reconsolidation AND human
memory AND reconsolidation
Figure 1.12: Research trends for memory reconsolidation. Cumulative Pubmed entries for
the search terms [“memory” AND “reconsolidation”] and [“memory” AND “reconsolidation”
AND “human”] (search conducted 23/07/2016). Note that these searches are only intended to
provide an approximate insight into research trends on memory reconsolidation. The searches
(a) overlap; and (b) include both empirical and non-empirical articles (e.g., reviews, opinion
pieces). Arrows and numbers indicate key developments in the field of reconsolidation. 1:
McGaugh (1966) publishes foundational review paper on memory consolidation theory; 2:
Misanin et al. (1968) reports cue-dependent amnesia e ect using ECS following memory
reactivation in rats; 3: Miller and Springer (1973) outline major critique of memory con-
solidation theory; 4: Gold and King (1974) respond with a defense of consolidation theory;
5: Squire (1976) is unable to obtain cue-dependent amnesia e ect using ECS in humans;
6: Lewis (1979) outlines an alternative to consolidation theory in which memory traces can
shift bidirectionally between active and inactive states; 7: Nader et al. (2000a) demonstrate
cue-dependent amnesia using a PSI in rats. Their study has a profound impact upon the
field; 8: Walker et al. (2003) publish what is generally considered to be the first compelling
demonstration of reconsolidation in humans; 9: Nader and Hardt (2009) publish major
review of reconsolidation theory and conclude that reconsolidation respresents a “fundamental
mnemonic process”. Figure adapted and extended from Besnard et al. (2012).
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Does reconsolidation enable memory trace updating? A literature review.
“We are faced with the impossible challenge of proving that the memory trace does not
exist.”
— Sara and Hars (2006, p.518)
As outlined in Chapter 1, reconsolidation theory has gained considerable attention in recent
years (see Figure 1.12), and numerous review articles suggest that it has received broad
empirical support across a range of species, intervention types, and paradigms (Besnard et al.,
2012; Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schwabe et al., 2014; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). The popularity
of the theory likely stems from its ability to maintain the explanatory coverage of its forebear,
consolidation theory, whilst also accommodating previously problematic demonstrations of
cue-dependent amnesia (see Chapter 1, R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; Riccio & Richardson,
1984). Consequently, reconsolidation theory preserves many of the core tenets of consolidation
theory whilst addressing one of the principle evidentiary lines that appear to undermine its
validity (see Figure 1.10, Lewis & Maher, 1965; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; R. R. Miller
& Matzel, 2006; Riccio & Richardson, 1984; Riccio, Millin, & Bogart, 2006).
Similarly, the idea that ‘reconsolidation is the mechanistic instantiation of memory updating’
(J. L. Lee, 2009, p. 418), has received widespread attention (e.g., Besnard et al., 2012;
Dudai & Eisenberg, 2004; Exton-McGuinness, Lee, & Reichelt, 2015; Hardt et al., 2010;
Nader et al., 2000b; Sara, 2000b; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). According to this account, the
reconsolidation process that is triggered upon trace retrieval opens a transient window of
plasticity during which the trace can be updated with incoming environmental information.
Investigation of such a theory would naturally require studies in which the post-retrieval
intervention involves an episode of new learning. However, as indicated in Chapter 1, the
most common intervention procedure entails delivery of invasive amnesic agents such as
electroconvulsive shock (ECS) or protein-synthesis inhibitors (PSIs) to non-human animals
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(Tronson & Taylor, 2007; Nader & Hardt, 2009). Although physiological interventions are
intended to directly disrupt the putative molecular substrates of reconsolidation, considerable
ambiguity surrounds the envisioned mechanism by which a behavioral intervention might
influence these same processes. Indeed, reconsolidation-updating claims are typically cast
in broad terms (Dudai, 2009; Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015; Hardt et al., 2010; J. L. Lee,
2009), and the qualitative nature of empirical outcomes taken to support these claims varies
considerably. In some cases, the updating process is considered to be constructive, allowing
for the ‘incorporation’ or ‘integration’ of new information ‘into’ existing memory traces (e.g.,
Forcato et al., 2007; Hupbach et al., 2007; St Jacques & Schacter, 2013). Conversely, in
other cases the updating process is considered to be destructive and results in the content of
memory traces being selectively ‘rewritten’ by post-retrieval new learning (J. C. K. Chan &
LaPaglia, 2013; Schiller et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2003). Finally, when the reconsolidation
process is left unperturbed, it is thought to strengthen the underlying trace (Finn & Roediger,
2011; Forcato et al., 2011; Sara, 2000b).
Although the consequences of post-retrieval new learning have rarely been explored in non-
human animal studies (cf. Monfils et al., 2009), the use of behavioural interventions is much
more common in the human reconsolidation literature. Due to ethical constraints, the use
of invasive amnesic agents is limited (Schiller & Phelps, 2011). Some human studies have
used less toxic pharmacological interventions, for example the beta-blocker propranolol (e.g.,
Kindt et al., 2009), or have been able to capitalize on opportunities where electroconvulsive
shock treatment is being used as a treatment for patients with depression (Kroes et al.,
2014). However, the vast majority of human investigations have used new learning as a
post-retrieval intervention (for previous reviews see Agren, 2014; Schiller & Phelps, 2011;
Schwabe et al., 2014). Unfortunately, limitations on the use of ECS or PSIs complicates
direct translation of protocols and findings between the two literatures. This has resulted
in considerable heterogeneity in the various methodological parameters employed across
human reconsolidation investigations. This methodological plurality may a ord greater
external validity, but other important factors such as reliability and internal validity appear
to have su ered. As a result, it has become increasingly di cult to ascertain whether there
is any compelling evidence to suggest that (a) reconsolidation occurs in humans; and (b)
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reconsolidation enables memory traces to be updated (overwritten) with new information.
In this chapter, we will summarise and evaluate the evidentiary basis of these two proposals.
If reconsolidation enables overwriting of memory traces in humans, it could have profound
theoretical (Nader et al., 2000b), clinical (Schwabe et al., 2014), and ethical (Hui & Fisher,
2014) implications. For example, the ability to erase ‘pathological’ memory traces that
contribute to post-traumatic stress disorder, addiction, and phobias, o ers the potential of
lasting relief from these conditions (Schwabe et al., 2014). More broadly, compelling evidence
for reconsolidation-mediated memory updating would represent a significant new development
in the debate outlined in Chapter 1 regarding the loci of forgetting. Further exploration
of reconsolidation could help to elucidate how persistence and plasticity are simultaneously
maintained in the human memory system.
In the first section (section 2.1), we outline 10 key criteria that should ideally be met if
a study is to provide a robust test of reconsolidation theory. We then systematically and
comprehensively evaluate the extent to which these criteria are met in human reconsoli-
dation investigations that have employed behavioural interventions. In the second section
(section 2.2), key case studies in the human reconsolidation literature will be described and
discussed in detail in order to highlight some of the idiosyncratic issues that can arise in
such investigations. The final section (section 2.3), will take a broader ‘meta-theoretical’
perspective on the concept of reconsolidation, and examine how the field has handled empirical
successes and failures. The chapter concludes with some concrete recommendations that may
foster a more fruitful approach in future investigations of reconsolidation.
2.1 Systematic review
2.1.1 Criteria
Decades of investigation into consolidation, cue-dependent amnesia, and subsequently recon-
solidation, have established a number of key criteria that should be met if a study is to provide
a robust test of the theory that a post-acquisition/post-retrieval (re)stabilisation process is
necessary for the (re)storage of the memory trace. These criteria are especially important
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because, like its forebear consolidation, reconsolidation is a “curiously ‘invisible’ construct”
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012a, p. 37) that must be indirectly inferred from behavioural data
(Nader, 2006; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). Given the multifaceted and often opaque stages that
intervene between an episode of new learning and subsequent learning-dependent performance
(Chapter 1, Figure 1.1), it can be extremely di cult to design experiments that isolate the
mechanisms operating during any single stage.
The criteria outlined here are often implicit in the control groups that researchers use in
their investigations of reconsolidation (e.g., Nader et al., 2000a) and occasionally they are
stated explicitly in review papers (e.g., Agren, 2014; Dudai, 2004; Tronson & Taylor, 2007;
Schiller & Phelps, 2011). However, the overlap between articles is not always complete, and
adherence to the criteria in empirical investigations varies considerably, especially in the human
reconsolidation literature. Here we have attempted to collate and precisely define criteria that
are implemented sporadically across the field and then systematically evaluate the extent to
which they have been met in studies using behavioural inventions with human participants.
A detailed table containing case-by-case outcomes of the review (Table 2.5) is provided at
the end of the chapter. The table is also available as a .csv file (https://osf.io/42k3u/).
A summary graph representing these outcomes is shown in Figure 2.2. Studies that have
used non-behavioural (i.e., pharmacological or electrophysiological) interventions will not be
discussed in great detail in the present review. The criteria should be considered minimum
standards given the present state of the field, and it is likely that they will need to be adjusted
and supplemented as the field develops.
In the remainder of this chapter we will use the following short-hand. When a criterion (e.g.,
Criterion 1, C1) is met, this will be indicated with a ‘Y’ symbol (e.g., C1Y). In this case,
the study has either successfully implemented a condition necessary for demonstrating a
reconsolidation e ect, or observed a result consistent with the predictions of reconsolidation
theory. When a criterion has been implemented/assessed but not met, this will be indicated
with a ‘N’ symbol (e.g., C1N). In this case the study has either failed to meet the conditions
necessary for a robust test of reconsolidation theory, or else it has observed a result inconsistent
with the predictions of the theory. When a criterion referring solely to findings (as opposed
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to methodological conditions) has not been assessed, this will be indicated with a ‘?’ symbol
(e.g., C1?). In this case, the study does not provide su cient information for us to assess the
particular aspect of the theory to which the criterion refers. In some cases, some idiosyncratic
reason makes it unclear whether a criterion has been met or not. This will be indicated
with a ‘U’ symbol (e.g., C1U) and additional explanation will be provided either in the table
footnotes (Table 2.5) or main text. Finally, in some cases criteria are not applicable. For
example, if a study finds that performance is not contingent on provision of a reminder
(i.e., C4N), then it is no longer necessary to assess the ‘Absence of recovery’ criterion (C10),
because there is no impairment from which to recover. These situations will be indicated in
Table 2.5) with a ‘:’. We will also use a short-hand to refer to the key experimental groups
that enable the criteria to be met. These group codes are displayed in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Group codes for key conditions in reconsolidation experiments.
Group Group Code Related Criterion
Reminder and intervention R+I+ All
No reminder, intervention R-I+ C4, C7
Reminder, no intervention R+I- C5, C7
No reminder, no intervention R-I- C6, C7
Reminder, delayed intervention R+ID C8
Reminder and intervention, short-term memory test R+I+TSTM C9
Reminder and intervention, recovery test R+I+TREC C10
The criteria are shown in Table 2.2 alongside a canonical reconsolidation protocol in Figure 2.1.
A brief introduction is provided here before each criterion is described in greater detail in
the following sections. When an existing, consolidated (C1) memory trace is reactivated
via a reminder (C4), it is destabilised and transiently open to modification by a variety
of post-retrieval (C2) interventions (C5). Modification e ects can be detectable through a
change in trace-dependent performance between baseline (established during training, or by
the reminder protocol itself, C3) and the Test Stage. Any modification e ect will be dependent
on the interaction of the reminder and intervention (C7) and cannot be solely attributed
to the independent influences of the reminder and/or intervention (C6). Interventions will
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operate with decreasing e ectiveness along a temporal gradient until progressive restabilisation
processes have terminated and the trace has been reconsolidated (C8). Consequently, an
appropriate intervention delivered within the time-window of restabilisation will serve to
modify the existing memory trace in a manner that is permanent and shows limited propensity
for recovery (C10). Because reconsolidation is thought to involve a time-dependent process,
the consequences of the intervention should only become apparent on a delayed test (i.e.,
post-reconsolidation) and performance may be una ected on an immediate (or short-delay)
test (C9).
Table 2.2: Criteria for a compelling demonstration of reconsolidation.
Code Criterion
C1 Trace has consolidated




C6 Control for independent e ects
C7 Reminder*intervention interaction
C8 Time-dependence of intervention
C9 Time-dependence of test





Test Training or or









Figure 2.1: Canonical reconsolidation protocol and necessary criteria for a compelling
demonstration of reconsolidation (see Table 2.2).
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2.1.2 Literature search
Relevant studies were identified by searching the PsychInfo database for the keyword term
“reconsolidation” with the search limiters “human”, and “English language” (final search
conducted 23rd June, 2016). This search returned 334 records. Each record was checked
manually to assess whether it referred to an empirical assessment of memory reconsolidation
theory (articles had to report novel data; review and opinion articles were not included).
Finally, this collection of records was supplemented with any additional articles meeting
the above parameters that were known to the present author. Only studies that employed
behavioural interventions are included in the systematic aspect of this review. Note that
the term ‘cases’ will be used to refer to individual experimental conditions in which a
reconsolidation e ect is expected to occur (i.e., R+I+ conditions, see Table 2.5). Cases are
evaluated based on associated control conditions reported in the same study (i.e., research
article). In total, 168 cases reported in 61 di erent studies were included in the systematic
review.
2.1.3 Criterion 1: Trace has consolidated
2.1.3.1 Description of criterion
A key prediction of reconsolidation theory is that a previously consolidated memory trace
can be destabilised by a reminder cue, thus initiating a restabilisation process. It is therefore
necessary to first establish that the target memory trace has consolidated before it can
be claimed that it has subsequently undergone reconsolidation12 (Nader & Hardt, 2009;
Tronson & Taylor, 2007). However, as discussed in subsection 1.2.7, there is no direct way to
measure that a trace has consolidated. In the absence of definitive biological indicators of
trace stabilisation, the operational definition of a consolidated trace is its immunity to post-
acquisition interventions (McGaugh, 1966). However, because ‘consolidation windows’ appear
12One could object by disputing the relative merits of consolidation theory itself (see subsection 1.2.7,
Lewis, 1979; Lewandowsky et al., 2012a) but this criterion is necessary for reconsolidation theory to at least
be internally consistent.
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to vary as a function of the intervention used (Dudai, 2004), immunity to one intervention
does not necessarily imply immunity to all interventions. In other words, establishing that a
trace has ‘consolidated’ in the operational sense, does not necessarily mean it has consolidated
in the theoretical sense. At the molecular level, this could be taken to imply that di erent
aspects of the consolidation process have di erent temporal trajectories (Dudai, 2004; Gold,
2006).
Naturally, if one cannot demonstrate that a trace has consolidated then it is di cult to argue
for the necessity of reconsolidation. Indeed, some theorists have proposed that apparent
reconsolidation e ects might be more accurately characterised as instances of ‘lingering
consolidation’ (Alberini, 2011; Dudai & Eisenberg, 2004). Nevertheless, if one can establish a
time-window of e ectiveness for a specific intervention (e.g., the intervention loses its e cacy
after 6h, Schafe & LeDoux, 2000), and then demonstrate that reactivation opens a new
time-window of e ectiveness for that same intervention (Nader et al., 2000a), then many
would consider this favourable evidence for the reconsolidation account (López, 2000; Nadel
& Land, 2000; Nader et al., 2000b; Sara, 2000b).
In practice, few studies follow this approach and instead assume that the memory trace has
consolidated after a 24h period has elapsed since acquisition (Dudai, 2004). This ‘rule of
thumb’ can be traced back to early investigations of cue-dependent amnesia. For example, in
a review of the literature, Miller and Springer (1973, p. 74) noted that “The time between
training and reactivation is usually 24 hours, an interval su cient to insure consolidation by
most any standard and inadequate to permit appreciable forgetting.” For the purposes of
this review, we will also adopt this 24h standard as our criterion for a ‘consolidated’ memory
trace. If a shorter time interval is employed on the basis of an operational demonstration
that the consolidation window has closed, that would also satisfy the criterion. However,
none of the reviewed studies took this approach. Time-intervals longer than 24h are also
more than acceptable. Indeed, if routine memory updating occurs via reconsolidation (J. L.
Lee, 2009) then traces older than 24h should also undergo reconsolidation. Memory age is
currently a contested boundary condition on reconsolidation theory (see section 2.3).
Meeting this criterion (C1Y) requires either that there is a minimum 24 interval between
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acquisition and reminder, or else the researchers have timed the reminder based on an
operational demonstration that the consolidation window has closed. Otherwise, the criterion
will not have been met (C1N).
CRITERION 1: Trace has consolidated
At a minimum, reactivation should occur 24 hours after acquisition.
2.1.3.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C1), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 148 out of 168 cases met the criterion (88%). The
remaining 20 cases did not meet it (12%).
The studies that did not meet this criterion tended to involve all key stages (see Figure 2.1)
being conducted within a single experimental session (e.g., Diekelmann et al., 2011; J. C. K.
Chan & LaPaglia, 2013, ExperimentCL 1, ExperimentCL 4). Based on typical operational
estimates of the consolidation window (see above), it seems unlikely that the target traces
would have fully stabilised by the time the reminder was delivered in these studies. Neverthe-
less, without a direct measure of trace stablisation, there is no way to know for certain if the
target traces had initially consolidated or not. In the vast majority of cases, there was a 24h
or longer interval between the training and reminder stages, allowing reasonable confidence
that the target memory traces had consolidated by the time they were reactivated.
2.1.4 Criterion 2: Reminder precedes intervention
2.1.4.1 Description of criterion
Because reactivation is necessary to trigger reconsolidation, the intervention must be delivered
after the reminder if it is to disrupt the reconsolidation process. This may seem obvious,
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Figure 2.2: Adherence to reconsolidation criteria in 168 cases, determined independently across
criteria. Y = Criterion met. N = Criterion not met. ? = Criterion not implemented/assessed.
U = Unclear if criterion met. N.A = Criterion not applicable.
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but practical constraints sometimes make it necessary to deliver the intervention before
or during the reminder (see below). This complicates interpretation of the observed e ect
because the intervention could have directly influenced retrieval, rather than the subsequent
reconsolidation process (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schiller & Phelps, 2011; Tronson & Taylor,
2007).
Interventions are often delivered before the reminder in studies using propranolol (which are
not included in the systematic aspect of this review; e.g., Kindt et al., 2009; Schwabe, Nader,
& Pruessner, 2013; Spring et al., 2015; Soeter & Kindt, 2010, 2011) because the drug typically
takes around 90m to reach peak plasma concentration in the blood (Schiller & Phelps, 2011).
The intention, therefore, is that the drug will be most potent during reconsolidation. However,
in practice the drug will also be at least partially e ective during the retrieval process itself.
Additionally, in a series of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies involving a
finger-tapping sequence learning paradigm (see Chapter 3), the intervention was directly
delivered during the reminder stage (Censor, Dimyan, & Cohen, 2010; Censor, Horovitz, &
Cohen, 2014b; Censor, Dayan, & Cohen, 2014a). The subsequent performance impairment
observed in the R+I+ group relative to the R+I- group could therefore be attributed to
the latter group benefiting from an undisrupted reminder rather than the former group
experiencing disruption of a reconsolidation process.
Meeting this criterion (C2Y) simply requires that the reminder precedes the intervention. If
it does not, the criteria has not been met (C2N)
CRITERION 2: Reactivation precedes intervention
Reactivation must occur before rather than during or after the intervention.
2.1.4.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C2), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 167 out of 168 cases met the criterion (99%). The
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remaining case did not meet it (1%).
Meeting this criterion is clearly much more straightforward when behavioural interventions
are employed relative to slow-acting pharmacological interventions (see above). Indeed, our
review revealed only a single case that did not meet the criterion, and this was an explicit
attempt to identify if the observed e ect was contingent on the temporal order of the reminder
and intervention stages (Finn et al., 2012). Therefore, we can be confident that this literature
almost entirely meets criterion 2.
2.1.5 Criterion 3: Baseline comparison
2.1.5.1 Description of criterion
Any reconsolidation-mediated modification of the target memory trace should be apparent in
di erential trace-dependent performance measured at baseline relative to final test (for the
R+I+ condition). Baseline measures could be taken towards the end of training, or during
the reminder stage if the reminder protocol involves active performance of the specific target
material (see subsubsection 2.1.13.1). For example, when retrieval of a previously learned
‘old’ sequence was followed by learning a new sequence, Walker et al. (2003) observed a
substantial drop in old sequence accuracy between the reminder stage and the final test
stage, consistent with the prediction that the trace representing the old sequence had been
compromised (cf. Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016, Chapter 3).
If a performance decline between baseline and final test is observed, then additional control
conditions are required to ascertain whether the e ect is dependent on the reminder and
the intervention (C4, C5, C6, C7). Accounting for baseline performance allows one to
ascertain whether any performance deficits in the R+I+ condition reflect absolute impairment
(performance lower at final test compared to baseline) rather than just relative impairment
(performance at final test in the R+I+ condition lower than in control conditions). For
example, in a motor sequence-learning paradigm (as in Walker et al., 2003), Censor, Dayan,
and Cohen (2014a) observed lower performance in a R+I+ group relative to a R+I- group
on the final test. However, this was only a relative impairment: performance had actually
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improved from baseline to final test in both conditions, just to a lesser extent in the R+I+
group. Because there was no absolute impairment e ect, these findings are not consistent with
the prediction that post-retrieval new learning will disrupt reconsolidation of the reactivated
memory trace causing its weakening or erasure.
It should be noted that absolute impairment e ects can also be identified by including
a condition that neither recieves reminder nor intervention (i.e., R-I-; C6). In fact, this
approach has the advantage of controlling for any interim forgetting (unrelated to the key
manipulations) that may have occurred between baseline and test. Nevertheless, measuring
baseline performance is desirable to rule out the possibility that di erential performance on
the final test is due to initial inter-condition di erences at baseline. Researchers often attempt
to minimize baseline di erences through the use of randomisation and/or counter-balancing
procedures. However, due to unsystematic sources of error, some baseline di erences are
inevitable. A common strategy is to employ a statistical test to examine whether any
baseline di erences are reliable, and a separate statistical test to examine whether any final
test di erences are reliable. However, this implicitly assumes that the di erence between
significant and not significant is itself statistically significant, which is not necessarily the case
(Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). A small numerical
di erence in performance at baseline, even if not statistically significant, could contribute to
a statistically significant di erence on the final test. A more appropriate procedure therefore,
is to directly compare baseline and final test e ects, for example using a factorial ANOVA
testing the time (baseline, test) by condition (e.g., R+I+, R-I-) interaction.
Cases are deemed to have met the present criterion (C3Y) if they include a statistical
comparison between baseline and final test performance and a significant di erence in the
expected direction13 is observed (i.e., R+I+ baseline ”= R+I+ test). If the comparison is
conducted but there is no significant e ect in the expected direction, then the case has not
met the criterion (C3N). If the comparison has not been conduced then the criterion cannot
be assessed (C3?).
13The direction of the e ect will depend the nature of the intervention, and one’s interpretation of
reconsolidation theory (see subsubsection 2.1.13.3).
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CRITERION 3: Baseline comparison
A statistical comparison between baseline and final test indicates a significant
e ect in the expected direction.
2.1.5.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C3), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. Only 7 out of 168 cases met the criterion (4%)
while 12 cases did not (7%). Finally, 149 cases did not assess the criterion (89%).
The majority of cases did not include a statistical comparison between baseline and final test
performance. The extent to which this is problematic will depend partly on whether the
research design also includes a R-I- condition (i.e., C6), which can serve a similar function.
However, adherence to C6 is also rare (see subsection 2.1.8). When C3 and C6 are not met,
it is unclear whether any performance deficits observed in the R+I+ condition compared
to controls reflected only relative impairment or also involved absolute impairment. It will
be important to assess both criteria in future studies because reconsolidation-mediated
disruption of the memory trace should be reflected in both relative and absolute impairment.
Furthermore, even if C6 is met, it is important to also meet C3 in order to rule out the
possibility that di erences in baseline performance are unduly influencing final test outcomes.
2.1.6 Criterion 4: Reactivation-dependent
2.1.6.1 Description of criterion
It is well established that learning new information can have a detrimental impact on the
subsequent recall of previously learned information (see ‘retroactive interference’ e ects
in Chapter 1). To attribute any modification e ect to reconsolidation, it is necessary to
demonstrate that the e ect is dependent on the reactivation manipulation (Agren, 2014;
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Nader & Hardt, 2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). If the e ect occurs in the absence of
reactivation then this suggests that it cannot be attributed to reconsolidation processes.
In practice, demonstrating the critical role of the reactivation manipulation involves comparing
the R+I+ condition to a R-I+ condition (see Table 2.1). Often a between-subjects manipulation
is used (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hupbach et al., 2007; Wichert et al., 2011, also
see Chapter 4 and Chapter 3), but some studies have employed a within-subjects manipulation
by providing reminders for some stimuli, and not others (e.g., Pashler, Kang, & Mozer, 2013;
Schiller et al., 2010, Chapter 5).
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C4Y) if they include a R-I+ control group and
a significant di erence in the expected direction13 is observed (i.e., R+I+ ”= R-I+). If the
comparison is conducted, but there is no significant e ect in the expected direction, then the
case has not met the criterion (C4N). If the required control group has not been included
then the criterion cannot be assessed (C4?).
CRITERION 4: Reactivation-dependent
Any modification e ect must be dependent on the reactivation manipulation.
2.1.6.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C4), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 36 out of 168 cases met the criterion (21%) while
65 cases did not (39%). Finally, 59 cases did not assess the criterion (35%) and for 8 cases
(5%) it was unclear if it had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5).
Whilst there are a concerning number of cases that did not assess this critical criterion,
the majority of cases did include the critical R-I+ control group. For these cases, there are
actually more instances in which a reconsolidation e ect is not found. In other words, a key
prediction of reconsolidation theory is not met. In most studies, cases in which there is no
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reconsolidation e ect are typically accompanied by one or more cases in which it is claimed
there is a reconsolidation e ect (e.g., Beukelaar, Woolley, & Wenderoth, 2014; Soeter &
Kindt, 2011; Wichert et al., 2011). Fewer studies report a complete absence of reconsolidation
e ects (e.g., Hardwicke, Taqi, & Shanks, 2016; Golkar, Bellander, Olsson, & Öhman, 2012;
Pashler et al., 2013; Potts & Shanks, 2012). Studies that did observe a reminder-contingent
e ect will also need to obtain a critical reminder*intervention interaction (C7) if the e ect is
to be consistent with reconsolidation theory.
2.1.7 Criterion 5: Intervention-dependent
2.1.7.1 Description of criterion
It is well established that reminders themselves can influence behaviour. For example, the
‘testing’ e ect refers to the phenomenon whereby attempting to retrieve information (as in a
‘specific-active’ reminder, see subsubsection 2.1.13.1) can facilitate subsequent performance
(Roediger & Butler, 2011). Conversely, in a conditioning paradigm, unreinforced presentations
of the CS+ can impair subsequent performance (i.e., “extinction”, see subsection 1.2.3, Bouton
& Moody, 2004). Any modification e ect must therefore also be critically dependent on the
intervention manipulation (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007).
In practice, demonstrating the critical role of the intervention manipulation involves comparing
the R+I+ condition to a R+I- condition (see Table 2.1). Both between-subjects (e.g., Beukelaar
et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2003; Wichert et al., 2011), and within-subjects manipulations
are used (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hardwicke et al., 2016, Chapter 4). In some
cases, the no-intervention condition involves skipping the intervention stage entirely (e.g.,
Wichert et al., 2011), whereas other studies involve placebo interventions that are missing
some critical ‘active’ component of the main intervention. For example, Censor et al. (2010)
employed TMS applied to a control site compared to TMS applied to the motor cortex, and
Hupbach (2015) compared a group who learned a new word list to a group who completed
Sudoko puzzles.
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C5Y) if they include a R+I- control group and
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a significant di erence in the expected direction13 is observed (i.e., R+I+ ”= R+I-). If the
comparison is conducted, but there is no significant e ect in the expected direction, then the
case has not met the criterion (C6N). If the required control group has not been included
then the criterion cannot be assessed (C6?).
CRITERION 5: Intervention-dependent
Any modification e ect must be dependent on the intervention manipulation.
2.1.7.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C5), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 54 out of 168 cases met the criterion (32%) while
26 cases did not (15%). Finally, 86 cases did not assess it (51%) and for 2 cases (1%) it was
unclear if the criterion had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5).
Just over half of the reviewed cases did not assess this criterion and a small but not insignificant
number found that the intervention was ine ective. In both types of case, it could be that
any observed modification e ect is being driven by the independent e ects of the reminder.
A reasonable number of studies did demonstrate that the e ect was intervention-contingent.
These studies will also need to obtain a critical reminder*intervention interaction (C7) if the
e ect is to be consistent with reconsolidation theory.
2.1.8 Criterion 6: Control for independent e ects
2.1.8.1 Description of criterion
As noted above (C4, C5), both reminders and interventions can have independent e ects on
performance that are unrelated to reconsolidation. Evidence for reconsolidation will require
that there is a reminder*intervention interaction (C7). In order to evaluate that interaction,
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a R-I- control group is required so that the independent e ects of the reminder (R+I-) and
intervention (R-I+) can be estimated. This is discussed further for criterion 7 below.
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C6Y) if they include a R-I- control group and
a significant di erence in the expected direction13 is observed (i.e., R+I+ ”= R-I-). If the
comparison is conducted, but there is no significant e ect in the expected direction, then the
case has not met the criterion (C6N). If the required control group has not been included
then the criterion cannot be assessed (C6?).
CRITERION 6: Control for independent e ects
It is necessary to control for any independent e ects of the reminder and
intervention.
2.1.8.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C6), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 30 out of 168 cases met the criterion (18%) while
7 cases did not (4%). Finally, 129 cases did not assess it (77%) and for 2 cases (1%) it was
unclear if the criterion had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5).
In a small subset of cases, the required control group was included and the expected di erence
from the R+I+ group obtained. Only in a few cases was the control group included and no
di erence observed. In the vast majority of cases this control was not included at all. The
main implication of this is that in those cases the critical reminder*intervention interaction
cannot be assessed (see C7 below).
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2.1.9 Criterion 7: Reminder*intervention interaction
2.1.9.1 Description of criterion
As noted above, in order for any modification e ect to be attributed to reconsolidation, it must
be contingent on both the reminder manipulation (C4) and the intervention manipulation (C5).
Both manipulations however, could have independent e ects on performance (C6). If those
independent e ects summated, it could lead to a pattern of results that appears to support
reconsolidation theory, but is actually caused by unrelated e ects. For example, consider a
study in which a non-reinforced CS+ is used as a reminder, and repeated presentations of
the CS+ (i.e., extinction trials) are used as the intervention (e.g., Schiller et al., 2010, see
subsection 2.2.3). The reminder could, by itself, lead to a reduction in performance on a
subsequent test. Similarly, the intervention alone could also impair subsequent performance.
Together then, this R+I+ condition would likely perform worse than the other experimental
conditions (R-I+, R+I-, R-I-), simply due to the main e ect of the reminder and the main
e ect of the intervention. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate that the performance
decrement goes ‘above and beyond’ what can be attributed to the independent e ects of the
reminder and intervention. This requires a significant reminder*intervention interaction.
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C7Y) if they test the critical reminder*intervention
interaction and find that it is statistically significant. If the comparison is made, and the
interaction is not significant, then the criterion is not met (C7N). If the comparison is not
made, then the criterion cannot be assessed (C7?), unless the data are available for further
analysis (e.g., see subsection 2.2.2, James et al., 2015).
CRITERION 7: Reminder*intervention interaction
It is necessary to demonstrate that any modification e ect is caused by a
reminder*intervention interaction
84
CHAPTER 2. RECONSOLIDATION LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.9.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C7), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 3 out of 168 cases met the criterion (2%) while 15
cases did not meet it (9%). Finally, 142 cases did not assess it (85%) and for 8 cases (5%) it
was unclear if the criterion had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5).
In the vast majority of cases, the critical reminder*intervention interaction was not tested.
In most cases, this was because the necessary experimental conditions were not available.
However, even when those conditions were included in the design, the interaction was not
always tested. For instance, in Chan and LaPaglia (2013, for further details see Chapter 4),
reminder (R+, R-) was manipulated between-subjects and intervention was manipulated
within-subjects (I+, I-), providing a fully crossed factorial design. The analysis approach
involved separate statistical comparisons between R+I+ and R+I- (a statistically significant
e ect, confirming C5), and R-I+ and R-I- (no significant e ect). This pattern of results
is intuitively appealing because it appears that the intervention was only e ective when a
reminder preceded it. As a result, it was concluded that disruption of reconsolidation had
occurred in the R+I+ group. However, this analysis approach is problematic because there was
no statistical comparison between the reminder conditions (nor is there a direct test of C4).
In other words, it was incorrectly assumed that a qualitative di erence between statistical
significance in the two separate conditions must also entail a meaningful quantitative di erence
between them, and that is not necessarily the case (Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et
al., 2011). Such a conclusion would require a statistical comparison of the di erence scores,
or perhaps a 2x2 factorial ANOVA to evaluate the reminder*intervention interaction.
Of course, just because the statistical comparison was not reported does not mean that
it would not be significant, but this cannot be ascertained from the information provided
in the article. In addition, even in the absence of a significant interaction, the outcome
would be ambiguous, rather than evidence against the reconsolidation hypothesis per se
(e.g., the power to detect a true interaction might be low). Nevertheless, the absence of a
significant interaction makes for a rather unconvincing demonstration of reconsolidation. In
subsection 2.2.2, a similar case (James et al., 2015) is discussed where a re-analysis of the
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publicly available dataset indicates that there is no significant interaction, undermining the
claim that the observed e ect was due to disruption of reconsolidation.
2.1.10 Criterion 8: Time-dependence of intervention
2.1.10.1 Description of criterion
Several non-human animal studies suggest that the e ectiveness of a post-retrieval interven-
tion is time-dependent (e.g., Judge & Quartermain, 1982; Mactutus et al., 1982; Nader et al.,
2000a; Przybyslawski & Sara, 1997), mirroring findings with post-acquisition interventions
in consolidation studies (see subsection 1.2.7). This is consistent with the idea that recon-
solidation involves a progressive restabilisation process (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Tronson &
Taylor, 2007). An ideal assessment of this prediction would involve systematic manipulation
of the reminder-intervention interval. This strategy has been used e ectively in consolidation
studies (e.g., Duncan, 1949, see Figure 1.7) to expose the anticipated temporal gradient.
In practice, the time-dependent e ectiveness of the intervention is typically demonstrated
by comparing outcomes in just two conditions (Tronson & Taylor, 2007): an immediate (or
short delay) post-retrieval intervention condition (i.e., standard R+I+), and a 6h delayed
post-retrieval intervention (i.e., R+ID, see Table 2.1). In the prominent Nader et al. (2000a)
study for instance, a PSI was found to induce profound amnesia when delivered immediately
after the reminder, but was ine ective when delivered after a 6h delay (see subsection 1.2.8).
This suggests that 6h was an upper bound on the reconsolidation window, at least given
the parameters used in that particular study. It is unclear to what extent the 6h upper
bound will generalise to other studies, particularly behavioural as opposed to pharmacological
interventions. Nevertheless, a 6h reminder-intervention interval seems to have become a
generally accepted ‘rule-of-thumb’ (Tronson & Taylor, 2007).
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C8Y) if they examined performance in at least
one delayed intervention condition (R+ID) and found that the e ectiveness of the intervention
declined with an increasing reminder-intervention interval. If an R+ID group was included, but
the e ectiveness of the intervention was not found to be time-dependent, then the criterion is
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not met (C8N). If a R+ID group was not included then the criterion cannot be assessed (C8?).
CRITERION 8: Time-dependence of intervention
It is necessary to demonstrate that the e ectiveness of the intervention is
time-dependent.
2.1.10.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C8), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 2 out of 168 cases met the criterion (1%) while
6 cases did not meet it (4%). 96 cases did not assess it (57%) and for 2 cases (1%) it was
unclear if the criterion had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5). For 62 cases (37%) the
criterion was no longer applicable because a reconsolidation e ect was not observed in the
main experimental groups (C3, C4, C5, C6, C7).
The time-dependent e ectiveness of the intervention is a key prediction of reconsolidation
theory. However, very few studies have assessed this criterion. In early consolidation studies
that employed behavioural interventions, it was the absence of a clear temporal gradient that
led psychologists to shift their focus to response competition theories (see subsection 1.2.1
and subsubsection 1.2.7.4; J. A. McGeoch, 1942; Wixted, 2004). It is now important that the
temporal gradient be evaluated in reconsolidation studies in order to ascertain whether a
similar retrieval-based explanation is applicable here too.
2.1.11 Criterion 9: Time-dependence of test
2.1.11.1 Description of criterion
One particularly intriguing finding that emerged from the consolidation literature was that
experimentally-induced amnesia tended not be apparent on short-term memory (STM) tests,
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but emerged later on long-term memory (LTM) tests (see subsubsection 1.2.7.6). In studies
using protein-synthesis inhibitors (PSIs), it was argued that this pattern was expected by a
dual-trace consolidation theory (McGaugh & Dawson, 1971). Because the PSI would have
no influence on the electrophysiological activity associated with the STM trace, but would
disrupt protein-synthesis necessary for the formation of the LTM trace, performance should
remain una ected after a short delay because the STM trace is intact. However, in studies
using electroconvulsive shock (ECS), which does disrupt the STM trace, the same pattern
was observed (e.g., Geller & Jarvik, 1968b; McGaugh & Landfield, 1970; R. R. Miller &
Springer, 1971). It is not clear how consolidation theory, and by extension reconsolidation
theory, can account for this finding (see subsubsection 1.2.7.6). Nevertheless, reconsolidation
investigations in non-human animals have predominantly relied on PSIs as their choice of
intervention (Besnard et al., 2012; Tronson & Taylor, 2007) and the finding of intact STM,
but impaired LTM, is often taken as compelling evidence that a reconsolidation process has
been disrupted (e.g., Nader et al., 2000a). The extent to which this pattern will generalise to
studies using behavioural interventions is unclear.
Typical practice is to conduct an STM test shortly after termination of the intervention,
and conduct an LTM test after a 24h interval (Tronson & Taylor, 2007). As with C1 (see
subsection 2.1.3), the choice of a 24h interval is fairly arbitrary, but appears to meet most
generally accepted upper-bounds on the completion of cellular consolidation (R. R. Miller &
Springer, 1973).
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C9Y) if they examined performance on both
an STM-test (R+I+TSTM) and an LTM test (i.e., a standard R+I+ group) and found that
performance was unaltered on the former, but modified on the latter. If the two conditions
were compared, but showed no di erence, then the criterion is not met (C9N). If the two
conditions are not included then the criterion cannot be assessed (C9?).
CRITERION 9: Time-dependence of test
It is necessary to demonstrate that performance is una ected shortly after the
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intervention, but modified on a delayed (24h) test.
2.1.11.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C9), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 5 out of 168 cases met the criterion (3%) and
7 cases did not (4%). 92 cases did not assess the criterion (55%) and for 0 cases (0%) it
was unclear if it had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5). For 64 cases (38%) the
criterion was no longer applicable because a reconsolidation e ect was not observed in the
main experimental groups (C3, C4, C5, C6, C7).
Very few studies have examined this criterion. In studies that have examined and met it, the
di erential STM-LTM pattern is considered a hallmark of a reconsolidation e ect (Hupbach
et al., 2007; Schiller & Phelps, 2011; Walker et al., 2003). However, it is not logically clear
whether una ected STM should be expected when behavioural interventions are used because
they could cause short-term interference e ects that are unrelated to reconsolidation. Further
theory development is needed to define exactly how behavioural interventions are thought to
interact with the reconsolidation process.
2.1.12 Criterion 10: Absence of Recovery
2.1.12.1 Description of criterion
As outlined in Chapter 1, evidence from studies using recovery protocols (reinstatement,
renewal, spontaneous recovery) indicates that behavioural interventions, such as extinction,
do not result in the overwriting of existing memory traces (e.g., see subsection 1.2.3; Bou-
ton, 2002). Furthermore, recovery from experimentally-induced amnesia can be observed
even when more potent post-acquisition interventions are employed (e.g., PSIs, ECS, see
subsubsection 1.2.7.8; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; Riccio & Richardson, 1984). Recovery
e ects appear to be inconsistent with the prediction that disruption of consolidation will
lead to irreversible impairment of the target trace. However, some researchers have defended
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consolidation theory by arguing that recovery e ects indicate that trace stabilisation was
only partly disrupted, leaving a partial, recoverable trace (see paragraph 1.2.7.8.2; Cherkin,
1972; Gold & King, 1974; Squire, 2006). Nonetheless, observing recovery on a subsequent test
makes any previous claim about trace modification seem less compelling. Arguably, recovery
e ects would be even more damaging for the theory that memory traces can be updated or
overwritten via new information learned during the reconsolidation window, because this
claim seems to imply complete destruction of the ‘old’ information (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia,
2013; J. L. Lee, 2009; Schiller et al., 2010).
Cases are deemed to have met this criterion (C10Y) if they examine performance in a recovery
protocol (e.g., reinstatement, renewal, or spontaneous recovery) and find that the modification
e ect observed during the first test stage has persisted. If a recovery protocol is used, and
recovery is observed, then the criterion not met (C1N). If a recovery protocol is not used
then the criterion cannot be assessed (C10?).
CRITERION 10: Absence of recovery
It is necessary to demonstrate that any modification e ect persists, and there
is no recovery of trace-dependent performance.
2.1.12.2 Evaluation of literature
Detailed case-by-case coding for this criterion can be found in Table 2.5 (column C10), and
summary data are presented in Figure 2.2. 5 out of 168 cases met the criterion (3%) and 15
cases did not (9%). 97 cases did not assess it (58%) and for 1 case (1%) it was unclear if the
criterion had been met or not (see notes in Table 2.5). For 50 cases (30%) the criterion was no
longer applicable because a reconsolidation e ect was not observed in the main experimental
groups (C3, C4, C5, C6, C7).
Very few studies have examined whether observed modification e ects can be recovered using
one or more recovery protocols. For the studies that have employed a recovery protocol, the
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Figure 2.3: Proportion of cases using di erent types of paradigm in human reconsolidation
studies. Cases refers to individual experimental conditions in which a reconsolidation e ect
is expected to occur, see Table 2.5.
majority (75%) observed recovery e ects. Although there are relatively few cases to consider,
the findings mirror a number of similar demonstrations of recovery following more potent
interventions in non-human animal research on reconsolidation (e.g., Anokhin & Tiunova,
2002; Eisenberg & Dudai, 2004; Gisquet-Verrier et al., 2015; Lattal & Abel, 2004; Trent,
Barnes, Hall, & Thomas, 2015). The implication of these findings is discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter (see section 2.3).
2.1.13 General characteristics of the field
In this section we will outline some general characteristics of the field that emerge from
the data gathered during the systematic review. The prevalence of di erent paradigms and
intervention types is shown in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 respectively. Further details are
provided in the in-depth review of selected studies later in this chapter (section 2.2). Below
we briefly discuss di erent types of reminder (subsubsection 2.1.13.1), distribution of sample
sizes (subsubsection 2.1.13.2), and types of reconsolidation e ect (subsubsection 2.1.13.3).
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Figure 2.4: Proportion of cases using various types of behavioural interventions in human
reconsolidation studies. Cases refers to individual experimental conditions in which a
reconsolidation e ect is expected to occur, see Table 2.5.
2.1.13.1 Reminder types
The nature of the Reminder Stage varies considerably between studies and we have broadly
classified them into four types for the purposes of this review (see Figure 2.5).
Specific reminders refer to those in which the learning material from the Training Stage
is either re-presented to the participant (Specific-passive reminder; S-P) or retrieved by
them (Specific-active reminder; S-A). For example, during the Reminder Stage of Walker
et al. (2003), participants re-performed a motor sequence task that they had learned the
previous day (S-A reminder). By contrast, during the Reminder Stage of St. Jacques and
Schacter (2013), participants were shown photographs taken during a museum tour they had
experienced the previous day (S-P reminder).
General reminders do not refer to the specific learning material, but involve retrieval cues
related to the broader contextual features of the original learning episode. In some cases,
this can simply involve the participant receiving the Intervention Stage in the same physical
context as the Training Stage (a General-passive reminder, e.g., Hupbach et al., 2008; B.
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J. Jones et al., 2015). Similarly, in a study by Diekelmann et al. (2011), participants were
re-exposed to an odour that had also been presented during the Training Stage, but was
irrelevant to the learning task. In other cases, researchers have asked participants to think
about general aspects of the learning task (e.g., ‘Do you remember what we did yesterday?’),
whilst instructing them not to recall the learning material itself (a General-active reminder,
e.g., Hupbach et al., 2007).
The precise construction of the reminder is currently the subject of contention in the field
(Forcato et al., 2009; Hupbach, 2015; Potts & Shanks, 2012). Many researchers have used S-A
reminders because they have many practical advantages (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Hardwicke et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2003). Firstly, they indicate that the material learned
on Day 1 was successfully encoded, and can now be successfully retrieved. Secondly, they
provide an important manipulation check as they indicate which item representations were
successfully reactivated, and thus presumably underwent reconsolidation (Chapter 4, J. C. K.
Chan & LaPaglia, 2013). This means that a baseline level of trace-dependent performance
can be established immediately prior to delivery of the intervention (see subsection 2.1.5).
However, some have proposed that the use of an S-A reminder is problematic because it
involves testing participants’ recall (J. C. K. Chan, 2009; Hupbach, 2015). As retrieval
practice is known to aid subsequent recall (the “testing e ect”, Roediger & Butler, 2011), it
could be that S-A reminders ‘mask’ other modification e ects that would be attributable to
reconsolidation (J. C. K. Chan, 2009; Hupbach, 2015). W. C. Gordon (1983) expressed a
similar idea when discussing the design of early investigations into cue-dependent amnesia.
He suggested that the cueing treatment should be designed in such a way as to allow for
successful memory retrieval, but without providing an opportunity for additional learning.
One counter-argument to this is that even following an S-A reminder, the trace presumably
still needs to re-stabilise. Therefore, the deployment of an e ective intervention should
still disrupt the reconsolidation process, even if the S-A reminder led to additional learning.
Resolution of this debate will require a more precise specification of the mechanisms that
are thought to trigger destabilisation of the trace and the process by which new learning
interacts with the reconsolidation process. The idea that ‘prediction error’ is a key feature of
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of cases using various types of reminder in human reconsolidation
studies. S-A = Specific-active. S-P = Specific-passive. G-P = General-active. G-A =
General-active. Cases refers to individual experimental conditions in which a reconsolidation
e ect is expected to occur, see Table 2.5.
a successful reminder intervention is discussed in section 2.3.
2.1.13.2 Sample sizes
The sample size of each critical R+I+ group was recorded and a histogram of these data is
shown in Figure 2.6. Clearly there is a large skew towards the lower-end of the scale, with a
large number of cases employing samples between 10-15 participants. Sample sizes ranged
from 6 to 107 participants (median = 14). Small sample sizes are problematic because study
outcomes are more susceptible to the influence of random variation. Consequently, small
sample sizes produce less reliable estimates of the e ect size (Lakens & Evers, 2014), have less
chance of detecting true e ects when they exist (J. Cohen, 1992), and increase the likelihood
of false discoveries (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2005).
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of sample sizes used in human reconsolidation studies employing
behavioural interventions (bin width = 5).
2.1.13.3 Memory e ects
Figure 2.7 shows the four types of e ects that have been claimed in the reviewed cases.
Destructive-updating e ects (see Nader, 2003a) refer to those in which it is suggested that
the intervention has disrupted the reconsolidation process and caused impairment to, or
overwriting of, the restabilising trace (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Forcato et al.,
2007; Schiller et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2003; Wichert et al., 2011). Conversely, constructive-
updating e ects refer to those in which new information learned during reconsolidation is
‘incorporated into’ the restabilising trace, without necessarily causing destructive loss of
information (e.g., Hupbach et al., 2007; B. J. Jones et al., 2015; St Jacques & Schacter, 2013).
Strengthening e ects refer to the idea that an existing memory trace (see Sara, 2000b) can
be ‘strengthened’ if reconsolidation is allowed to proceed unperturbed (e.g., Forcato et al.,
2011), or enhanced via a stressful intervention (Finn & Roediger, 2011). These ideas are
explored in more detail in section 2.2. Finally, in many cases, the researchers did not observe
a reconsolidation e ect.
For a literature that is generally interpreted as demonstrating strong support for reconsolida-
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Figure 2.7: Proportion of cases claiming di erent types of e ect in human reconsolidation
studies. Cases refers to individual experimental conditions in which a reconsolidation e ect
is expected to occur, see Table 2.5.
tion theory (Agren, 2014; Besnard et al., 2012; Hardt et al., 2010; Schiller & Phelps, 2011;
Schwabe et al., 2014), there are a surprisingly large number of cases in which a reconsolidation
e ect was not observed. Note that all cases refer to a R+I+ condition in which one might a
priori anticipate a reconsolidation e ect according to the core tenets of the theory. However,
most studies, which can include several cases, tend to report at least one case that is found to
elicit a reconsolidation e ect. For example, one study reported evidence for reconsolidation
when neutral-valence learning stimuli were used, but not when negative-valence or positive-
valence stimuli were used (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). Similarly, Walker et al. (2003) reported a
reconsolidation e ect in a motor-sequence learning task for the ‘accuracy’ dependent measure,
but not for ‘speed’. It is less common to fail to obtain reconsolidation e ects outright, but
there are several examples (e.g., Golkar et al., 2012; Hardwicke et al., 2016; Kindt & Soeter,
2013; Pashler et al., 2013; Potts & Shanks, 2012).
2.1.14 Interim summary
This systematic review of human reconsolidation investigations using behavioural interventions
has revealed that few cases meet important criteria necessary for a robust and compelling
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Figure 2.8: Proportion of cases claiming a reconsolidation e ect that meet reconsolidation
criteria (see Table 2.2). Cases refers to individual experimental conditions in which a
reconsolidation e ect is expected to occur, see Table 2.5.
demonstration of a reconsolidation e ect (see Figure 2.2). In fact, out of 168 reviewed cases,
most only meet three criteria or fewer (82%), and no case meets more than six criteria (see
Figure 2.8). Even if one considers broad research programmes in which multiple studies have
been conducted using essentially the same core paradigm, the number of criteria met overall
does not exceed 6 and is typically lower (Figure 2.9). Therefore, there has arguably not been
a single compelling demonstrating of memory reconsolidation using a behavioural intervention
in human participants. In section 2.2, we provide a more in-depth examination of several key
studies that are often taken to provide compelling demonstrations of reconsolidation-mediated
updating.
2.2 Selective case study review
This section will provide an in-depth, selective review of key case studies in the human
reconsolidation literature in order to demonstrate application of the reconsolidation criteria
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Figure 2.9: Number of reconsolidation criteria met by di erent research programmes.
in specific cases. These case studies have been selected because they are generally regarded as
providing compelling demonstrations of reconsolidation in major review articles (e.g., Agren,
2014; Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schiller & Phelps, 2011; Schwabe et al., 2014) and illustrate how
qualitative outcomes can vary quite substantially between studies (e.g., constructive updating
and destructive updating). Firstly, we examine the claim that post-retrieval learning of a
new list of objects can lead to reconsolidation-mediated constructive updating of the trace
representing a previously learned list of objects (subsection 2.2.1, Hupbach et al., 2007).
Secondly, we examine evidence that non-specific behavioural interference (playing Tetris)
can disrupt the reconsolidation of traces representing experimentally-induced traumatic
memory (subsection 2.2.2, James et al., 2015). Finally, we will turn to studies proposing
that conducting extinction trials within the reconsolidation window can lead to destructive
updating of ‘fear-memory’ in a conditioning paradigm (subsection 2.2.3, Agren et al., 2012;
Björkstrand et al., 2015; Schiller et al., 2010). Discussion of two further cases (J. C. K. Chan
& LaPaglia, 2013; Walker et al., 2003) is deferred to Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Code for
any re-analyses is available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/m9und/).
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2.2.1 Constructive-updating in list learning studies
In a series of studies, Hupbach and colleagues (Hupbach et al., 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011)
investigated whether memory traces supporting declarative recall of object ‘lists’ could be
updated in a reconsolidation paradigm. The general procedure (see Hupbach et al., 2007)
was as follows: on Day 1, participants completed a Training Stage in which they were
asked to memorise 20 assorted objects (List 1; e.g., balloon, calculator, sock etc.) presented
sequentially by an experimenter and placed into a blue basket. After all of the objects had
been shown and taken out of sight, the participant was asked to recall as many of them as
possible. This was repeated until the participant could recall at least 17 out of 20 objects or 4
learning cycles had been completed14. 48h later on Day 2, participants completed a Reminder
Stage in which they were taken to the same room as used on Day 1 by the same experimenter,
shown the empty blue basket and asked “Do you remember this basket and what we did
with it?” Participants were encouraged to describe the general learning procedure but not to
mention specific objects. This was intended to be a ‘subtle reminder’ that reactivated the
memory trace representing Day 1 information. Following the Reminder Stage participants
completed an Intervention Stage in which they were asked to memorise 20 unrelated objects
(List 2) placed simultaneously on a table in front of them for 30s (the learning procedure was
intentionally di erent to Day 1 in order to reduce the likelihood that it would itself act as a
reminder). The objects were then removed and the participant asked to recall as many of
them as possible. As with Day 1 learning, this process was repeated until the participant
could recall at least 17 out of 20 objects or 4 learning cycles had been completed. 48h later
on Day 3, all participants completed a Test Stage in which they were asked to recall as
many objects as possible from List 1. They were given four opportunities to do this and the
14Participants who did not reach the criterion were given a learning cycles score of 5 and the mean number
of trials taken to reach this criterion is reported. However, the actual performance levels and number of
participants who did not reach the criterion are not reported. This is important because di erences in baseline
performance are likely to influence performance on the final test, potentially obscuring the true impact of the
independent variables (see subsection 2.1.5).
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researchers reported the mean number of List 1 objects recalled15 and the mean number of
List 2 objects recalled (i.e., intrusions).
In ExperimentHN07 1, there were three groups: a Reminder and Intervention Group who
followed the above procedure (R+I+, n = 12), a No-Reminder Group who did not complete
the Reminder Stage and completed the Intervention Stage in a di erent room with a di erent
experimenter (R-I+, n = 12), and a No-Reminder, No-Intervention Group who skipped the
Reminder Stage and Intervention Stage entirely (R-I-, n = 12). In ExperimentHN07 2, a
Reminder and Intervention STM-Test Group (R+I+TSTM, n = 12), No-Reminder STM-Test
Group (R-I+TSTM, n = 12), and No-Reminder, No-Intervention STM-Test Group (R-I-TSTM,
n = 12) completed the Test Stage immediately after the Intervention Stage on Day 2. Finally,
in ExperimentHN07 3, an additional Reminder and Intervention Group (R+I+T-L2, n = 12)
and No-Reminder Group (R-I+T-L2, n = 12) were asked to recall List 2 rather than List 1
objects.
The findings were as follows. In ExperimentHN07 1, the number of List 1 objects recalled
during the Test Stage did not di er significantly across the R+I+, R-I+, and R-I- groups
suggesting that the post-retrieval new learning of List 2 had not disrupted reconsolidation
of the memory trace representing List 116. However, the number of intrusions from List 2
was significantly larger in the R+I+ group (C2Y; C3+) compared to the R-I+ (C4Y) and R-I-
groups (C5Y; there was no R+I- group: C6?). This led the researchers to conclude that “the
reminder did reactivate memory of the original list, returning it to a state in which new
information could be incorporated” (Hupbach et al., 2007, p. 49).
In ExperimentHN07 2, the number of List 1 objects recalled on the STM-Test was substantially
15The rationale for reporting the mean across four trials is unclear and it may underestimate participants’
knowledge by diluting higher performance trials with lower performance trials. Indeed, a significant linear
trend is reported indicating that recall improved across trials. As amnesia is a key prediction of reconsolidation
theory it would arguably be more useful to report the maximum number of List 1 objects recalled because
this would provide a more sensitive estimate of participants’ knowledge.
16It should be noted that, numerically, List 1 recall was substantially (~8.7-13.2%) lower in the R+I+ group
relative to the R-I+ and R-I- groups. It is possible that the experiment was not su ciently powered to detect
a true impairment e ect.
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lower in the groups receiving the intervention (R+I+TSTM, R-I+TSTM) compared to the group
that did not (R-I-TSTM). However, the e ect was not dependent on the reminder, as there
was no significant di erence between the R+I+TSTM and R-I+TSTM groups (i.e., there appears
to have been a retroactive interference e ect, but it was not attributable to reconsolidation).
In contrast to the Day 3 test in ExperimentHN07 1, the number of intrusions from List 2 was
practically non-existent across all STM-Test groups (C9Y). Finally, in ExperimentHN07 3
when participants were asked to recall objects from List 2, there was no di erence between the
R+I+T-L2 and R-I+T-L2 groups in the number of List 2 objects or List 1 objects (intrusions)
recalled. The time-dependence of the intervention (C8?) and absence of recovery (C10?)
criteria were not evaluated in this study.
In Hupbach et al. (2008), the researchers ran a series of additional R+I+ groups (as in
ExperimentHN07 1; n = 12 per group) in which they manipulated aspects of the Reminder
Stage. Elevated intrusions were only observed when participants completed Day 2 in the
same context as training, and was absent when participants completed Day 2 in a novel
context, but met with the same experimenter and/or received the ‘subtle reminder’ question
(ExperimentsHN08 1 and 2). Intriguingly, the e ect was also absent when participants briefly
entered the training context for the Reminder Stage, but were taken to a novel context for
the Intervention Stage (ExperimentHN08 3). The researchers proposed that being returned
to the encoding context for the Intervention Stage was both necessary and su cient for
the reconsolidation-mediated updating to occur (for further discussion of such ‘boundary
conditions’ see section 2.3). Note that there were no No-Reminder17 or No-Intervention
17B. J. Jones et al. (2015) conducted a replication of this experiment in young adults (M age = 19.8 years,
SD = 2.8;) and older adults (age > 65 years; M and SD not provided) and employed Reminder (R+I+) and
No-Reminder (R-I+) Groups. As in Hupbach et al. (2007) and Hupbach et al. (2008) recall of Set 1 objects
did not vary substantially between R+I+ and R-I+ (for both age groups) and higher intrusion levels were
observed in R+I+ relative to R-I+ (for young adults). However, unexpectedly the intrusion pattern was
reversed in the older adults; intrusion levels in R+I+ were comparable to the young adult group, but lower
than in R-I+. B. J. Jones et al. (2015) also observed higher intrusions rates in the R+I+ group relative to
the R-I+ group in a sample of young rats performing an analogous task based on the Hupbach paradigm
(also see B. J. Jones, Bukoski, Nadel, & Fellous, 2012). But the reminder had no substantial influence on
intrusion levels in a group of older rats (B. J. Jones et al., 2015). The reasons for this pattern of results are
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groups (C4?, C5?, C6?) in this study and it is necessary to compare to the relevant control
groups in Hupbach et al. (2007). Additional criteria were also not implemented/assessed
(C8?, C9?, C10?).
Hupbach et al. (2009) followed a similar procedure to Hupbach et al. (2007) but used an
old/new recognition test and source memory test. During the Test Stage, the experimenter
read out the names of List 1, List 2, and novel ‘foil’ objects in a randomised order (60
objects in total), and the participant had to indicate whether each object was ‘old’ or ‘new’.
If they responded ‘old’, the experimenter asked whether the object had been presented
during the Training Stage (‘Monday’) or the Intervention Stage (‘Wednesday’). There was a
Reminder and Intervention Group (R+I+, n = 10) and a No-Reminder Group (R-I+, n =
10). Participants in both groups had comparable, almost perfect recognition performance
for both List 1 and List 2 objects (>91% ‘hits’), providing compelling evidence against any
form of destructive updating e ect. Participants in both the Reminder and No Reminder
Group were also equally good at attributing List 1 objects to their correct source (>87%
correct). However, participants in the Reminder group were more likely to attribute List
2 objects to List 1 relative to the No Reminder Group (C4Y), echoing the asymmetrical
intrusion e ect previously observed in a free-recall task (Hupbach et al., 2007). Note that
there was no No-Intervention group (C5?, C6?) in this study and it is necessary to compare
to the relevant control groups in Hupbach et al. (2007). Additional criteria were also not
implemented/assessed (C8?, C9?, C10?).
Hupbach et al. (2011) also followed a similar procedure to Hupbach et al. (2007) and
investigated the role of context familiarity in a sample of young children (~5 years old). The
familiarity of a context was defined as whether participants had encountered it (children’s
home) or not (previously unvisited room in daycare center) prior to the experiment. Firstly
(ExperimentHN11 1), the researchers replicated the previous finding (Hupbach et al., 2008)
that completing Day 2 stages in the same context as training (R+I+, n = 11) was su cient
to elevate intrusion rates relative to a No-Reminder Group who completed Day 2 in a
di erent spatial context (R-I+, n = 9; C4Y). In a second experiment (ExperimentHN11 2),
unclear (B. J. Jones et al., 2015) and will require further empirical investigation.
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intrusion e ects were relatively low when the Day 1 and Day 2 context was the same, but
pre-experimentally familiar (R+I+, n = 12). By contrast, elevated intrusions were observed
in a group who received a ‘three-component-reminder’ (R+I+, n = 12) consisting of a familiar
spatial context, the same experimenter as Day 1, and a ‘subtle reminder’ about the learning
procedure from Day 1 (see above, Hupbach et al., 2007). Therefore, it would seem that
the familiarity of the spatial context constrains whether the intrusion e ect will occur. In
addition, other ‘reminders’ (experimenter, subtle reminder), appear to become e ective in a
familiar context (cf. Hupbach et al., 2008).
Finally in ExperimentHN11 3, all participants received a three-component reminder (as in
ExperimentHN11 2) but one group of children were asked to recall List 1 objects immediately
after the Intervention Stage (R+I+TSTM, n = 8) and a second group were asked to recall List 2
objects on Day 3 (R+I+T-L2, n = 8). In comparison to the three-component reminder group
of ExperimentHN11 2, both of these groups had substantially lower intrusion rates, suggesting
the e ect was dependent on the time of testing (C9Y) and asymmetric (as in Hupbach et al.,
2007). Throughout this study (Hupbach et al., 2011) the ‘updating e ect’ was restricted to
di erences in intrusion levels: there was no impairment of List 1 recall. In addition, there
were no No-Intervention controls (C5?, C6?; it is necessary to compare to the relevant control
groups in Hupbach et al., 2007) and other criteria were not implemented/assessed (C8?,
C10?).
To summarise, in contrast to much of the non-human animal literature (e.g., Nader et al.,
2000a), and a prior study which employed a post-retrieval new learning intervention in human
participants (Walker et al., 2003), Hupbach and colleagues (Hupbach et al., 2007, 2008,
2009, 2011) did not observe a destructive updating e ect (cue-dependent amnesia): recall of
List 1 objects did not di er significantly across experimental groups18. This e ect is clearly
inconsistent with the predictions of reconsolidation theory as the new learning intervention
does not appear to have perturbed the restabilisation of the List 1 memory trace. Nevertheless,
the researchers did observe an intriguing asymmetric source-misattribution e ect: receiving
18Although as mentioned above, it could be that these studies were not su ciently powered to detect a
true impairment e ect.
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a List 1 reminder 48h after the Training Stage (C2Y), and immediately prior to learning
List 2 (C3+), led to an elevated number of intrusions/misattributions when participants
were subsequently asked to recall (Hupbach et al., 2007, 2011) List 1 objects, or identify the
source of List 2 Objects (Hupbach et al., 2009; also see Gershman et al., 2013), but hardly
any intrusions/misattributions occurred when participants were asked to recall or identify
the source of List 2 objects (R+I+ and R+I+T-L2 respectively). The e ect was contingent
on the reminder (R-I+; C4Y), and the intervention (R-I-; C5Y; although cross-experiment
comparisons are necessary). The absence of a R+I- group prevented a test of the critical
reminder-intervention interaction (C6?), but it seems highly unlikely that the intrusion e ect
could be driven solely by the reminder because production of List 2 items presumably relies on
having learned List 2. Consistent with the delayed onset of reconsolidation e ects observed in
previous studies (e.g., Nader et al., 2000a; Walker et al., 2003), the intrusion e ect was absent
on a test conducted shortly after the Intervention Stage but emerged 48h later (R+I+TSTM;
C9Y). The time-dependence of the intervention (C8?) and absence of recovery (C10?) criteria
were not evaluated in this series of studies.
Hupbach and colleagues have taken these findings to indicate that reconsolidation allows
for the “incorporation of new information into old memories” and suggest that “memory
‘traces’ are dynamic rather than static” (Hupbach et al., 2007, p. 52). More broadly, this
is a proposal that reconsolidation enables an updating process that is constructive (also
see St Jacques & Schacter, 2013) rather than destructive (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Walker et al., 2003; Schiller et al., 2010, see Figure 2.7). Although intuitively appealing,
the idea that new information can be ‘incorporated into a memory’ is poorly specified. The
explanation is trying to capture the phenomenon that an instruction to recall items that
belong to List 1 not only elicits responding with List 1 items, but also responding with
List 2 items. Colloquially, participants’ ‘memory’ for List 1 has been altered in the sense
that they now (appear to) think that List 2 items occurred on Day 1 when they learned
List 1. However, in terms of the stage analysis presented in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1), it
is participants’ ecphoric memory that contains a mixture of List 1 and List 2 items. It is
by no means inevitable that this ecphoric phenomenon relies on physical modification of
memory traces (see Figure 1.1). The observed e ect could simply involve the formation of
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associative links between the original trace and a trace representing the new information.
Alternatively, it could involve the formation of an entirely new memory trace representing
old and new information that co-exists with the original trace. The theoretical construct of
reconsolidation seems unnecessary in both scenarios.
More concretely, Sederberg, Gershman, Polyn, and Norman (2011; also see Gershman et al.,
2013) argued that the critical asymmetric intrusion e ect reported by Hupbach and colleagues
(Hupbach et al., 2007, 2009) could be explained without recourse to a reconsolidation
process via the established principles of contextual reinstatement and item–context binding
instantiated in the Temporal Context Model (TCM; see Figure 1.1, orange triangle). In TCM,
the temporal context is represented by a recency-weighted average of recently encountered
items. When an item is encoded, it is ‘bound’ to the current temporal context. Items can be
retrieved by cueing with a temporal context (e.g., ‘Recall Set 1 from Monday’). Successful
item retrieval also retrieves the temporal context associated with that item from encoding,
which in turn can facilitate the retrieval of other items associated with the same temporal
context.
The TCM can account for the Hupbach et al. (2007) finding as follows: during the Training
Stage (Day 1), in addition to learning list 1 objects, participants learn that those objects
are associated with various aspects of the external environment (e.g., mode of presentation,
experimenter, room) and the current temporal context (from herein ‘Context A’). In the
Reminder Stage (Day 2), memory traces representing Context A elements will be reactivated.
During the subsequent Intervention Stage, List 2 objects will become associated with the
various aspects of the external environment and current temporal context (Context B) in
addition to the reactivated Context A elements. Therefore, there is a critical asymmetry in
the Reminder Group: List 2 is associated with Context A and Context B, whereas List 1 is
only associated with Context A. Consequently, during the Day 3 Test Stage, cueing List 1
triggers recall of both List 1 objects and List 2 objects (i.e., intrusions) whereas cueing List 2
triggers only recall of List 2 objects. For participants in the No-Reminder Group, List 1 is
only associated with Context A and List 2 is only associated with Context B, so intrusions
are substantially lower.
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Recall that Hupbach et al. (2007) also observed unaltered performance in a R+I+TSTM
group indicating that the observed intrusion e ect was contingent on the time of test (C9+).
Sederberg et al. (2011) suggest that this can be attributed to participants use of a ‘recall-to-
reject’ strategy to discriminate between List 1 and List 2 items. In response to the List 1 cue,
the List 2 objects are successfully retrieved, but withheld (see Figure 1.1, conversion) because
the retrieved context for those items (Context B) matches the current context (Context B),
therefore indicating the object was seen ‘today’ (Day 2) and could not be a member of List 1
1 (Context A). Such a strategy would of course be invalid on the Day 3 Test because none of
the retrieved objects would match the current context (Context C, i.e., Day 3). In summary
therefore, although several key criteria of the reconsolidation theory appear to have been
met in this series of studies, alternative perspectives that favour retrieval-based mechanisms
are also plausible. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that there is no evidence of a
destructive updating e ect in any of these studies (List 1 recall is always intact), which is a
qualitatively di erent outcome to that of non-human studies of reconsolidation using invasive
interventions (Nader et al., 2000a), and many human studies that have used behavioural
interventions (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Walker et al., 2003; Schiller et al., 2010).
2.2.2 General behavioural interference (Tetris)
Whilst some studies have employed new learning as a form of intervention (Walker et al., 2003;
Hupbach et al., 2007), others have employed more general behavioural tasks, such as playing
the computer game Tetris (James et al., 2015). In contrast to the idea that new learning
might overwrite related content stored in existing traces (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Schiller et al., 2010), the approach adopted here appears to be more in line with Wixted’s
(2004) theory about behavioural tasks having non-specific disruptive e ects on consolidation
processes (see subsubsection 1.2.7.4). Specifically, James et al. (2015) were interested in the
potential of post-retrieval Tetris to disrupt the reconsolidation of memory traces representing
a traumatic event. Participants first viewed a short video depicting unpleasant scenes (e.g.,
car-pedestrian collision; Training Stage). 24h later on Day 2 (C1Y), participants completed a
Reminder Stage (C2Y) which involved viewing a series of stills from the video. After a short
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10m delay, they played Tetris for 12m (Intervention Stage). For the Test Stage, participants
were asked to keep a daily diary until Day 7 in which they recorded any incidence of ‘intrusive
memory’ (spontaneous recall) involving content from the video. Additionally, on the final
day (Day 7) participants also completed visual and verbal true/false recognition tests for the
video content.
In ExperimentJH 1, the incidence of intrusive memories across the Day 1 - Day 7 period was
significantly lower in a R+I+ group (n = 26) relative to a R-I- group (n = 26, C6Y), but the
manipulation had no impact on recognition test performance (C6N). The researchers suggest
that these findings provide tentative evidence for reconsolidation theory, proposing that
playing Tetris leads to competition for ‘working memory resources’, resulting in ‘cognitive
blockade’ of the reconsolidation process. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that additional
R+I- and R-I+ groups are required to ensure the observed e ect is not simply a result of the
reminder and/or intervention acting independently (C4?, C5?, C7?). The absence of an e ect
on the recognition test was given little attention even though it appears to contradict the
key predictions of reconsolidation theory (i.e., impairment or erasure of underlying memory
traces).
ExperimentJH 2 involved the same procedure as above, but with the inclusion of aforemen-
tioned additional control groups (n = 18 per group), thus enabling a fully crossed factorial
design. As in ExperimentJH 1, there was no di erence between groups on the recognition
memory test. Additionally, the incidence of intrusive memories was significantly lower in
the R+I+ group relative to the R-I- group (C6Y; see Figure 2.10). It was also significantly
lower than in the R+I- group (C5Y) and R-I+ groups (C4Y). However the statistical analysis
employed did not allow for a test of the critical reminder*intervention interaction (C7?).
Specifically, the researchers employed a one-way ANOVA with Experimental Condition as a
combined between-subjects factor, rather than a two-way factorial ANOVA with Reminder
(R+, R-) and Intervention (I+, I-) as separate between-subject factors.
Fortunately, because the study data has been made openly available (https://osf.io/izxv2/)
it is possible to run this alternative analysis and re-plot the individual participant scores
(see Figure 2.10). The ANOVA indicates no main e ect of Reminder, F(1,68) = 2.315, p
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Figure 2.10: Findings of James et al. (2015, ExperimentJH 2). Mean number of intrusive
memories reported in the daily diary as a function of reminder (R) and intervention (I)
condition. Black diamonds represent means, and error bars show ±SEM. Coloured circles
show individual participant scores (with horizontal jitter). Plotted using data from James et
al.
= .133, a significant main e ect of Intervention, F(1,68) = 7.746, p = .007, and critically,
no significant interaction between Reminder and Intervention, F(1,68) = 1.323, p = .254.
Therefore, contrary to the conclusions of James et al. (2015), the observed e ect appears to
be largely driven by the independent influence of the Intervention, rather than the interaction
of the Reminder and Intervention. Nevertheless, the absence of a significant interaction is
di cult to interpret within the NHST framework, and it could be that a more powerful
design is capable of detecting the target e ect. Together with the absence of an e ect on
the recognition test in either experiment, and the fact that additional criteria were not
assessed (C3?, C8?, C9?, C10?), the extant data obtained in this study plainly do not provide
compelling support for reconsolidation theory.
2.2.3 Extinction
As discussed in subsection 1.2.3 (also see Bouton & Moody, 2004), an extinction protocol can
successfully reduce responding to the CS in a conditioning paradigm, giving the impression
108
CHAPTER 2. RECONSOLIDATION LITERATURE REVIEW
that the previously acquired CS-US association has been ‘unlearned’ (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972). As a non-invasive procedure for mitigating the influence of potentially undesirable
memory associations, extinction (or ‘exposure therapy’) is commonly used to treat disorders
involving ‘maladaptive memory’, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), addiction,
or phobias (Bouton, 2014). However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that extinction
does not involve modification of existing memory traces. Conditioned responding can typically
be recovered via a number of reminder protocols (spontaneous recovery, contextual renewal,
reinstatement, see subsection 1.2.3, Bouton, 2002). Consequently, the utility of extinction in
clinical settings is partly undermined by the high likelihood of relapse (Bouton, 2014).
Researchers have recognised that the brief period of plasticity that is thought to occur during
reconsolidation may present an opportunity for weakening or even erasing undesirable memory
traces in various clinical circumstances (e.g., R. D. Lane et al., 2015; Pitman, 2011; Schwabe
et al., 2014). Seeking to capitalise on this, a number of studies have examined whether
performing extinction trials within the putative ‘reconsolidation window’ might be more
e ective at eliminating fear responses than standard extinction protocols (for review see
Auber, Tedesco, Jones, Monfils, & Chiamulera, 2013; Kredlow, Unger, & Otto, 2015). The
logic here is that reactivation of a memory trace opens a time-dependent window during
which that trace can be modified. Previous studies have estimated that the upper bound
for this window is 6h (i.e., the intervention becomes ine ective when delivered 6h after the
reminder, Nader et al., 2000a). Therefore, reconsolidation should be disrupted when the
intervention is delivered shortly after reactivation (e.g., 10m), but not when delivered after
6h.
One slightly unusual aspect of reconsolidation-extinction experiments is that they typically
use a non-reinforced presentation of the CS+ as a reminder, which is itself an extinction trial
(Monfils et al., 2009; Schiller et al., 2010). The di erence between a standard extinction
protocol and a reconsolidation-extinction protocol is that the reminder trial is temporally
isolated from the other trials. Typically, the isolated trial occurs 10m prior to the remaining
extinction trials (Monfils et al., 2009; Schiller et al., 2010), but the rationale for using this
interval is unclear. It is also unclear why the first trial of a standard extinction protocol
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should not also be considered su cient for the initiation of reconsolidation.
Nevertheless, an initial investigation of reconsolidation-extinction in rats concluded that:
“Our results are consistent with the idea that an adaptive purpose of reconsolidation is to
incorporate new information at the time of retrieval, and to update a memory. . . in the
present case leading to destabilization of the initial trace in the lateral amygdala, and the
re-encoding of the once fear-inducing CS as safe” (Monfils et al., 2009, p. 955). Building
on these findings, Schiller et al. (2010) sought to investigate reconsolidation-extinction in a
human fear-conditioning study. During the Training Stage (ExperimentSP 1), participants
were shown two coloured squares. One square (CS+) was paired with a mild wrist shock (US)
on 38% of trials (i.e., a partial reinforcement schedule). The other square was never paired
with the shock (CS-). The purpose of the CS- is to control for non-associative e ects of the
US.
Skin conductance response (SCR) was measured as an index of learning (heightened SCR
is typically associated with a fear response). Approximately 24h later on Day 2, some
participants received a single unreinforced presentation of the CS+ (Reminder Stage) prior to
ongoing ‘extinction’ trials in which both the CS+ and CS- were repeatedly presented without
the US (Intervention Stage). Note that the reminder itself was procedurally identical to the
subsequent extinction trials. The key manipulation was the time delay between the Reminder
Stage and the Intervention Stage. For one group, the delay was only 10m (R+I+, n = 20).
For a second group, the delay was 6h (R+ID, n = 23). For a third group, there was no
reminder (R-I+, n = 22). Approximately 24h later on Day 3, all participants completed a
further series of non-reinforced CS+ and CS- trials (‘re-extinction’) which also acted as a test
of trace-dependent performance (Test Stage).
Fear-conditioning during the Training Stage was successful, with elevated SCRs being observed
for the CS+ relative to the CS- in all groups. Similarly, extinction during the Intervention
Stage successfully reduced this di erential fear response in an equivalent manner across the
three groups. The key test of reconsolidation theory was whether di erential SCRs would
re-emerge in the initial trials of the Day 3 Test Stage (i.e., spontaneous recovery; Rescorla,
2004). Spontaneous recovery was expected for the R-I+ and R+ID groups as the memory
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trace representing the CS+ - US association should be intact. Conversely, no spontaneous
recovery was predicted for the R+I+ group because the CS+ - US association should have
been overwritten (Schiller et al., 2010).
The spontaneous recovery e ect was first examined with a two-way ANOVA with the between-
subjects factor of Reminder Condition (10m, 6h, no reminder) and the within-subjects factor
of re-extinction phase (early phase: trials 1-4; late phase: trials 5-8). The dependent variable
was di erential SCRs (CS+ minus CS-). A significant main e ect of Reminder Condition was
reported, as well as a significant Reminder*Phase interaction. However, follow-up t-tests
were applied to a di erent aspect of the data. Specifically, three pairwise comparisons were
conducted between the di erential SCRs on the last trial of extinction (Intervention Stage)
and the first trial of re-extinction (Test Stage). Significant increases were obtained for the
no reminder group and 6h-delay intervention group, but not for the 10m-delay intervention
group, leading the researchers to conclude that there was a spontaneous recovery e ect in
the former groups but not the latter. However, as the di erence between significant and not
significant is not necessarily itself statistically significant (Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2011), this conclusion requires a statistical comparison between those di erence scores.
In other words, it is not clear that the critical manipulations were actually e ective (C4U,
C5U, C7U, C8U). Other criteria were not implemented/assessed in this experiment (C3?, C6?,
C9?).
Ten to fourteen months after the Test Stage, a small subset19 of the original participants
(10m group, n = 8; 6h group, n = 4; no-reminder group, n = 7) returned for a reinstatement
procedure (Rescorla & Heth, 1975) in order to assess propensity for recovery. Participants
were given four unsignaled wrist shocks prior to a series of extinction trials (Recovery
Test). The researchers reported a ‘reinstatement index’ which in the main text is defined as
the “di erence in the conditioned fear response at the end of re-extinction after the initial
spontaneous recovery test and the conditioned fear response immediately after reinstatement
19Some additional participants who returned for the Recovery Test (n = 4) were later excluded because
they ‘failed to re-extinguish after the spontaneous recovery test’ or ‘showed no measurable responses to the
shocks during reinstatement’. Whether these exclusions had an appreciable influence on the outcome of the
main analysis is not reported.
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1 year later” (Schiller et al., 2010, p. 51). However, in the supplementary materials (p.3) it is
noted that “The first CS+ and CS- trial were disregarded due to the orienting response at
the beginning of the session”. Other researchers have pointed out that this approach may be
problematic because the first trial, being an extinction trial itself, will likely have attenuated
the fear response, potentially masking recovery e ects (Kindt & Soeter, 2013; Soeter & Kindt,
2011).
For analysis of recovery e ects, the researchers did conduct a statistical comparison of the
time-point di erences between groups (cf. above). A two-way ANOVA with a between-subjects
factor of Reminder Group (10m, 6h, no reminder), a within-subjects factor of stage (Test
Stage, Recovery Test), and di erential SCR score (CS+ minus CS-) as the dependent variable,
revealed no significant interaction (p = .07). Nevertheless, a one-tailed t-test suggested that
the reinstatement index (see above) was significantly larger in the 6h/no-reminder groups
combined compared to the 10m group (t = 1.75, p = .04920). Based only on marginally
significant di erences and small sample sizes, it seems reasonable to remain cautious about
the robustness of these e ects (C10U). Furthermore, using the reported t value it is possible
to calculate a Bayes Factor (“default” JZS prior, Cauchy distribution with scale r = .707,
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) in order to shed light on the evidentiary
support for the (directional) alternative hypothesis (H 1: 6h/no-reminder groups - 10m group
> 0) relative to the null hypothesis (H 0: 6h/no-reminder groups - 10m group = 0). The
Bayes Factor indicates only weak evidence in favour of H 1 relative to H 0 (BF 10 = 2.06).
In a second experiment (ExperimentSP 2), Schiller et al. (2010) employed a similar procedure
to ExperimentSP 1 (C1Y, C2Y) with some key modifications. Firstly, a within-subjects (rather
than between-subjects) reminder/no-reminder manipulation was employed (n = 18). During
the Training Stage, there were three square stimuli: two were associated with wrist shock on
38% of trials (CSa+ and CSb+) and one was never associated with shock (CS-). The Day 2
Reminder Stage consisted of a single presentation of CSa+ and CS-. CSb+ was not presented.
The Intervention Stage was conducted 10m later. The Final Test on Day 3 employed a
20Note that in the original article the p-value is reported as p < .05, but the precise value (p = .049) can
be recalculated from the t value.
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reinstatement protocol (see above).
In order to examine the recovery of fear, the researchers employed a two-way ANOVA with
CS-type (CSa+, CSb+ and CS-) and re-extinction phase (early phase: trials 1-4; late phase:
trials 5-8) as independent variables, and SCRs as the dependent variable. A significant
CS-type*phase interaction is reported, but as above, the follow-up t-tests were applied to a
di erent aspect of the data. Specifically, SCRs were compared between the last trial of the
Intervention Stage and the first extinction trial of the Test Stage (i.e., post-reinstatement).
A series of t tests indicated significant recovery only for CSb+ (i.e., the R-I+ condition), and
not for CSa+ or CS-. As outlined above, it is important to examine whether these e ects
are significantly di erent from each other in order to establish that the critical reminder
manipulation has been e ective. As the data are not publicly available, it is not possible
to assess whether this is the case or not (C4U, C5U, C6U C7U). Other criteria were not
implemented/assessed (C3?, C5?, C8?, C9?, C10?).
Similar issues are also apparent in other extinction studies that are interpreted as yielding
evidence favourable to reconsolidation theory (Agren et al., 2012; Björkstrand et al., 2015).
In Agren et al. (2012), following fear-conditioning on Day 1 (Training Stage), all participants
completed a Reminder Stage 24h later on Day 2 (C1Y). Subsequently, participants performed
extinction trials (Intervention Stage) either after a 10m delay (R+I+ group) or after a 6h delay
(R+ID; C2Y). On Day 3, all participants had a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan
but no behavioural measures were recorded. Finally, on Day 5, all participants completed a
reinstatement protocol. Return of fear (ROF) was operationalised as SCRs for the CS+ on
the first post-reinstatement trial of Day 5 minus CS+ SCRs on the final extinction trial of
Day 2. ROF scores are shown in Figure 2.11. Two one-sample t-tests were conducted on the
ROF scores for each group individually, and a statistically significant e ect was observed in
the 6h group, t(10) = 2.72, p = 0.02, but not in the 10m group, t(8) = 0.23, p = 0.82. The
researchers concluded that “extinction training initiated during reconsolidation abolishes fear
expression by erasing a memory trace in the amygdala” (Agren et al., 2012, p. 1552).
The analysis used to support this conclusion is problematic for two primary reasons. Firstly,
it does not account for the CS- which is supposed to act as a control for the non-associative
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Figure 2.11: Return of fear (skin-conductance response; see main text for precise operational-
isation) in Agren et al. (2012) and Bjorkstrand et al. (2015). Black diamonds represent
means, and error bars show ±SEM. Coloured circles show individual participant scores (with
horizontal jitter). Plotted using data from Agren et al. and Bjorkstrand et al. (see main text
for details).
e ects of the US. Secondly, it relies on a statistically significant e ect in one group (6h), but
not in the other (10m), without testing if they are significantly di erent from each other
(Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). Fortunately, a subset of the data from this
study was available (Agren, personal communication, March 7, 2016) and it was possible to
run an alternative analysis. A three-way mixed ANOVA with the factors Group (10m, 6h),
CS (plus, minus), and Stage (last trial of extinction, first trial post-reinstatement) revealed
no statistically significant main e ects or interactions (Table 2.3).
Furthermore, a Welch two-sample t-test comparing the CS+ only ROF scores (see above)
between the 6h and 10m groups also indicated no significant e ect, t(14.87) = -1.77, p = .097
(see Figure 2.11). A Bayes Factor (“default” JZS prior, Cauchy distribution with scale r =
.707, Rouder et al., 2009) can also be calculated to quantify the evidentiary support for the
alternative hypothesis (H 1: 10m group - 6h group ”= 0) relative to the null hypothesis (H 0:
10m group - 6h group = 0). The Bayes Factor indicates that the data do not adequately
di erentiate between H 1 and H 0 (i.e., the data are inconclusive, BF 10 = 1.14).
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Table 2.3: ANOVA table for return of fear re-analysis
based on Agren et al. (2012a).
Term F df1 df2 p ÷2G
Group 0.96 1 18 .339 .01
CS 2.16 1 18 .159 .03
Group ◊ CS 0.01 1 18 .930 .00
Group ◊ Stage 3.97 1 18 .062 .07
CS ◊ Stage 0.87 1 18 .364 .01
Group ◊ CS ◊ Stage 0.16 1 18 .694 .00
Group, 10m/6h reminder-intervention delay. CS
= plus/minus. Stage = last trial of Day 2 extinc-
tion/first trial of Day 5 post-reinstatement.
In an 18-month follow-up experiment, Björkstrand et al. (2015) were able to recall 19
out of the 22 original participants and conducted an additional ROF test. In this case,
recovery was examined in a 4-trial reacquisition session during which the CS+ was again
paired with the US. Mean SCRs across these four trials were compared between the CS+
and the CS- independently within each group (10m, 6h). A significant e ect (reacquisition)
was reported in the 6h group, t(9) = 2.08, p = .034, but not in the 10m group, t(8) =
0.95, p = .185 (one-tailed tests). In addition, ROF scores were calculated (see Figure 2.11),
operationalised as CS+ SCRs on the last trial of extinction on Day 2 relative to mean SCRs
over 4 trials of reacquisition 18-month later (in contrast to Agren et al., where only the
first post-reinstatement trial was used). Analysis of this ROF score did involve a statistical
comparison of the di erence scores (cf. Agren et al.), and indicated a marginally significant
e ect, t(17) = 1.72; p = .052 (one-tailed). The conclusion was that “disrupting reconsolidation
have (sic) long lasting behavioral e ects and may permanently erase the fear component
of an amygdala-dependent memory” (Björkstrand et al., 2015, p. 1). However, as was the
case for Agren et al., an alternative analysis of the data does not appear to support this
conclusion.
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Table 2.4: ANOVA table for reacquisition re-
analysis based on Bjorkstrand et al. (2015).
Term F df1 df2 p ÷2G
Group 2.50 1 17 .132 .07
CS 5.19 1 17 .036 .12
Group ◊ CS 1.55 1 17 .230 .04
Group, 10m/6h reminder-intervention delay.
CS = plus/minus.
Firstly, the reacquisition analysis does not involve a statistical comparison between the two
groups (10m, 6h) which is problematic for the reasons outlined above. A re-analysis of
the data (which is publicly available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.v1d06/) using
a two-way mixed ANOVA with Group (10m, 6h) as a between-subjects factor, and CS
(plus, minus) as a within-subjects factor, indicates only a significant main e ect of CS (see
Table 2.4). The absence of a group by CS-type interaction undermines the claim that there
was reacquisition in the 6h group but not in the 10m group (Björkstrand et al., 2015).
Moreover, the ROF analysis is problematic firstly because it does not include the CS-.
Unfortunately, insu cient information is included in the available datasets to conduct a
re-analysis including the CS-. The second problem pertains to the evidential value of the
data, which were only marginally significant. A Bayes Factor (“default” JZS prior, Cauchy
distribution with scale r = .707, Rouder et al., 2009) quantifying the evidentiary support for
the (directional, to correspond to the use of a one-tailed t-test) alternative hypothesis (H 1:
10m group - 6h group < 0) relative to the null hypothesis (H 0: 10m group - 6h group = 0).
The Bayes Factor indicates that the data do not adequately di erentiate between H 1 and H 0
(BF 10 = 1.08).
In summary, the findings of Schiller et al. (2010), Agren et al. (2012), and Björkstrand et
al. (2015) appear to be numerically consistent with several key aspects of reconsolidation
theory, but the robustness of the e ects is uncertain, and Bayesian analysis indicates that the
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evidentiary value is extremely weak21. A number of subsequent studies have attempted to
replicate the findings with varying degrees of success. Whilst some researchers have reported
successful reconsolidation-extinction e ects (D. C. Johnson & Casey, 2015; Oyarzún et al.,
2012; Schiller, Kanen, LeDoux, Monfils, & Phelps, 2013; Steinfurth et al., 2014; Y. X. Xue et
al., 2012), others have found the critical retrieval manipulation to be ine ective (Fricchione
et al., 2016; Golkar et al., 2012; Kindt & Soeter, 2013; Klucken et al., 2016; Meir Drexler
et al., 2014; Soeter & Kindt, 2011; Warren et al., 2014). Attempts to replicate the original
demonstration of reconsolidation-extinction in rats (Monfils et al., 2009) have also resulted in
mixed outcomes (cf. Baker, McNally, & Richardson, 2013; W. Y. M. Chan, Leung, Westbrook,
& McNally, 2010; Costanzi, Cannas, Saraulli, Rossi-Arnaud, & Cestari, 2011; Ishii et al.,
2015; Jones, Ringuet, & Monfils, 2013). Because a number of parameters vary between these
replications, it can be di cult to ascertain whether a putative reconsolidation process is being
modulated by subtle theoretically-irrelevant procedural di erences, or theoretically-relevant
‘boundary conditions’ (Auber et al., 2013; Haaker et al., 2014). These mixed findings could
also indicate that extinction, and more generally new learning, is not capable of disrupting
reconsolidation processes. It could also be the case that there is no reconsolidation process
occurring at all.
2.3 Theoretical quagmire
2.3.1 Stuck in the mud: Boundary conditions and theoretical progress
Since its (re)birth a decade and a half ago (Nader et al., 2000a; Przybyslawski & Sara,
1997; Sara, 2000a), the theory of reconsolidation has been buoyed by considerable empirical
attention and theoretical excitement (Alberini, 2011; Besnard et al., 2012; Dudai, 2004;
Nadel & Land, 2000; Nader et al., 2000b; Nader & Hardt, 2009; Nader, 2015; Schwabe et al.,
21Note that Agren et al. and Bjorkstrand et al. also reported correlations between blood oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) activity in the amygdala and the behavioural return of fear measure. However, we have
focused on whether there is a behavioural e ect consistent with reconsolidation theory. It is unclear how much
can be inferred from brain imaging when the behavioural data indicates no e ect of the critical manipulation
(Henson, 2005; Wilkinson & Halligan, 2004).
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2014; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). Conjecture that reconsolidation may be a memory updating
mechanism furnishing traces with a capacity for both persistence and plasticity is widespread
(e.g., Dudai, 2009; Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015; Hardt et al., 2010; J. L. Lee, 2009; Sara,
2000b). However, in many respects the present reconsolidation literature is recapitulating
the same issues that dogged its forebear, consolidation, during the previous century (R. R.
Miller & Matzel, 2000, 2006; Millin, Moody, & Riccio, 2001; Riccio, Moody, & Millin, 2002;
Riccio et al., 2006; Sara & Hars, 2006).
The assumption that the stabilisation of a newly acquired trace renders it relatively immune
to subsequent interference attempts (see Figure 1.10) was challenged decades ago by studies
showing that a retrieval cue could restore vulnerability to various pharmacological and
electroconvulsive interventions (see paragraph 1.2.7.8.3; e.g., Lewis et al., 1972; Misanin
et al., 1968; Richardson et al., 1982). However, rather than attempting to reconcile these
findings within the prevailing zeitgeist (cf. Nader et al., 2000a), many early theorists viewed
these cue-dependent amnesia (CDA) e ects as just one of a number of sharp thorns in
the side of consolidation theory (Lewis & Maher, 1965; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973;
Riccio & Richardson, 1984; Spear, 1973). Perhaps the most problematic prediction of
consolidation theory was that experimentally-induced amnesia would be permanent (because
the underlying impairment was storage-based). Contrary to this notion, a considerable
number of investigations reported that amnesia e ects were only transient (suggesting the
impairment was retrieval-based, R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; Sara & Hars, 2006). Similarly,
several early CDA studies also found that trace-dependent performance could at least partially
recover, either spontaneously or via a reinstatement protocol (e.g., Bregman et al., 1976;
Judge & Quartermain, 1982; Mactutus et al., 1982).
Many contemporary investigations of CDA/reconsolidation also report that amnesia e ects
are transient (e.g., Anokhin & Tiunova, 2002; Eisenberg & Dudai, 2004; Gisquet-Verrier et al.,
2015; Lattal & Abel, 2004; Trent et al., 2015). This is highly problematic for a theory which
suggests that amnesic agents act to disrupt restabilisation of memory traces, rendering them
irreversibly impaired or even erased (Nader, 2003a; Nader & Hardt, 2009). Nevertheless, as
was the case with consolidation (see subsubsection 1.2.7.8), investigation of recovery e ects has
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yielded a disconcerting quantity of conflicting evidence. Several studies report that amnesia
e ects in reconsolidation studies are lasting, despite attempts at reinstatement (e.g., Boccia,
Blake, Acosta, & Baratti, 2005; Debiec et al., 2002; Duvarci & Nader, 2004). In contrast,
several studies have not been able to obtain cue-dependent amnesia e ects at all (Biedenkapp
& Rudy, 2004; Blaiss & Janak, 2007; Cammarota, Bevilaqua, Medina, & Izquierdo, 2004;
Font & Cunningham, 2012; Taubenfeld, Milekic, & Monti, 2001), emulating earlier replication
di culties (see paragraph 1.2.7.8.3, Banker et al., 1969; Dawson & McGaugh, 1969; Gold &
King, 1972; Jamieson & Albert, 1970; Squire et al., 1976).
The outcomes of our systematic review (section 2.1) and selective review (section 2.2) also
reveal that there is a considerable quantity of evidence inconsistent with the theory, and
inconsistent with other evidence. Many studies include multiple cases, some of which appear
to yield reconsolidation e ects, and some of which do not (see Figure 2.7). Furthermore, many
prominent findings have proved di cult to obtain in subsequent replication attempts (e.g.,
cf. Hardwicke et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2003; and cf. Kindt & Soeter, 2013; Schiller et al.,
2010). The typical strategy used to accommodate situations such as these is to propose that
a ‘boundary condition’ of the theory has been identified (e.g., J. L. Lee, 2009; Nader & Hardt,
2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007; Walker & Stickgold, 2016). Proposed boundary conditions
include length of reactivation (Eisenberg et al., 2003), prediction error (Exton-McGuinness et
al., 2015), trace strength (Suzuki, 2004), reminder context (Hupbach et al., 2008), participant
age (St Jacques et al., 2015), session time (Walker & Stickgold, 2016), valence of learning
materials (Schwabe & Wolf, 2010), valence of intervention (Strange et al., 2010), sleep/wake
state (Diekelmann et al., 2011), and memory age (Coccoz et al., 2013). Unfortunately, many
of the boundary conditions are themselves based on conflicting evidence. For instance, it has
been proposed that exposure to the training context is both su cient and necessary to trigger
reconsolidation (Hupbach et al., 2008; also see DeVietti & Holliday, 1972), but other studies
indicate that it is neither necessary (Kroes et al., 2014), nor su cient (Forcato et al., 2009).
It has also been proposed that older memory traces do not undergo reconsolidation, leading
some theorists to suggest that cue-dependent amnesia e ects actually represent disruption
of a lingering consolidation process (Alberini, 2011; Dudai & Eisenberg, 2004). In apparent
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support of this notion, a number of studies have reported reconsolidation e ects in ‘younger’,
but not ‘older’ memory traces. For instance, reconsolidation e ects have been observed with
training-reminder intervals at 1d but not 8d (Forcato et al., 2013), 6d but not 20d (Coccoz
et al., 2013), 2d and 7d, but not 14d or 28d (Milekic & Alberini, 2002), and 1d and 28d,
but not 7d (Wichert et al., 2011). However, other studies have observed reconsolidation
e ects for ‘older’ memory traces, with training-reminder intervals of 7d (Steinfurth et al.,
2014), 14d (Nader et al., 2000a), 30d (Einarsson & Nader, 2012), and 60d (DÍbiec & LeDoux,
2004). A boundary condition of memory age also seems incompatible with the notion that
reconsolidation routinely updates traces over their lifespan (J. L. Lee, 2009; Exton-McGuinness
et al., 2015).
An additional and much discussed candidate boundary condition is prediction error (Exton-
McGuinness et al., 2015; J. L. Lee, 2009). According to this idea, reconsolidation will only be
triggered when a prediction error signal occurs at the reminder stage. The idea is that trace
updating is only adaptive when some change in the environment necessitates a concomitant
change in the information content of the memory system (J. L. Lee, 2009). A number of
studies appear to indicate a role for prediction error because reconsolidation e ects are only
obtained when there is an apparent ‘mismatch’ between what the experimental subject should
expect, and what actually happens (Forcato et al., 2009; Pedreira et al., 2004; Morris et al.,
2006; Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2005; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2014). However, many non-human
animal studies have employed conditioning protocols in which a reinforced presentation of
the previously learned contingency (CS+ and US) is used to reactivate the underlying trace
at the Reminder Stage. Therefore, the expectations of the subject are fulfilled, and there is
presumably no prediction error. Nonetheless, these studies still report reconsolidation e ects
(Duvarci & Nader, 2004; Eisenberg & Dudai, 2004; Sangha et al., 2003). Similarly, several
apparent demonstrations of reconsolidation in humans involve specific-active or specific-
passive reminders (see Figure 2.5, and subsubsection 2.1.13.1) in which the participant is
tested on the knowledge they acquired during training (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Beukelaar et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2003; Wichert et al., 2011), or re-presented with aspects
of the learning material (e.g., James et al., 2015; St Jacques & Schacter, 2013; Wirkner et al.,
2015). It seems unlikely that these protocols involve prediction error.
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The numerous appeals to boundary conditions is indicative of a Lakatosian defense intended to
preserve the ‘core’ of the theory by adjusting its auxiliary assumptions in instances where its
predictions have not been met (Lakatos, 1978; Meehl, 1990a). Such a defense may be warranted
when a theory has a ‘good track record’, i.e., it can successfully account for a wide range of
other relevant phenomena. This is arguably the case for the consolidation/reconsolidation
framework as it o ers a reasonable explanation for the widespread evidence of temporally-
graded amnesia observed across multiple species and paradigms (see Chapter 1). Informally, it
may seem like “we are on to something” and it would certainly be rash to discard a successful
theory at the merest hint of falsification. The boundary condition defense therefore seems
like a rational strategy in principle.
The strategy can become problematic however, when it is only deployed in the context
of individual empirical reports, and its implications are not considered at the field level.
For instance, a new ad hoc theoretical assumption might appear to provide an adequate
explanation of a discrepancy between data and theory in the case of a non-replication (cf.
Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016; Walker & Stickgold, 2016). However, calibrating a theory to
a specific dataset on an ad hoc basis may only explain the idiosyncratic scenario under
scrutiny, whilst reducing the overall explanatory coverage of the theory at the field level
(i.e., ‘over-fitting’). Boundary conditions should not only be invoked in cases of theoretical
failure, but must also be applied to cases of theoretical success, otherwise they are not really
boundary conditions at all, but new ‘sub-theories’. In other words, boundary conditions
should not just be used to ‘explain away’ individual cases that are inconsistent with the
theory, but should be integrated with existing theoretical tenets, and applied to the existing
evidence base. The danger is that it is easy to ‘over-fit’ an explanation once the data
have been observed (Kerr, 1998; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, Maas, & Kievit, 2012).
Boundary conditions are only likely to be useful theoretical tools if they also accommodate
cases that have previously o ered support for the theory (i.e., the explanatory coverage of
the theory is maintained), and generate new predictions that can be verified empirically
(cf. Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016; Walker & Stickgold, 2016). The proliferation of unverified
boundary conditions that are incompatible with aspects of the extant data, and do not
generate precise testable predictions, has led to theoretical confusion rather than theoretical
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progress. From a Lakatosian perspective, the research programme is degenerating (Lakatos,
1978).
2.3.2 Recommendations to foster theoretical progress
How can reconsolidation extract itself from this theoretical quagmire? When one is stuck in
the mud, conventional wisdom suggests “Don’t panic!” (Adams, 1979). A number of other
strategies, based on the principles of open, cumulative, and collaborative science may also be
useful in our specific context.
2.3.2.1 Direct replication
Years of intensive empirical investigation (Figure 1.12) have yielded a disappointing bounty
of ambiguous and conflicting evidence and it has become extremely di cult to isolate the
conditions under which reconsolidation e ects will reliably emerge. A possible reason for this
is the absence of direct replication (Simons, 2014). In a direct replication (e.g., Hardwicke et
al., 2016), the idea is to repeat the methodology of a previous study as closely as possible.
The goal is to identify whether the previously reported e ect is reliable. This is important
because the findings of an individual study can be entirely spurious for a number of reasons:
“The undetected equipment failure, the rare and possibly random human errors of procedure,
observation, recording, computation, or report are known well enough to make scientists
wary of the unreplicated experiment. When we add the possibility of the random ‘fluke’
common to all sciences, the fact of individual organismic di erences, and the possibility
of systematic experimenter e ects, the importance of replication looms larger still to the
behavioral scientist” (Rosenthal, 1990, p. 2). The dramatic prevalence of low-sample size
studies (see Figure 2.6) should make us especially skeptical of the reliability of the field’s
major empirical claims (Button et al., 2013; Meehl, 1990b).
Direct replications are rarely reported in the field of reconsolidation (cf. Hardwicke et al.,
2016), although arguably ‘conceptual’ replications are more common, particularly in studies
based on the well-established fear-conditioning and extinction paradigm (Golkar et al., 2012;
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Kindt & Soeter, 2013; Soeter & Kindt, 2011). In a conceptual replication, one follows the
methods of a previous study to some extent, but key parameters are varied in order to
test the generalisability of the theory (Schmidt, 2009). Conceptual replications are most
useful when part of a ‘replication battery’ that systematically and explicitly manipulates key
theoretically-relevant parameters on a continuum of similarity based on the original study
(Rosenthal, 1990; Schmidt, 2009). The problem with a conceptual replication that di ers
haphazardly, rather than systematically, from the original study, is that the source of any
deviation from the original study’s findings is di cult to identify.
For example, a post-retrieval extinction study conducted by Soeter and Kindt (2011; also
see Kindt & Soeter, 2013) was unable to replicate a reconsolidation e ect reported in a
similar study conducted by Schiller et al. (2010). The absence of a reconsolidation e ect
in the replication studies is an important finding because the predictions of reconsolidation
theory were found wanting. However, how can we explain the discrepancy with the original
finding? Although reasonably similar, there were several di erences between the studies. For
example, Soeter and Kindt (2011) used fear-relevant stimuli (pictures of spiders), whereas
Schiller et al. (2010) used fear-irrelevant stimuli (coloured squares). Could it be the case
that the reconsolidation e ect is contingent on the use of fear-irrelevant stimuli? Or perhaps
the original finding was a false-positive? It is di cult to draw strong conclusions because
the replication also varied in several other ways from the original study (e.g., di erent
reinforcement schedule). Indeed, the ambiguity of a ‘failed’ conceptual replication may
increase the likelihood that it ends up in the file-drawer (Fanelli, 2012; Rosenthal, 1979),
whilst successful conceptual replications are readily published because they demonstrate
positive evidence for the theory (Pashler & Harris, 2012; Simons, 2014). A more fruitful
approach therefore would be to combine the conceptual replication with a direct replication,
and manipulate only the key parameter of interest. If the direct replication obtains a similar
e ect to the original, and the conceptual replication with (say) fear-relevant stimuli does not,
then one can be more certain that the nature of the stimuli is in some way moderating the
e ect. It could also be that the direct replication itself does not obtain a similar finding to
the original (e.g., Hardwicke et al., 2016), in which case, depending on the evidential value
of the replication (i.e., sample size etc.) relative to the original study, the reliability of the
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original finding should be placed in doubt (see Chapter 3).
Widespread methodological heterogeneity creates considerable problems for those attempting
to summarise the state of the field. In a review of the reconsolidation-extinction literature,
Auber and colleagues (Auber et al., 2013) diligently attempted to extract the relevant boundary
conditions or moderators that could be causing discrepant findings (also see Kredlow et al.,
2015). However, they were eventually forced to note that “seemingly slight di erences in
methodologies can yield drastically varied results” (Auber et al., 2013, p. 633). Fostering
a healthy culture of direct replication can help to identify which of these methodological
di erences are actually important, and which simply reflect the poor reliability of one or
more of the studies under scrutiny (Ioannidis, 2012, 2014).
2.3.2.2 Open data
Published studies rarely upload their raw data to a third-party repository so that it is publicly
available for other scientists to access (e.g., Kidwell et al., 2016). Additionally, despite the data
being supposedly available on request according to the standards of professional organisations
and journals, this is rarely the case in practice (Vanpaemel, Vermorgen, Deriemaecker, &
Storms, 2015; Wicherts, Borsboom, Kats, & Molenaar, 2006). Data availability is important
because published articles merely represent the authors’ summary account of the study, and
not the evidence itself, which is the data. Given that scientists are only human (Hardwicke,
Jameel, Jones, Walczak, & Magis-Weinberg, 2014), and operate within scientific ecosystems
characterised by unscientific values (M Bakker, Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Giner-Sorolla, 2012;
Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012), their interpretations of the data are highly susceptible to bias
and error, even when this is unintentional (Marjan Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Chamberlin,
1965; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; O’Boyle, Banks, & Gonzalez-Mule, 2014).
A powerful defense against fooling ourselves and others (Feynman, 1974), is to make data
available to the scientific commons so it can be checked, re-analysed, and incorporated
into quantitative summaries via meta-analysis (Ioannidis, 2014). Concrete examples are
available in section 2.2, where re-analysis of data from published studies suggests that
critical interactions are not statistically significant, and the data are relatively inconclusive
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in determining between the null and reconsolidation hypotheses.
2.3.2.3 Pre-registration
The rapid growth of the reconsolidation field (see Figure 1.12) has been accompanied by
the rapid proliferation of ad hoc theoretical adjustments, or ‘boundary conditions’. As
outlined above, invoking a boundary conditions argument can be a useful tool for theoretical
advancement, but only when there is a clear distinction between exploratory ‘hypothesis-
generating’ and confirmatory ‘hypothesis-testing’ phases of scientific inquiry (Kerr, 1998;
Wagenmakers et al., 2012; also cf. Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016; Walker & Stickgold, 2016).
When considering the various components of a study (hypotheses, methods, analysis protocols),
pre-registration simply makes clear what was planned, and what was not. As well as
constraining untoward or unintended exploitation of various researcher degrees of freedom
(Gelman & Loken, 2014; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), pre-registration makes
transparent whether a proposed boundary condition is based on an a priori hypothesis, or
post hoc conjecture (Kerr, 1998; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Both situations are perfectly
valid aspects of scientific inquiry, but only when the distinction is made explicit. If a boundary
condition is proposed a priori, and confirmed by experiment, the scientist (and others) can
be more confident that it is genuine. Conversely, when a boundary condition is proposed
post hoc in order to accommodate anomalous data within a particular theoretical framework,
the scientist (and others) might be less convinced and await empirical confirmation before
drawing strong conclusions (Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2012).
2.3.2.4 Collaborative research
A general recommendation that has numerous associated benefits, is to encourage more
large-scale, collaborative research in which multiple independent laboratories work together
towards a shared goal (Ioannidis, 2014; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration,
2015; Simons, Holcombe, & Spellman, 2014). In collaborative research, scientists can pool
otherwise sparse resources. For example, by distributing responsibility for data collection
across multiple teams, it is possible to recruit much larger sample sizes than are typically
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obtained by a single team working alone (see Figure 2.6). Recruiting large samples will
lead to more precise e ect size estimates (Lakens & Evers, 2014) and help to improve the
reliability of the field (Button et al., 2013). Large-scale collaboration also fosters other open
practices (open data, open analysis code, open materials, pre-registration) which naturally
support e cient collaboration (Ioannidis, 2014; Simons et al., 2014).
2.4 Summary and conclusions
The outcomes of our systematic review (section 2.1) and selective review (section 2.2) suggest
that the theory of reconsolidation-mediated memory updating lacks a compelling evidence-
base. This is partly due to the considerable ambiguity surrounding the large number of cases
where key criteria have not been implemented or assessed (see Figures 2.2 and 2.8). Initially
promising findings have proved di cult to replicate (e.g., cf. Hardwicke et al., 2016; Walker
et al., 2003; and cf. Kindt & Soeter, 2013; Schiller et al., 2010), or can be explained without
recourse to reconsolidation theory (e.g., Hupbach et al., 2007; Sederberg et al., 2011; and
cf. J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013, Chapter 4). Several studies that are considered to
demonstrate convincing reconsolidation e ects (Agren et al., 2012; Björkstrand et al., 2015;
James et al., 2015; Schiller et al., 2010), no longer seem compelling when re-analysis indicates
that critical interactions are absent, and their evidentiary support for the reconsolidation
hypothesis is weak relative to the null (see section 2.2). Although the field is often presented as
documenting a weighty catalogue of theoretical successes, it is in fact imbued with numerous
theoretical failures (see Figure 2.7). Reconciling these instances with the central tenets
of the theory is far from straightforward due to considerable methodological heterogeneity
coupled with a lack of systematic, direct replications. This has resulted in frequent appeals
to ‘boundary conditions’ recruited to protect the core tenets of the theory. However, even
these boundary conditions are based on bodies of conflicting evidence, resulting in a highly
complex theoretical landscape in which various sub-versions of the theory are distributed
across the field and called upon as required. As a result, the field of reconsolidation has
stumbled into a quagmire, and the central tenets of the theory are in doubt.
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Investigating reconsolidation in a sequence learning paradigm:
Attempted replications of Walker et al. (2003)
A particularly prominent finding reported by Walker et al. (2003, also referred to here as the
“original study”) is widely cited as a convincing demonstration of reconsolidation-mediated
memory updating in humans (e.g., Tronson & Taylor, 2007; J. L. Lee, 2009; Nader & Hardt,
2009; Schiller & Phelps, 2011; Schwabe et al., 2014). The results are especially compelling
because the experiment conformed to the canonical 3-day reconsolidation protocol (Figure 3.1)
typically used in non-human animal studies, thus meeting several key criteria necessary for a
robust investigation of reconsolidation (see Chapter 2, Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schwabe et al.,
2014; Tronson & Taylor, 2007).
On day 1, participants used a computer keyboard to repeatedly tap a simple sequence of
on-screen digits (e.g., 41342). Speed and accuracy improvements were observed as participants
learned this initial (‘Old’) sequence. On day 2, participants in the Reminder group (n =
16) practiced the Old Sequence immediately before learning a New Sequence. The No-
Reminder group did not practice the Old Sequence before new learning. The No-Intervention
group practiced the Old Sequence but did not learn a New Sequence. On day 3, sequence
performance was tested for all groups. The key finding was that the Reminder group’s Old
Sequence accuracy su ered a substantial decline (≥ 57%) between the Reminder Stage and
the Test Stage, although only minor decrements were observed on the speed measure (≥ 2%).
By contrast, improvements in accuracy and speed between Training and Test Stages were
observed in the No-Reminder and No-Intervention groups. Therefore, it would appear that
the accuracy impairment in the Reminder group was contingent on both the reminder and
intervention as demonstrated in similar non-human animal studies (Nader et al., 2000a) and
widely accepted as evidence for reconsolidation (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schwabe et al., 2014;
Tronson & Taylor, 2007). Consistent with the view that the Old Sequence memory trace had
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been rewritten by the new learning (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Schiller et al., 2010),
the authors suggested that reconsolidation may have “functional significance,” allowing the
“continued refinement and reshaping of previously learned movement skills” (Walker et al.,
2003, p. 618).
However, from the perspective of the aforementioned storage–retrieval debate (Chapter 1),
this interpretation should be viewed with caution, especially as retrieval-deficit explanations
were not explored. For example, it was not clear whether the e ect endured beyond the
3-day study period, or showed propensity for recovery under favorable retrieval conditions
(see Chapter 2, criterion 10, Bouton, 2002), e ects that have been observed in several
investigations of reconsolidation with non-human animals (e.g., Eisenberg & Dudai, 2004;
Lattal & Abel, 2004; Power, Berlau, McGaugh, & Steward, 2006). In the present study, we
initially sought to replicate and extend the reported reconsolidation e ect (Walker et al.,
2003, Group 7) by examining whether it could be accounted for by retrieval-deficits rather
than the storage-deficit mechanisms outlined under reconsolidation theory (our investigation
does not address other findings, unrelated to reconsolidation, reported in the same article).
We conducted a replication battery (Rosenthal, 1990) consisting of both ‘direct replications’
(Simons, 2014) that followed the methodology of the original study as closely as possible, and
‘conceptual replications’ (Schmidt, 2009) that manipulated key task parameters to explore
the broader validity of the reconsolidation-updating theory.
3.1 General Methods
All experimental software and materials, data, and analysis code pertaining to this chapter
have been made publicly available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/ry8fw).
All data exclusions, manipulations, and measures conducted during this study are reported.
Participants were recruited from the University College London (UCL) mixed-occupation
subject pool and received either monetary compensation or course credits. All participants
reported that they were right-handed and had no history of neurological, psychiatric, or sleep
disorder. All participants provided informed consent and the study was approved by the
local UCL ethics committee.
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Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Training Reminder Inteference Test
old sequence old sequence new sequence old sequence new sequence










RECALL 1x RECALL 1x RECALL
unstable trace destabilisation
consolidation disruption of reconsolidation impaired trace













Figure 3.1: Reconsolidation sequence learning paradigm for Walker et al. (2003) and direct
replications (A, red boundary, Experiments 1-4), conceptual replications (blue boundary) with
reminder condition (B, Experiments 5-6) and without reminder condition (C, Experiment 7),
and hypothesized underlying mechanisms and events predicted by reconsolidation theory (D,
green boundary). Critical time points for calculation of the reconsolidation score (RS) are
indicated by triangle symbols. See main text for details.
3.2 Experiments 1-4
We initially intended to run a single direct replication in order to establish the reliability of the
e ect under scrutiny before conducting additional manipulations. However, to foreshadow our
findings, the complete absence of a reconsolidation e ect precluded any further investigation
of a retrieval-deficit account. Instead, we made several attempts to reproduce the target e ect
in repeated direct replications (N = 64) using our own software (Experiment 1), software
provided by the original researchers (Experiment 2), and under conditions intended to increase
task di culty (Experiments 3 and 4).
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3.2.1 Methods
3.2.1.1 Participants
Sixteen participants took part in each of the four direct replication experiments, a ording a
total sample size of 64 individuals (49 females; age Mdn = 22 years, range = 18–54 years).
Two additional participants were excluded for typing an incorrect sequence at the Reminder
Stage, and four additional participants did not complete all three stages of the study.
3.2.1.2 Design
Participants performed a ‘finger-tapping’ sequence learning task in three discrete sessions
taking place on consecutive days (Figure 3.1). Two five-digit sequences (X: 4–1–3–2–4; Y:
2–3–1–4–2) were assigned to be the Old Sequence and the New Sequence in counterbalanced
order. On day 1, participants completed 12 Old Sequence trials (Training). On day 2,
participants performed three Old Sequence trials (Reminder) immediately before 12 New
Sequence trials (Interference). On day 3, participants completed three trials of both the Old
Sequence and the New Sequence in counterbalanced order (Test). The dependent variables
(for details see Appendix A) were the number of sequences completed during each 30s trial
(‘speed’) and the ratio of errors to speed (‘accuracy’: 1≠ errorsspeed ).
Sequence order (X or Y; i.e., whether the Old Sequence was designated as 4–1–3–2–4 or
2–3–1–4–2, with the remaining sequence being assigned as the New Sequence) and test
order (A or B; i.e., whether the Old or New Sequence came first on the Day 3 Test) were
counterbalanced (n = 8 per condition), except in Experiment 2 where researcher error led to
unbalanced conditions (test order: A = 12, B = 4; sequence order: X = 7, Y = 9). Neither
test order nor sequence order influenced the presence or absence of reconsolidation e ects
(see Appendix B).
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3.2.1.3 General Procedure
Unless otherwise stated below (see subsubsection 3.2.1.4), the following procedures were
used in all direct replications and precisely matched those reported in the original study.
Ambiguous or missing information was clarified through contact with the senior author of
the original research team. Participants were seated in front of a computer screen in a
quiet room and used the four fingers of their left (non-dominant) hand to respond using
the four top-row numeric keys 1, 2, 3, and 4 of a standard keyboard. The task involved
repeatedly tapping a five-element sequence that was displayed on the screen for 30s (including
on ‘test’ trials), followed by 30s of rest during which the sequence was absent. Key presses
were acknowledged with white dots that accumulated on screen, but there was no feedback
regarding response accuracy. A 30s countdown timer was displayed during the rest phase to
signal the approaching test phase. During the tapping phase, the screen background was green,
and during the rest phase it was red. Participants were instructed to ‘tap out the sequence
as quickly and accurately as possible.’ There was no within- or between-subjects timing
variability in the original study because all sessions were conducted at 1:00 PM. In the present
experiments, there was also no within-subject variability: participants completed sessions at
precise 24 hour intervals (±15 min); however, session times varied between participants (9:00
AM to 6:00 PM).
3.2.1.4 Procedural variations
Each experiment had minor variations from the general procedure outlined above. Unlike
the other experiments, in Experiment 1 the sequence remained on screen during rest trials,
there was no countdown timer, and the background color was invariant throughout. Key
presses were acknowledged with the transient display of white dots arranged in a row that
corresponded to the horizontal order of the physical keys. Experiments 1, 3, and 4 were
executed in Python code (https://osf.io/g9n87/) developed by T.E.H., whereas Experiment
2 was run from an executable file provided by the original research team.
In the original study and Experiments 1 and 2, participants were instructed to tap the
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sequence, ‘. . . as quickly and accurately as possible.’ In Experiments 3 and 4, this instruction
was modified to read ‘. . . as quickly as you can. Try not to make errors, but overall you
should emphasize speed over accuracy.’ The phrase ‘tap as quickly as you can!’ was also
displayed continuously on screen during test phases in Experiments 3 and 4. In Experiment
4, the keyboard was positioned in an adapted box file such that the participant was unable to
view their hand during task performance. Tactile markers were placed on the response keys
to prevent the participants’ hand shifting to the incorrect keys. Participants were allowed to
lift the lid of the box file during rest phases so they could stretch their fingers and ensure the
hand was correctly positioned before closing the lid and starting the next trial.
3.2.2 Results
Statistical significance was defined at the .05 level. Minor procedural di erences between the
replications and the original study (variability in participant age and time of testing) were
ruled out as potential confounds through additional analyses (Appendix B).
3.2.2.1 Training Stage (Old Sequence)
To establish whether there were performance gains during the Old Sequence Training Stage,
we used two separate 4 ◊ 12 mixed-factorial ANOVAs for accuracy and speed with one
between-subjects variable (Experiment: 1–4) and one within-subjects variable (Trial: 1–12).
Accuracy (Figure 3.2A, Training) increased numerically between trial 1 (M = 0.806, SD =
0.238) and trial 12 (M = 0.879, SD = 0.132), although neither the linear [F(1,60) = 2.96,
p = 0.091] nor quadratic [F(1,60) = 0.105, p = 0.747] trend was significant. There was no
significant interaction between experiment and either linear [F(3,60) = 0.580, p = 0.630] or
quadratic [F(3,60) = 1.203, p = 0.316] trend of trial. Speed (Figure 3.2B, Training) increased
numerically between trial 1 (M = 14.200, SD = 6.40) and trial 12 (M = 21.238, SD = 6.356).
Linear [F(1,60) = 95.398, p < 0.001] and quadratic [F(1,60) = 12.908, p = 0.001] trends
were both statistically significant. There was no significant interaction between experiment
and linear trend of trial, F(3,60) = 1.371, p = 0.260, but the interaction between experiment
and quadratic trend of trial was significant, F(3,60) = 3.209, p = 0.029.
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Sequence type: new old
A
B
Figure 3.2: Experiments 1-4 (pooled) timeline showing mean accuracy (A; number of errors
made relative to the number of complete sequences achieved) and mean speed (B; number of
complete sequences achieved) by stage (Training, Reminder, Interference, and Test), trial,
and sequence type. Error bars show ±SEM.
3.2.2.2 Interference Stage (New Sequence)
The same ANOVA design was used to assess changes in New Sequence performance across the
Interference Stage. Accuracy (Figure 3.2A, Interference) increased numerically between trial
1 (M = 0.769, SD = 0.246) and trial 12 (M = 0.862, SD = 0.155). Across trials, there was a
significant quadratic trend, F(1,60) = 7.651, p = 0.008. The linear trend was not significant,
F(1,60) = 1.087, p = 0.301. There was no significant interaction between experiment and
quadratic trend of trial, F(3,60) = 1.254, p = 0.298, or linear trend of trial, F(3,60) = 1.327,
p = 0.274. Speed (Figure 3.2B, Interference) increased numerically between trial 1 (M =
14.466, SD = 6.593) and trial 12 (M = 21.128, SD = 7.588). A linear trend, F(1,60) =
83.075, p < 0.001, and quadratic trend, F(1,60) = 58.072, p < 0.001, were both significant.
There was no interaction between experiment and linear trend, F(3,60) = 1.137, p = 0.342,
or quadratic trend F(3,60) = 1.362, p = 0.263.
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3.2.2.3 Between-Stage Comparisons
In the original study, two comparisons were made to examine overnight changes in sequence
performance. Overnight Score Old (OSO) was the percentage change between Old Sequence
Training (trials 10–12 only22) and Old Sequence Reminder (all three trials). Overnight Score
New (OSN) was the percentage change between New Sequence Interference (trials 10–12
only) and New Sequence Test (all three trials). To establish whether the overnight scores
varied between experiments, we used a series of one-way ANOVAs with Experiment (1–4)
as a between-subjects factor and overnight score (separately for old/new and separately for
accuracy/speed) as a dependent variable. For accuracy, there was no significant main e ect
of Experiment for OSO, F(3,60) = 1.287, p = 0.287, or OSN, F(3,60) = 0.986, p = 0.406.
However, for speed, there was a significant main e ect of Experiment for both OSO, F(3,60)
= 3.426, p = 0.023, and OSN, F(3,60) = 5.126, p = 0.003. Consequently, the following
OSO and OSN analyses concerns the data pooled across experiments for accuracy, or each
experiment individually for speed (Table 3.1).
One-sample t tests (one-tailed) were used to assess whether any performance changes between
time points were significantly greater than zero. Consistent with the original study, we
observed significant overnight accuracy improvements for OSO [M = 4.649, SD = 15.089,
t(63) = 2.465, p = 0.008] and OSN [M = 5.638, SD = 15.081, t(63) = 2.991, p = 0.002] when
data were pooled across experiments. Aside from Experiment 1, improvements in speed were
larger (relative to accuracy) and more in keeping with the original study for both OSN and
OSO (Table 3.1).
3.2.2.4 Reconsolidation Score
The critical index of a reconsolidation e ect was the percentage di erence between Old
Sequence performance at the Reminder Stage and Test Stage (from herein Reconsolidation
22Only the final three trials of the Training and Interference Stages were used because calculating an
average across all 12 trials could attenuate the true time-dependent performance changes achieved by the end
of these stages (after Walker et al., 2003).
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Table 3.1: Overnight scores (speed) for direct replications.
Experiment Sequence Overnight Score SD t(15) p
1 old 5.93 20.81 1.14 .136
2 old 16.72 14.16 4.72 <.001
3 old 19.72 16.87 4.67 <.001
4 old 26.00 19.90 5.23 <.001
1 new 2.89 12.86 0.90 .191
2 new 15.82 15.66 4.04 <.001
3 new 13.63 9.25 5.89 <.001
4 new 21.71 16.60 5.23 <.001
Score or RS; Figure 3.1, triangles). The Reconsolidation Score fluctuated tightly around
zero for both accuracy (Figure 3.3A) and speed (Figure 3.3B) in all four direct replication
attempts (Experiments 1–4). Averaged across experiments, mean RS declined by less than
1% for accuracy (compared with a decline of ≥ 57% in the original study), and increased
by ≥ 4% for speed (compared with a decline of ≥ 2% in the original study). One-sample
t tests (one-tailed) indicated that none of the RS values (Table 3.2) obtained in the direct
replications were significantly less than zero.
The inherent limitations of null-hypothesis significance testing constrain the degree to which
one can determine the strength of evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014).
To address this we conducted a Bayesian analysis that enabled us to quantify the evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis H 0 (RS = 0) relative to the reconsolidation hypothesis H 1
(RS < 0). Specifically, we calculated directional Bayes factors (Rouder et al., 2009) using an
‘objective’ JZS prior (Cauchy distribution with scale r = 1). H 1 was based on the general
prediction of reconsolidation theory that trace-dependent performance should be reduced
following disrupted reconsolidation of the reactivated trace (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schwabe
et al., 2014; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). In all experiments, Bayes factors (BF 01; Table 3.2)
were larger than 1, indicating greater evidentiary support for H 0 relative to H 1.
A primary goal of replication attempts is to facilitate more precise estimates of e ect-size
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Figure 3.3: Accuracy (A) and speed (B) reconsolidation scores (RSs) for Walker et al. (2003);
n = 16) and Experiments 1–4 (N = 64). Black diamonds represent means, and error bars
show SEM. Where raw data are available (Experiments 1–4), individual participant scores
(circles, with random horizontal jitter) and kernel density distributions are also depicted.
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Table 3.2: Direct replication RS statistics for accuracy and speed.
Experiment Dependent Variable RS SD t(15) p BF 01
1 accuracy 3.13 14.94 0.84 .792 8.97
2 accuracy 0.08 14.75 0.02 .508 5.38
3 accuracy -1.98 7.58 -1.04 .157 1.90
4 accuracy -2.64 9.88 -1.07 .151 1.85
1 speed 8.24 17.14 1.92 .963 13.59
2 speed 2.85 12.74 0.89 .807 9.23
3 speed 5.41 9.75 2.22 .979 14.68
4 speed 1.12 8.70 0.52 .693 7.52
RS , Reconsolidation Score. BF 01, Bayes factor quantifying evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis (RS = 0) relative to the reconsolidation
hypothesis (RS < 0).
magnitude (Cumming, 2012). However, in light of the stark discrepancy between the finding
observed in the original experiment (n = 16) and the four direct replications (n = 64), we
focused on assessing the extent to which the collated evidence indicated that the phenomenon
exists at all. That is to say, we aimed to establish whether the e ect is qualitatively
reproducible, as non-replication will preclude attempts to derive greater quantitative precision
in the estimation of the e ect’s magnitude. Directional meta-analytic Bayes factors using
t values for Experiments 1-4 (Table 3.2) indicated greater evidentiary support for the null
hypothesis (RS = 0) relative to the reconsolidation hypothesis (RS < 0) for both accuracy
(BF 01 = 5.743) and speed (BF 01 = 36.027). This pattern remained after incorporating an
estimated t value for the original study23 (accuracy: BF 01 = 2.080; speed: BF 01 = 31.317).
23As neither raw or summary-level data for the original study were available, we used plot-digitizing
software to extract RS values for accuracy (M = -57, SEM = 25) and speed (M = -2, SEM = 2) from the
original article (Figure 4C in Walker et al., 2003). Values were rounded to the nearest whole number. As t
values were not reported, we used these means and SEMs to recalculate them for use in meta-analysis.
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3.2.3 Discussion
Consistent with the original study (Walker et al., 2003), we observed time-dependent improve-
ments in accuracy and speed across the course of the Training and Interference Stages, and
overnight between stages (Figure 3.2). However, contrary to reconsolidation theory, we saw no
marked decline in performance between reactivation and test. The Reconsolidation Scores for
accuracy completely contradicted the finding of the original study: we observed only minor
fluctuations around zero in all four direction replications. For speed, we also observed only
small, non-significant e ects (Walker et al., 2003 observed a small, non-significant decline).
Bayesian analysis confirmed that there was greater evidentiary support for the null hypothesis
compared to the reconsolidation hypothesis for all Reconsolidation Scores. The complete
absence of predicted outcomes across these four experiments suggests that the reconsolidation
e ect reported in Group 7 of the original study (Walker et al., 2003) is not robust.
3.3 Experiments 5-7
In the second component of the replication battery we conducted a series of conceptual
replications (n = 48) using ‘declarative’ recall conditions more consistent with the wider
human reconsolidation literature (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Forcato et al.,
2009; Hupbach et al., 2007). These experiments also involved sequence learning within
a 3-day reconsolidation protocol (Figure 3.1), but used sequences similar in length and
structure to phone numbers (Experiments 5 and 7) or computer passwords (Experiment 6).
A No-Reminder control group (Experiment 7) enabled us to ascertain whether performance
impairments were contingent on retrieval-induced plasticity as predicted by reconsolidation
theory.
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3.3.1 Methods
3.3.1.1 Participants
Sixteen participants were randomly allocated to each of the three conceptual replication
experiments, a ording a total sample size of 48 individuals (38 females; age Mdn = 22 years,
range = 18-52 years). Three additional participants were excluded as they did not complete
all three stages of the study.
3.3.1.2 Design
Participants performed a sequence-learning task in three discrete sessions taking place on
consecutive days (Figure 3.1). Two 10-item sequences with independent grammars24 were
assigned to be the Old Sequence and the New Sequence in counterbalanced order. For
Experiments 5 and 7, the sequences were numbers (X: 1–4–6–3–2–9–5–0–8–7; Y: 2–6–5–7–0–
1–9–4–3–8). For Experiment 6, the sequences were letters (X: l–p–k–s–f–q–j–d–x–h; Y:
j–f–l–d–q–x–k–h–p–s). On day 1, an adaptive test-feedback protocol was used to ensure
that all participants could recall the Old Sequence unassisted five times in a row (Training).
On day 2, participants in Experiments 5 and 6 recalled and restudied the Old Sequence
immediately before new learning (Reminder). All participants learned the New Sequence
in the same manner as Old Sequence Training (Interference). On day 3, participants were
asked to recall both sequences in counterbalanced order (Test). The dependent variable was
a metric of the similarity between the target (Old/New) sequence at a given stage and the
24Sequences were generated with relatively unique grammars but used the same items to ensure a degree
of old-new competition. To do this, we first defined a ‘base set’ of 10 items, which were either randomly
selected consonants (l p k s f q j d x h; Experiment 6) or single digits (0–9; Experiments 5 and 7). The first
sequence was generated by randomly shu ing the order of these items. The second sequence was generated by
repeatedly shu ing the first sequence until (i) all relative item positions (i.e., pairwise forward and backward
transitions) were unique, and (ii) all absolute item positions were unique. The same two sequences were used
for all participants.
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sequence entered by the user (‘sequence similarity’)25.
Sequence order (i.e., whether the Old Sequence was designated as 1–4–6–3–2–9–5–0–8–7 /
2–6–5–7–0–1–9–4–3–8 in Experiments 5 and 7; or l–p–k–s–f–q–j–d–x–h / j–f–l–d–q–x–k–h–p–s
in Experiment 6; with the remaining sequence being assigned as the New Sequence) and
test order (i.e., whether the Old or New Sequence was tested first on the Day 3 Test) were
counterbalanced (n = 8 per condition). Neither test order nor sequence order influenced the
presence/absence of reconsolidation e ects (see Appendix B).
3.3.1.3 Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen in a quiet room and responded using a
standard keyboard. On STUDY trials, participants were instructed to memorize the sequence
while it was displayed on screen for 5s. No response was required. On RECALLFeedback trials,
participants were asked to enter the sequence from memory into 10 blank place-holders (_).
Correctly entered items appeared in green. Entering an item in an incorrect order caused
that item to flash in red and black (4 ◊ 0.5s flashes over 2s) followed by replacement with the
correct item, which flashed in green and black (4 ◊ 0.5s flashes over 2s), and early termination
of the trial. On RECALLNoFeedback trials, participants also had to enter the sequence from
memory; however, the trial was not interrupted if they entered items in an incorrect order
and they could make corrections if they wished. All items appeared in black so there was no
feedback on these trials.
The Training and Interference Stages involved iterative cycles of STUDY and RECALLFeedback
trials starting with the former. Accurately entering the whole sequence on a RECALLFeedback
trial led to additional RECALLFeedback trials. Failure to complete a RECALLFeedback trial
resulted in a STUDY trial and the cumulative RECALLFeedback counter was reset. When
the participant had achieved five accurate RECALLFeedback trials in a row, the stage was
25Specifically, the similarity between the target (Old/New) and user-entered sequences was measured
using a normalized ratio of the Damerau–Levenshtein edit distance: a metric that indicates the number of
‘fundamental’ operations (substitution, deletion, insertion, or transposition) required to convert one character
string into another and thus reflecting the ‘similarity’ of the two sequences (Van der Loo, 2014).
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terminated.
The Reminder Stage involved a single RECALLNoFeedback trial followed by two STUDY trials.
The Test Stage involved two RECALLNoFeedback trials where participants were asked to ‘Recall
the OLD sequence from day one and enter it on the next screen’ and, separately, ‘Recall the
NEW sequence from day two and enter it on the next screen.’ Participants completed sessions
at precise 24-h intervals (±15 min); however, session times varied between participants (9:00
AM to 6:00 PM).
3.3.2 Results
Unequal variances in between-subject comparisons were addressed by using Welch t tests.
Statistical significance was defined at the .05 level.
3.3.2.1 Training Stage (Old Sequence)
All participants were trained until they reached a performance criterion of five consecutive
errorless recalls of the Old Sequence (Figure 3.4). Recall failure resulted in additional study
trials. This ensured that, regardless of idiosyncratic learning strategies, all participants
robustly encoded the sequence. More trials were required to reach criterion in Experiment
6 (Letters; M = 13.00, SD = 6.623) than Experiment 5 (Numbers; M = 8.688, SD =
2.676) and Experiment 7 (Numbers No Reminder; M = 7.813, SD = 3.124). A one-way
ANOVA indicated that the number of trials required to reach criterion varied significantly
between experiments, F(2,45) = 6.089, p = 0.005. Follow-up Welch two-sample t tests
indicated that Experiments 5 and 7 did not di er significantly, t(29.31) = 0.851, p = 0.402.
However, participants required significantly more trials to reach criterion in Experiment 6
compared with Experiment 5, t(19.77) = -2.42, p = 0.026. No participants failed to reach
the performance criterion.
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Experiment type: Reminder No Reminder Sequence type: old new
Figure 3.4: Full study timeline showing performance in Experiments 5 and 6 pooled (Reminder
groups; n = 32), and Experiment 7 (No-Reminder group; n = 16). The Training and
Interference panels show mean proportion correct on RECALLFeedback trials across five trial
bins plotted relative to participants’ final response of the stage. All participants reached
the performance criterion (five correct trials in a row) but required a di erent number of
trials to do so. The small number of participants who took more than 20 trials to reach
criterion (Training: n = 2, maximum trials = 29; Interference: n = 1, maximum trials =
22) contribute to all relevant analyses. The Reminder and Test panels show mean sequence
similarity between the target sequence and the user-entered sequence assessed on a single
RECALLNoFeedback trial for each previously learned sequence (Old and New). Error bars show
SEM.
3.3.2.2 Interference Stage (New Sequence)
The same learn-to-criterion procedure was used in the Interference Stage as in the Training
Stage. Although more trials were required to reach criterion in Experiment 6 (Letters; M
= 10.375, SD = 4.938) than in Experiment 5 (Numbers; M = 8.563, SD = 4.397) and
Experiment 7 (Numbers No Reminder; M = 7.125, SD = 2.363), a one-way ANOVA indicated
that these di erences were not statistically significant, F(2,45) = 2.583, p = 0.087. No
participants failed to reach the performance criterion.
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3.3.2.3 Between-Stage Comparisons
Following the Training Stage baseline (1.0), there were decrements in Old Sequence perfor-
mance at the subsequent Reminder (M = 0.756, SD = 0.253) and Test Stages (M = 0.606,
SD = 0.315) in Experiment 5 (Numbers). A similar pattern was observed in Experiment 6
(Letters) with performance declining at the Reminder (M = 0.744, SD = 0.248) and Test
Stages (M = 0.669, SD = 0.322). A 2 ◊ 3 mixed-factorial ANOVA (Experiment: 5, 6; Stage:
Training, Reminder, Test) showed that this performance decline across stages was statistically
significant, F(2,87) = 8.629, p < 0.001. There was no main e ect of Experiment, F(1,87) =
1.122, p = 0.292, or interaction between Experiment and Stage, F(2,87) = 0.672, p = 0.513.
New Sequence performance declined from the Interference Stage baseline (1.0) to the subse-
quent Test Stage in Experiment 5 (M = 0.625, SD = 0.317), Experiment 6 (M = 0.594, SD
= 0.342), and Experiment 7 (M = 0.488, SD = 0.245). A 3 ◊ 2 mixed-factorial ANOVA
(Experiment: 5, 6, 7; Stage: Interference, Test) indicated that there was a main e ect of
Stage, F(1,88) = 15.425, p < 0.001, and no main e ect of Experiment, F(2,88) = 0.548, p =
0.580, or interaction between Experiment and Stage, F(2,88) = 0.548, p = 0.580.
3.3.2.4 Reconsolidation Score
As the overall performance pattern did not vary between Experiments 5 and 6 (‘Reminder
Experiments’), we pooled these data for subsequent analysis. A one-way repeated-measures
ANOVA indicated significant changes across stages (Training, Reminder, Test) for the
Reminder experiments (see Figure 3.4), F(2,90) = 8.68, p < 0.001. Follow-up paired t tests
(one-tailed) showed that there was significant decline from the Training Stage (1.0) to the
Reminder Stage (M = 0.750, SD = 0.246), t(31) = 5.742, p < 0.001, and from Reminder stage
to the Test Stage (M = 0.638, SD = 0.315), t(31) = 2.645, p < 0.001. Participants in the
No-Reminder Control Group also showed a substantial performance decrement from Training
(1.0) to Test (M = 0.488, SD = 0.363). A paired-samples t test (two-tailed) confirmed that
this decline was significant, t(15) = 5.646, p < 0.001. A between-group comparison of Test
Stage performance indicated poorer recall in the No-Reminder Experiment (M = 0.488, SD
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= 0.363) compared to the Reminder Experiments (M = 0.638, SD = 0.315), although a
two-sample t test (one-tailed) indicated no significant di erence, t(26.59) = -1.409, p = 0.915.
3.3.3 Discussion
During the Training and Interference Stages, all participants successfully reached the criterion
of five consecutive errorless sequence recalls indicating successful learning of both the Old
and New Sequences. In Experiments 5 and 6 (Reminder), there was a decline in performance
between baseline (Reminder Stage) and Test Stage, as anticipated by reconsolidation theory.
However, a similar decline was also observed in Experiment 7 (No Reminder control).
Therefore, the recall impairments observed in the Reminder Experiments could not be
causally attributed to the time-dependent interaction of memory reactivation and interference
as required by reconsolidation theory (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schwabe et al., 2014; Tronson
& Taylor, 2007). Indeed, rather than inducing a transient state of heightened susceptibility
to interference, memory reactivation resulted in numerically less recall impairment of the
Old Sequence at the Test Stage relative to no memory reactivation, an e ect in the opposite
direction to that predicted by reconsolidation theory.
3.4 General Discussion
Reconsolidation-updating theory suggests that retrieval of an existing trace in the human
memory system can render that trace vulnerable to modification from post-retrieval new
learning. In the present investigation, we attempted to replicate and extend a critical
finding (Walker et al., 2003) widely considered to provide a compelling demonstration of
reconsolidation-mediated memory updating in humans. In four direct-replication attempts
involving procedural recall and three conceptual-replication attempts involving declarative
recall, we did not observe the critical impairment e ects observed in the original study and
predicted by reconsolidation theory (Nader & Hardt, 2009; Schwabe et al., 2014; Tronson &
Taylor, 2007).
Broadly speaking, a non-replication of this kind could occur for three reasons: (1) the original
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finding was a false-positive; (2) the replication was a false-negative, or (3) some unanticipated
variable moderated the e ect. It is not possible to definitively determine which of these
explanations is correct, but we can consider the weight of evidence for the various possibilities.
Naturally the larger sample size obtained in the present study relative to the original study
a ords greater confidence in the interpretation that the replications were not false-negatives,
and that the original study could have been a false-positive. Is there additional data bearing
on this question? Several recent investigations have used variations of the original paradigm
(Walker et al., 2003), with either transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS, Censor et al.,
2010, 2014b, 2014a) or new learning (Beukelaar et al., 2014) interventions, but there is some
contention as to whether these studies successfully replicate the findings of the original study
or not (cf. Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016; Walker & Stickgold, 2016). Although the findings of
these studies were interpreted as yielding favorable evidence for reconsolidation theory, the
expected Reminder–Test performance decrement was actually absent in most conditions.
The study by Beukelaar et al. (2014) represents a reasonably close procedural replication of
the original and present study, although the primary dependent variable was operationalised in
a di erent manner. Specifically, ‘accuracy’ was the percentage of correct sequences on a given
trial and ‘speed’ was the inter-trial time interval measured in seconds (cf. Appendix A). The
primary ‘performance’ measure was a ratio of accuracy/speed, and between stage comparisons
were based on shorter ‘blocks’ (first 5 tapped sequences). In contrast to Walker et al. (2003),
and consistent with the present findings, no Day 2 - Day 3 performance decrement was
observed in a group who performed 3x30s finger tapping trials during the Reminder Stage. A
number of additional groups were given di erent reminder configurations (5x sequences, 10x
sequences, 1x30s, 1x60s), and Beukelaar et al. (2014) did observe a significant linear trend in
which shorter reactivation lengths were associated with greater Day 2 - Day 3 decrements.
This is an interesting pattern that may warrant further empirical attention. However, in
order to test a reconsolidation account it will be necessary to demonstrate that this e ect is
due to a reminder by intervention interaction (see Chapter 2) rather than just an e ect of
the reminder manipulation itself. It should also be noted that the observed decrements were
modest and performance rapidly recovered within the test session. It is di cult to reconcile
this with the prediction of permanent trace modification (Nader & Hardt, 2009).
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In the series of experiments that employed TMS (Censor et al., 2010, 2014b, 2014a) the
researchers focused on the ‘speed’ dependent measure as operationalised in Walker et al.
(2003) and the present replications. The critical accuracy measure that showed a substantial
decrement in the original study was not examined. On the speed measure, there was actually
a small Day 2 to Day 3 performance increment for the R+I+ group, and these gains were less
than that seen in a R+I- group. This e ect was interpreted as favourable to reconsolidation
theory because the ‘o ine gains’ achieved in the R+I- group were assumed to have been
mediated by a reconsolidation process. The reduced gains in the R+I+ group were therefore
taken to reflect ‘blocked o ine gains’ as a result of TMS disrupting the reconsolidation
process.
But there are some important caveats to bear in mind regarding these results. Firstly, it
should be noted that this is a qualitatively di erent e ect to the one reported in Walker et
al. (2003), which was a substantial decrement in performance (accuracy) between Day 2
and Day 3. Furthermore, the e ect is rather tenuous evidence for reconsolidation: (i) there
was no “no-reminder” control condition (R-I+ or R-I-; see C4, C6, C7 in Chapter 2); (ii) the
intervention was delivered during, rather than after reactivation (see C2 in Chapter 2); and
(iii) such “o ine gains” can often be driven by various procedural confounds (Rickard, Cai,
Rieth, Jones, & Ard, 2008). In summary, the outcomes of this set of studies (Beukelaar
et al., 2014; Censor et al., 2010, 2014b, 2014a) cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as
yielding successful replications of the original finding (cf. Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016; Walker
& Stickgold, 2016), and hardly seem consistent with the central tenets of reconsolidation
theory more generally (see Chapter 2, Nader & Hardt, 2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007).
As noted above, another possible explanation for the discrepancy in findings is that some
unanticipated variable(s) moderated the e ect. In other words, it could be the case that
reconsolidation theory in its present form is not su ciently well specified to identify the
conditions under which reliable e ects will and will not be observed. The authors of the
original study have recently proposed several such moderators (Walker & Stickgold, 2016),
which include participant age range, and session time, and suggest that our experiments have
established these potential moderators as ‘boundary conditions’ on reconsolidation theory.
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However, this claim blurs the important line between the exploratory (“hypothesis-generating”)
and confirmatory (“hypothesis-testing”) phases of scientific inquiry (Wagenmakers et al.,
2012). Post-hoc conjecture, or “hypothesing after the results are known” (Kerr, 1998) is an
important part of the scientific process as it can generate new hypotheses. However, because
it is easy to ‘over-fit’ explanations once the data have been observed, such conjectures should
be considered tentative until they have been empirically verified (Hardwicke & Shanks, 2016).
Furthermore, the role of the specific moderators that Walker and Stickgold (2016) suggest can
be examined to some extent through additional analyses of our data (see section B.1). In the
case of age range for instance, it is possible to re-examine the critical Reconsolidation Scores
in the subgroup of participants who fell within the exact age bracket of participants recruited
in the original study (18-27). This still yields a healthy sample size of 48 participants, and
the additional analyses confirm that no reconsolidation e ect emerged. Similarly, analyses
indicated no appreciable relationship between Reconsolidation Scores and session time. These
analyses suggest that the proposed moderators do not provide a compelling account of the
extant data. Nevertheless, our experiment was not designed to manipulate these variables as
they were not indicated as relevant in the original study (Walker et al., 2003), nor are they
considered central tenets of reconsolidation theory (Nader & Hardt, 2009). It is important
that proposed ‘boundary conditions’ are not only applied on a case-by-case basis to instances
of theoretical failure, but are also able to accommodate instances of theoretical success. Thus,
if these potential moderators are to be considered boundary conditions then they should
ideally maintain or extend, rather than restrict, the explanatory coverage of the theory (see
section 2.3).
The findings of our conceptual replications cast further doubt on the veracity of claims that
memory updating can be mediated by reconsolidation processes (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia,
2013; Dudai, 2009; Hardt et al., 2010; J. L. Lee, 2009; Schiller et al., 2010). These experiments
adhered to the canonical 3-day reconsolidation protocol and aimed to increase external validity
through the use of sequences similar in structure to phone numbers or computer passwords. In
addition, consistent with several studies in the human reconsolidation literature (e.g., J. C. K.
Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Forcato et al., 2009; Hupbach et al., 2007), participants completed a
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declarative recall task. Under these conditions, performance impairments occurred in the both
the presence and absence of memory retrieval. Rather than triggering a state of heightened
trace-vulnerability, retrieval actually led to numerically higher performance compared to
the no-retrieval control group. This finding is consistent with previous investigations of
reconsolidation that found retrieval practice can a ord some protection against interference
(e.g., Potts & Shanks, 2012), and a considerable body of evidence suggesting that retrieval
aids rather than impairs subsequent recall (Roediger & Butler, 2011).
Two notable aspects of human reconsolidation research are not directly addressed by the
present investigation. First, there is evidence that post-retrieval pharmacological interventions
can attenuate emotional responding in a fear-conditioning paradigm (Kindt et al., 2009).
However, the reliability of these e ects has also recently come under scrutiny (Bos, Beckers,
& Kindt, 2014). Similarly, initially promising findings based on using post-retrieval extinction
to disrupt reconsolidation in a fear-conditioning paradigm (Schiller et al., 2010) have proved
elusive in subsequent replication attempts (Golkar et al., 2012; Kindt & Soeter, 2013). It is
striking that declarative recall of the conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus contingency
remains intact across these fear-conditioning studies, either in the presence or absence of
e ects on emotional responding.
Additionally, it has been suggested that ‘prediction error’ is a necessary reconsolidation trigger
(see Chapter 2, Forcato et al., 2009; Sevenster et al., 2014). If this were the case, it could
explain the absence of reconsolidation e ects in the present replications. However, it would
also be surprising that a reconsolidation e ect was observed in the original study because the
reminder protocol required participants to practice the Old Sequence in its entirety, and thus
presumably did not invoke prediction error. To justify an auxiliary theoretical assumption
about prediction error, one would need to reconcile a considerable amount of contradictory
evidence. For example, relative to controls, no impairment of declarative recall is observed
in the aforementioned prediction error studies (Forcato et al., 2009; Sevenster et al., 2014),
only attenuation of emotional responding (Sevenster et al., 2014), or ambiguous null e ects
on an indirect measure of trace integrity (retrieval-induced forgetting; Forcato et al., 2009).
Furthermore, reconsolidation-like e ects have been reported when the reminder involves
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reinforced trials (and thus no prediction error) in both non-human animals (Duvarci & Nader,
2004) and humans (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013), and impairment e ects are absent even
in studies where prediction error would be expected (Golkar et al., 2012; Kindt & Soeter,
2013). At present, therefore, it is unclear whether prediction error is either necessary or
su cient for reconsolidation e ects to emerge.
Taken together, our findings cast doubt on the e cacy of new-learning interventions as a
means for disrupting the reconsolidation of procedural or declarative memory in humans. The
absence of reconsolidation e ects in all four direct replications suggests that the considerable
theoretical weight attributed to the original study (J. L. Lee, 2009; Nader & Hardt, 2009;
Schiller & Phelps, 2011; Schwabe et al., 2014; Tronson & Taylor, 2007) is no longer warranted.
Furthermore, the absence of retrieval-contingent impairment in the conceptual replications is
inconsistent with the purported functional role of reconsolidation as an adaptive mechanism
that underlies memory updating (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Dudai, 2009; Hardt et
al., 2010; J. L. Lee, 2009). Replication will be an essential tool in future reconsolidation
investigations as researchers seek to verify the reliability of existing findings, identify genuine
boundary conditions, and foster theoretical progress.
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Chapter 4
Revisiting the misinformation e ect:
Does disruption of reconsolidation enable memory trace overwriting?
The classic ‘misinformation e ect’ powerfully testifies to the inherent fallibility of human
memory in general and the potential unreliability of eyewitness testimony in particular (Ayers
& Reder, 1998; Loftus, 2005; Zaragoza et al., 2006). In a seminal study by Loftus and
colleagues (Loftus et al., 1978), participants first viewed a series of slides depicting a tra c
accident (the Event Phase). Subsequently, one group of ‘misled’ participants was exposed to
information that contradicted an aspect of the event information whereas for another group
of ‘control’ participants no misinformation was presented (the Post-Event Information Phase).
For example, when a ‘stop’ sign was shown in the slides, the post-event information either
referred to a ‘stop’ sign (control condition26) or a ‘yield’ sign (misled condition). In the Final
Test Phase, all participants were asked what happened during the event and presented with
a forced choice between the event item and the misleading item. 75% of participants in the
control group correctly chose the event item compared to just 41% of misled participants.
Exposure to misinformation had apparently led a considerable number of individuals to report
something that never actually happened during the original event.
Whilst these striking findings highlight the ease with which eyewitness testimony can poten-
tially be distorted (Zaragoza et al., 2006), their mechanistic origins have been the subject of
considerable controversy. As outlined in Chapter 1, the misinformation e ect is a specific
example of the broader phenomenon of ‘retroactive interference’, whereby learning of new
information impairs an individual’s ability to recall previously learned information (Crowder,
26In the control condition of Loftus et al. (1978) the event item was correctly represented at the Post-Event
Information Stage (e.g., referring to a ‘stop sign’ as a ‘stop sign’). However, in subsequent studies (e.g.,
Loftus, Donders, Ho man, & Schooler, 1989) the typical approach has been to make a ‘neutral reference’ to
the event item (e.g., referring to a ‘stop sign’ as a ‘sign’).
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1976; Titcomb & Reyna, 1995; Postman & Underwood, 1973). A historic debate spanning
multiple fields of enquiry, experimental paradigms, and species, has considered whether these
apparent ‘forgetting’ e ects are attributable to permanent alteration of underlying memory
traces (i.e., “storage-based” impairment, e.g., J. M. Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Müller
& Pilzecker, 1900; Melton & Irwin, 1940) or factors that may only temporarily perturb
trace-dependent performance while allowing the trace itself to persist (i.e., “retrieval-based”
impairment, e.g., Bouton, 2002; Capaldi & Neath, 1995; J. A. McGeoch, 1942; Tulving, 1974).
The processes that drive retroactive interference may also have an adaptive role through
inhibiting and/or replacing erroneous or out-dated information stored in the memory system.
Therefore, identifying the underlying cause of the misinformation e ect will not only aid
e orts to mitigate the influence of misleading information on eyewitness testimony, it will
impact upon our broader understanding of the fundamental operations that enable human
memory updating (R. A. Bjork, 1978; Dudai, 2009).
An early account of the misinformation e ect suggested that exposure to misleading informa-
tion resulted in the ‘destructive updating’ or ‘overwriting’ of the memory trace representing
the event information (Loftus, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus et al., 1985, 1989). In other words, not
only were participants led to preferentially report misinformation, they had also permanently
erased aspects of the event information from memory. However, as outlined in Chapter 1
(also see Figure 1.1), poor performance on a memory test does not necessarily entail any
destructive loss of information from the memory system. Such an e ect could indeed arise
when target information is no longer available (i.e., permanently destroyed), but it would also
occur when memory traces are temporarily inaccessible (e.g., Tulving, 1974). In the years
following Loftus’s initial investigations, a lively debate ensued about the type of memory
impairment that might cause the misinformation e ect (see Figure 4.1). When retrieval factors
were implicated (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Chandler, 1991; Christiaansen & Ochalek,
1983), researchers suggested that the trace representing the event information was intact
(the ‘persistence hypothesis’). When retrieval factors were not identified, researchers often
favoured storage-based accounts such as the ‘overwriting hypothesis’ (e.g., Belli, Windschitl,
& McCarthy, 1992; Chandler, 1989; Loftus, 1979b). The theoretical and practical implications
of the two accounts are stark. The overwriting hypothesis entails the irrecoverable loss of
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical implications of the misinformation e ect (control performance >
misled performance). If a misinformation e ect is observed using conventional tests (e.g.,
the Original Test or the True/False Test) then it could be due to memory impairment
or factors unrelated to memory impairment. When a misinformation e ect is observed
using a test that minimizes the role of factors unrelated to memory impairment (e.g., the
Modified Test), it suggests that memory impairment has occurred. However, the locus of the
memory impairment (i.e., storage/retrieval factors) remains to be determined. Obtaining
a misinformation e ect using the Modified Test is therefore necessary, but not su cient
evidence in support of the overwriting hypothesis. If no misinformation e ect is observed
(control performance ¥ misled performance) then this corroborates the persistence hypothesis.
memory traces whereas the persistence hypothesis suggests that those traces are intact and
potentially accessible, particularly under favourable retrieval circumstances (Chandler &
Fisher, 1996).
In considering the relative merits of these memory impairment accounts, it is important to
note that a participant’s performance on a memory test can be influenced by a number of
factors unrelated to the presence or retrievability of information stored in memory, such
as motivation, attention, or fatigue (Cahill et al., 2001). Therefore, an additional type of
explanation that does not involve memory impairment at all is also plausible (Figure 4.1). In
a rigorous critique, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a, also see 1985b; Zaragoza & McCloskey,
1989) outlined how the memory test employed in previous investigations (from herein “Original
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Test”; e.g., Loftus et al., 1978) was susceptible to confounding factors. Recall that on the
Original Test participants are o ered a two-alternative forced choice between the event
item and the misleading item. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) suggested that poorer
performance in the misled condition relative to the control condition is expected even if no
memory impairment occurs. Firstly, consider a participant who may not remember the event
item during the Final Test Phase for reasons unrelated to the misleading information, for
example, never encoding the event item during the Event Phase27. In the control condition,
such a participant should have no particular inclination towards choosing either the event
item or the misled item28 and would simply be guessing. However, in the misled condition, a
participant who does not remember the event item may nevertheless be able to remember the
misled item, and would therefore be biased towards choosing it (“misinformation acceptance”,
also see Belli, 1989). Secondly, consider a participant who recalls both the event item and
the narrative reference. In the control condition, such a participant would likely choose
the event item, because it was not contradicted during the Post-Event Information Phase.
However, in the misled condition, the participant may be more inclined to choose the misled
item by reasoning that they are likely mistaken: presumably the experimenter who provided
the narrative knew what happened in the slides better than they do (“deliberation”, also
see Belli, 1989). Alternatively, the participant might choose the misled item believing it to
be the response that the experimenter wants them to give (“demand characteristics”, also
see Lindsay, 1990). Finally, a participant who can remember one or both items may simply
respond based on item familiarity and neglect information about the item’s source entirely
(“source misattribution”; also see Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989).
Overall then, there are a number of reasons why the inclusion of the post-event item as an
option on the Original Test will lead to poorer performance in the misled condition compared
to the control condition for reasons unrelated to memory impairment.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) reinforced their arguments by devising a new ‘Modified Test’.
27This is likely to be the case for many participants as performance in the control condition is typically
well-below ceiling (Loftus et al., 1978; Zaragoza et al., 2006).
28Any item-level e ects, such as the general plausibility of an item’s role in the scenario, are minimized
through counter-balanced assignment of items to the control and misled conditions.
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The procedure is similar to the Original Test, requiring participants to make a two-alternative
forced choice between the event item and a second item. However, instead of the misled item,
the second option is a novel item that has never occurred during either the Event Phase
or the Post-Event Information Phase. The absence of the post-event item from the test
should minimize the impact of response biases in the misled condition, thus providing a less
confounded assessment of memory impairment (see Figure 4.1). If misinformation hinders
an individual’s ability to remember the event information (through either storage-based
or retrieval-based memory impairment) then participants will have no reason to prefer the
event item to the novel item and should perform at chance level in the misled condition. By
contrast, if participants can successfully recall the event information then performance in the
misled condition should be similar to the control condition. Across six experiments (N =
444) using the Modified Test29, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) found that performance in
the control and misled conditions was indeed comparable (75% vs. 72%, ns30). The authors
concluded that there was no evidence that exposure to misleading information had any impact
on participants’ ability to remember the event information, thus corroborating the persistence
hypothesis.
Since McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a), a number of other investigations have employed
the Modified Test to evaluate whether misinformation e ects can be attributed to memory
impairment. Payne, Toglia, and Anastasi (1994) identified a total of 44 such experiments
(reported in 13 individual studies) of which the majority (30) did not report a statistically
significant di erence between the control and misled conditions. However, the authors noted
that when the outcomes of all studies were combined in a single overall t-test, there was a
29Note that in the study described at the outset of this article (Loftus et al., 1978), post-event item type
(misled vs. control) was manipulated between-subjects. Subsequent studies (e.g., J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia,
2013; Loftus et al., 1989; M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a) have employed a within-subjects manipulation
where several event items were subsequently referred to in a misleading way, or a neutral way (control),
during the Post-Event Information Phase.
30Although such null findings are ambiguous within the framework of null-hypothesis significance testing
(e.g., Dienes, 2014), a Bayes Factor can be calculated using the reported t value and sample size (see “General
Analysis Procedure” for more details). The Bayes Factor (BF01 = 3.866) indicates moderate support for the
null hypothesis (control - misled = 0) relative to the directional alternative hypothesis (control - misled > 0).
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small but significant di erence between the control (M = 75.8%) and misled (M = 71.7%)
conditions, t(43) = 4.65, p < .001. Contrary to McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a), they
concluded that memory impairment can contribute to the misinformation e ect. Although we
will raise some potential problems with this analysis in the discussion, Payne et al. (1994)’s
study appears to have shifted the focus of the misinformation debate from asking Does
memory impairment ever occur?, to Under what circumstances does memory impairment
occur? (Ayers & Reder, 1998; Loftus, 2005).
Recently, it has been proposed that storage-based impairment e ects can arise when partic-
ipants are exposed to contradictory misinformation during a transient period of retrieval-
induced plasticity initiated during memory ‘reconsolidation’ (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Hardt et al., 2010). Reconsolidation theory suggests that existing memory traces are destabi-
lized when they are reactivated (e.g., via retrieval) and start to undergo a time-dependent
restabilisation (reconsolidation) process. During this brief time window, it is suggested that
traces are temporarily amenable to modification, or even erasure, if the reconsolidation
process is disrupted (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Nader, 2003a; Schiller et al., 2010).
Reconsolidation e ects are investigated in non-human animals through the delivery of invasive
interventions intended to perturb the molecular restabilisation of reactivated memory traces
(Nader & Hardt, 2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). For example, in a fear-conditioning paradigm
Nader, Schafe, and Le Doux (2000a) observed the apparent loss of a previously acquired
freezing response in rats following post-retrieval infusion of a protein-synthesis inhibitor,
anisomycin, directly into the animals’ amygdala. By contrast, the freezing response was
intact in no-reactivation, no-intervention, and delayed-intervention control groups, indicating
that the performance deficit was contingent on the predicted time-dependent interaction of
reactivation and intervention.
It is not straightforward to investigate reconsolidation in humans primarily because the
invasive treatments used in non-human animal studies have toxic side e ects (Agren, 2014;
Schiller & Phelps, 2011; cf. Kroes et al., 2014). However, a number of investigators have used
post-retrieval new learning as a means to ‘update’ or ‘overwrite’ existing traces by disrupting
the reconsolidation process (e.g., Hupbach et al., 2007; Forcato et al., 2007; Schiller et al.,
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2010; St Jacques & Schacter, 2013; Walker et al., 2003). Recently, it has been specifically
proposed that disruption of reconsolidation could enable the overwriting of event memory
traces in a misinformation paradigm (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hardt et al., 2010; also
see J. C. K. Chan et al., 2009). In Chan and LaPaglia (2013), participants watched a video
episode of the TV series ‘24’ during the Event Phase. In the Post-Event Information Phase,
an audio narrative was presented in which some of the critical items in the video were referred
to in a misleading way (‘misled’ condition), or were not mentioned (‘control’ condition). For
example, in the video, a fictional terrorist used a hypodermic needle on a flight attendant
and in the misled condition the audio narrative suggested that the terrorist had used a stun
gun. In the Final Test Phase, statements about critical items from the video were presented,
some of which were true (‘the terrorist used a hypodermic needle’) and some of which were
false (‘the terrorist used a chloroform rag’). As with the Modified Test, the misleading item
was omitted: the false statements referred to a novel item that had not appeared in either
the video or the audio narrative. For each statement, participants responded either ‘true’ if
they had seen the item in the video or ‘false’ if they had not (from herein ‘True/False Test’).
In order to investigate the role of reconsolidation, Chan and LaPaglia (2013) introduced a
Reminder Phase that preceded the Post-Event Information Phase. During the Reminder Phase,
one group of participants (‘Reactivation’ condition) answered a series of cued-recall questions
about the critical items and other items from the video. The goal was to reactivate event
memory traces, initiating their reconsolidation and rendering them temporarily vulnerable
to overwriting. Another group of participants (‘No Reactivation’ condition) played the
game Tetris for 10 minutes as a distractor activity. An important feature of the canonical
reconsolidation protocol is the relative timing of the experimental phases. Although Chan
and LaPaglia (2013) reported four experiments in which they predicted impairment e ects,
only one of these (ExperimentCL 6) adhered to the timing parameters required for a controlled
test of reconsolidation theory (e.g., Nader et al., 2000a; also see Chapter 2; Nader & Hardt,
2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007; Schiller & Phelps, 2011). In ExperimentCL 6, the phases were
distributed across 3 consecutive days (see Figure 4.2). This ensured that (a) there was time
for information encoded during the Event Phase on Day 1 to consolidate overnight before (b)
the Reminder Phase immediately preceded the Post-Event Information Phase on Day 2, and
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(c) the Final Test Phase did not occur until Day 3 when impairment e ects attributable to
the disruption of reconsolidation are expected to emerge (Nader et al., 2000a; Nader & Hardt,
2009). The other experiments deviated from key aspects of this design (specifically points a
and c) either because all phases took place on the same day (ExperimentCL 1, ExperimentCL
4), or the Final Test Phase was conducted immediately after the Reminder Phase on Day 2
(ExperimentCL 3). Thus, only ExperimentCL 6 was capable of ruling out the key confounds
that are controlled in a three-day design. Consistent with the predictions of reconsolidation
theory, performance in ExperimentCL 6 was impaired in the misled condition compared to
the control condition only in the Reactivation group, and not in the No-Reactivation group31.
Chan and LaPaglia (2013) concluded that “human declarative memory can be selectively
rewritten during reconsolidation” (p. 9309) and noted that theirs was the first study to
demonstrate reconsolidation-associated impairment e ects on a declarative recall measure.
Are the findings observed in ExperimentCL 6 evidence of overwriting? As outlined above
(Figure 4.1), corroboration of the overwriting-hypothesis would first require unambiguous
evidence that the misinformation e ect was due to memory impairment before one could begin
to unravel the relative contributions of storage and retrieval factors. However, as with the
Original Test, the True/False Test used in Chan and LaPaglia (2013) may also be influenced
by factors unrelated to memory impairment. Indeed, the True/False Test32 was originally
intended only to minimize the influence of misinformation acceptance (Belli, 1989). It has
been acknowledged that the test cannot straightforwardly delineate the source of any residual
performance deficits, which could still be attributed to memory impairment (storage- or
retrieval-based), source misattribution, and/or deliberation (Belli, 1989; Lindsay & Johnson,
31Although this pattern of results appears consistent with reconsolidation theory, no direct comparison of
the Reactivation/No-Reactivation conditions is reported (see C4 and C7 in Chapter 2). This is potentially
problematic because the di erence between significant and not significant is not necessarily itself statistically
significant (Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). Additionally, the apparent absence of an e ect
in the No-Reactivation group is di cult to reconcile with classic misinformation studies that did not include
a reactivation stage but still observed performance deficits using the True/False Test (Belli, 1989; Lindsay &
Johnson, 1989; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989).
32Rather than requiring a true/false response, early versions of the test required an equivalent ‘yes/no’
response (Belli, 1989; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989).
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1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989). Lindsay and Johnson (1989), for instance, found that
misinformation e ects observed on a True/False Test were eliminated when participants were
explicitly directed to consider item source (also see Zaragoza & Lane, 1994; Zaragoza &
Koshmider, 1989).
Therefore, as with the Original Test, performance on the True/False Test in the misled
condition could be lower than in the control condition for reasons unrelated to memory
impairment. As it is necessary to demonstrate memory impairment before one can identify
its locus (storage or retrieval factors, see Figure 4.1) the True/False Test may not be
optimal for evaluating whether disruption of reconsolidation enables the overwriting of event
memory traces. In summary, the observation of poorer performance in the misled vs. control
condition in Chan and LaPaglia’s (2013) ExperimentCL 6 (Reactivation Condition) cannot be
unambiguously interpreted as evidence in favour of the reconsolidation-overwriting account.
In the present study, we developed a 3-day hybrid reconsolidation-misinformation paradigm
and sought to test the prediction that reactivation prior to the presentation of contradictory
misinformation would facilitate the overwriting of memory traces representing a witnessed
event (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hardt et al., 2010). We used the Modified Test
(M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a) as the principle means of assessing participants’ event
knowledge to enhance our confidence that any observed performance deficits were not
contaminated by factors unrelated to memory impairment. Detecting a misinformation
e ect on the Modified Test would be necessary but not su cient evidence in support
of the overwriting hypothesis. Further investigation would be required to delineate the
relative contributions of storage-based and retrieval-based factors (see Figure 4.1). The
absence of a misinformation e ect on the other hand, would demonstrate that event memory
traces remained intact despite exposure to contradictory misinformation during the putative
reconsolidation window. This would be inconsistent with the reconsolidation-overwriting
hypothesis, and corroborate the persistence hypothesis.
Alongside Modified Test outcomes, we sought to verify that our novel hybrid paradigm could
elicit previously reported misinformation e ects with the Original Test (Experiment 8) and
the True/False Test (Experiment 9). As previous studies have used di erent methods for
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triggering ‘reconsolidation’, we also investigated whether specific reactivation procedures
are necessary to elicit memory impairment e ects (Experiment 10). Finally, we revisit and
re-evaluate the findings of a previous meta-analysis (Payne et al., 1994) that suggested
misinformation e ects can be obtained using the Modified Test, and thus attributed to
memory impairment.
4.1 General Methods
All data, and analysis code pertaining to this chapter have been made publicly available on
the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/7wn8c). All data exclusions, manipulations, and
measures conducted during this study are reported.
4.1.1 Overview
All of the experiments reported here employed the three critical phases of the classic ‘misin-
formation paradigm’, plus an additional phase designed to trigger memory reconsolidation
(see Figure 4.2). As in ExperimentCL 6, the phases were distributed across three consecutive
days in order to meet the timing parameters of the canonical reconsolidation paradigm
(Nader & Hardt, 2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). On Day 1, participants watched a short
video in order to learn the initial ‘event’ information (Event Phase). The following day
(Day 2), participants were reminded about items that appeared in the event (Reminder
Phase) immediately prior to the Post-Event Information Phase, during which they read a
narrative containing references to critical events from the video. On the final day (Day 3),
participants completed a forced-choice recognition test containing items that appeared during
the event video and foil items (Final Test Phase). The core design involved a within-subjects
manipulation at the Post-Event Information Phase: four critical items were referred to in a
misleading manner (‘Misled’ condition), and four critical items were referred to in a neutral
manner (‘Control’ condition).
In the experiments outlined below, the Event Phase and Post-Event Information Phase
did not vary, however we manipulated the nature of the Final Test Phase (Original Test,
181
CHAPTER 4. RECONSOLIDATION AND THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT
True/False Test, Modified Test) and the Reminder Phase (No Reminder, Subtle Reminder,
Retrieval Practice) in order to investigate various predictions of the reconsolidation-overwriting
hypothesis. The overall goal was to evaluate the claim that reminding participants about
the event video would trigger the reconsolidation of target memory traces and render them
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Figure 4.2: Hybrid reconsolidation-misinformation paradigm used in Experiments 8-10. The
four discrete phases of each experiment were distributed over 3 consecutive days. The nature
of the Reminder Phase and Final Test Phase varied across experiments whereas the Event
Phase and Post-Event Information Phase remained constant.
4.1.2 Materials
Modern video (6m 28s) and narrative (803 words) materials developed specifically for the
misinformation paradigm (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006) were employed. The video
depicted a tradesman, ‘Eric’, visiting an unoccupied home and examining the owner’s
belongings as he made his way through various rooms. Eric helps himself to food and drink
and steals a number of items such as jewelry. Both the video and narrative contained 12
‘filler’ items (see Appendix D) included to disguise the aims of the experiment, and 8 critical
items (see Appendix C) that were subsequently referred to in the post-event narrative. Four
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of the critical items were referred to in a misleading way (‘Misled’ condition), and four of
the critical items were referred to in a neutral way (‘Control’ condition). For example, a
participant who saw Eric drink a can of Pepsi in the video might subsequently read that he
‘helped himself to a can of Coke from the fridge’ (Misled item; emphasis added) or ‘helped
himself to a can of soft drink from the fridge’ (Control item; emphasis added). Two versions
of the video and four versions of the narrative were employed in order to counter-balance33
which type of each critical item appeared in the video and whether it was subsequently
referred to in a misleading or neutral manner (see Appendix E). For example, under optimal
counter-balancing conditions half of the participants would see Coke during the video and
half would see Pepsi. In addition, half of the participants would read a misleading reference
to the drink in the narrative (either Coke or Pepsi, depending on the item presented in the
video) and half would read a neutral reference.
4.1.3 General procedure
The experiments were delivered to participants via a web browser using custom JavaScript
code written by T.E.H. Participants were told that they were participating in a study
investigating ‘visual and verbal learning modes’ (after Takarangi et al., 2006), instructed to
rely only on their memory, and asked not to write down any information.
33It should be noted that the structure of the materials did not enable us to include the ‘novel item’ within
the counter-balancing arrangements. If the novel item is to serve as an e ective foil option on the Modified
Test, then it is important that there is no bias towards selecting either the event item or the novel item (for a
participant who has no knowledge of either). In other words, it is necessary to ensure that a given item is
not inherently more plausible, or more similar to the misled item, than its alternative on the Modified Test.
One way to examine the influence of this potential confound would be to ask a new group of participants
to read a version of the narrative that contains only neutral references, and then ask them to complete the
Modified Test. As these participants will not have been previously exposed to either the event or novel
item, their performance should be at chance level if they are not inherently biased towards either option.
Ultimately, it will be necessary to replicate the present experiments using materials that allow for complete
counter-balancing of the event, misled, and novel items.
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4.1.3.1 Event Phase
On Day 1, participants were told to pay close attention to the video, as they would be asked
questions about it later in the study. After watching the video, they were asked to return
after a 24-hour interval for the next stage of the study.
4.1.3.2 Reminder Phase
On Day 2, participants in the Retrieval Practice condition (Experiments 8-10) answered 20
randomly intermixed and sequentially presented cued-recall questions about the critical items
(see Appendix C) and filler items (see Appendix D). For example, “What did Eric drink a
can of?” The questions were self-paced and a response was required before participants could
move on to the next item. For each response, participants also used a slider to provide a
confidence rating from 0-100%. Participants in the Subtle Reminder condition (Experiment
10) were simply told, “Please take a few moments to think about the video you saw yesterday”
and presented with a 30 second countdown after which the phase terminated. Participants in
the No Reminder Condition (Experiment 10) skipped this phase entirely.
4.1.3.3 Post-Event Information Phase
Immediately after the Reminder Phase, participants were instructed to read the narrative
once only. Reading time was self-paced.
4.1.3.4 Final Test Phase
On Day 3, participants were told, “During this stage we will ask you a series of questions
about the video you saw during stage 1. We are testing your memory for this video.”
Participants then completed the Original Test (Experiment 8), True/False Test (Experiment
9), or Modified Test (Experiments 8-10). For all tests, questions regarding the 8 critical items
(see Appendix C) and 12 filler items (see Appendix D) were presented in a random order.
Items were self-paced and a response was required before participants could move on to the
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next item. For each response, participants also used a slider to provide a confidence rating
from 0-100%.
For the Original Test, participants were presented with questions about the items and given
two response options: the event item and the misled item (see Appendix C and Appendix D).
The relative screen position (top/bottom) of each item type was randomised. Participants
were instructed to choose the item that most accurately represented what they saw in the
video (see Appendix F).
For the True/False Test, participants were presented with statements about the items (see
Appendix C and Appendix D). Half of the statements were correct and referred to the
event item. Half of the statements were incorrect and referred to a novel item that had not
appeared in either the video or the narrative. The number of correct/incorrect statements
was balanced across Post-Event Information conditions such that two of each type of item
(misled and control) were referred to incorrectly (i.e., statement about novel item) and two
were referred to correctly (i.e., statement about event item). None of the statements referred
to the misled item. Participants were instructed to respond ‘true’ if they saw a statement that
accurately represented what they saw in the video, or ‘false’ if it did not (see Appendix F).
The Modified Test was identical to the Original Test except that the response options were
the event item and a novel item that had not appeared in either the video or narrative. The
misled item was never an option.
4.1.4 General analysis procedure
All data used in ANOVAs met the assumption of homogeneity of variance (according to
Levene’s test). Where data used in t tests did not meet the assumption of normality (according
to a Shapiro-Wilk test), we also employed an equivalent non-parametric test (e.g., Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank). Unless otherwise reported, the outcome of non-parametric tests were consistent
with the parametric tests. Median values for all key pairwise comparisons are also shown in
Figure 4.3.
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4.1.4.1 Final Test Phase Accuracy
On the Original and Modified Tests, item accuracy (i.e., choosing the ‘event item’) was first
aggregated at the participant level providing a ‘proportion of correct responses’ score for both
misled and control items. On the True/False Test, response accuracy was first calculated at
the participant level as the hit rate minus the false alarm rate for both misled and control
items.
For the critical e ect under scrutiny (”) we considered the null hypothesis (H 0) of no di erence
in accuracy between control and misled conditions (” = 0), relative to the directional
alternative hypothesis (H 1) of higher accuracy in the control condition compared to the
misled condition (” > 0), as predicted by reconsolidation theory (see introduction). Support
for H 1 on the Modified Test would indicate memory impairment and therefore be consistent
with the overwriting of the underlying memory trace representing the event (see Figure 4.1).
Further investigation would be required to delineate the exact nature of the impairment e ect
(storage-based and/or retrieval-based). Support for H 0 would demonstrate that overwriting
had not occurred and corroborate the persistence hypothesis.
Our analysis approach consisted of a complementary battery of classical null hypothesis
significance testing (NHST), Bayesian statistics, and cumulative e ect size estimation through
meta-analysis (G. S. Howard, Maxwell, & Fleming, 2000). For each critical comparison,
statistical significance for NHST was defined at the .05 level.
Because of the interpretative di culties surrounding null e ects within a NHST framework
(Dienes, 2014), the conclusion of ‘no impairment’ in previous Modified Test studies has
always been necessarily tentative (Zaragoza, Dahlgren, & Muench, 1992). To overcome this
inferential asymmetry, we calculated directional Bayes Factors (BF 01; Rouder et al., 2009)
using a ‘default’ JZS prior (Cauchy distribution with scale r = .707). Bayes Factors can be
understood as a continuous measure of evidentiary strength for one hypothesis (e.g., H 0)
relative to a second hypothesis (e.g., H 1) and are therefore capable of indicating support for
the null. For instance, BF 01 = 3 would indicate that the observed data are three times more
likely under the null hypothesis relative to the alternative hypothesis.
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4.1.4.2 Final Test Phase Confidence
The di erence between confidence ratings (0-100%34) in the control vs. misled condition was
also examined. We first calculated mean confidence ratings for both misled and control items
at the participant level. We considered the null hypothesis (H 0) of no di erence between
conditions (” = 0), and the non-directional35 alternative hypothesis (H 1) of di erential
accuracy in the control condition compared to the misled condition (” <> 0).
4.1.4.3 Retrieval Practice Condition Coding
For individuals in the Retrieval Practice condition it was possible to gain some insight
into participants’ event knowledge at the Reminder Phase. This also enabled an analysis
of responses in the Final Test Phase contingent on recall accuracy during the Reminder
Phase. This is useful because only when items have been successfully retrieved during the
Reminder Phase can we be relatively certain that the underlying traces (a) were initially
formed and remained intact immediately prior to the Post Event Information Phase; and (b)
were successfully reactivated, and thus presumably underwent reconsolidation.
As responses during Retrieval Practice were unconstrained, manual coding was necessary
to quantify accuracy. A response was coded as ‘correct’ when its meaning approximately
matched the event information. For example, for the question “What was Eric wearing on
the lower half of his body?” (see Appendix C), the imperfect response ‘blue trousers’ would
be considered su ciently similar to the correct response “jeans”, and marked as correct. As
there was a degree of subjectivity in this process, two raters independently coded each item.
Inter-rater reliability was high (Cohen’s Ÿ = 0.92) and the small number of discrepancies
were resolved through discussion.
34Participants in Experiment 8 actually provided confidence ratings on a scale ranging from 0-5. However,
these responses have been converted to percentages so as to be consistent with confidence ratings provided in
Experiments 9 and 10, which were on a 0-100% scale.
35Although previous studies have found higher confidence ratings for control vs. misled items, we employed
non-directional tests as an e ect in the opposite direction remains plausible. These analyses can be considered
relatively exploratory as the a priori predictions of reconsolidation theory are not clear in this context.
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4.1.4.4 Filler items
Performance on filler items was high and comparable across experiments (M = 0.90, SD =
0.01) indicating good general retention of event details. No further analysis was conducted
on filler performance as it was not relevant to the hypotheses under scrutiny.
4.2 Experiment 8
This experiment had two principle goals: (1) to establish whether our hybrid reconsolidation-
misinformation paradigm could replicate the classic misinformation e ect when participants’
knowledge was measured using the Original Test (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978); and (2) to
evaluate whether memory impairment e ects could be detected using the Modified Test
under conditions that should induce a transient state of plasticity in target memory traces
whilst they undergo reconsolidation (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hardt et al., 2010).
As outlined in the introduction, the Modified Test is a more appropriate assay of memory
impairment because it minimizes the influence of unrelated factors such as misinformation
acceptance, deliberation, demand characteristics, and source-misattribution (M. McCloskey
& Zaragoza, 1985a).
As in Chan and LaPaglia (2013), participants engaged in ‘retrieval practice’ during the
Reminder Phase in order to trigger reconsolidation of the memory traces representing event
information. During the Final Test Phase one group of participants completed the Original
Test and another group completed the Modified Test.
4.2.1 Methods
4.2.1.1 Participants
Fifty-nine first-year psychology undergraduate students (52 female; 7 male; age Mdn =
18 years, range = 18-22 years) attending University College London (UCL) were recruited
as part of a class on research methods. Participants were randomly assigned to the final
test conditions (Original Test, n = 35; Modified Test, n = 24). 52 additional participants
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attempted the study but were rejected prior to data analysis due to failure to comply with
the necessary timing parameters (n = 32), technical issues that resulted in data loss (n =
7), or not attending to the video or narrative36 (n = 13). These data exclusions resulted in
unbalanced assignment to counter-balancing conditions for experimental materials (A = 19,
B = 24, C = 7, D = 9; see Appendix E), an issue that is addressed in Experiment 10. In this
and all subsequent experiments, participants provided informed consent and received either
monetary compensation or course credits. The local UCL ethics committee approved the
study.
4.2.1.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was a 2 x 2 mixed-factorial design with Post-Event Information (Control,
Misled) manipulated within-subjects and Final Test (Original, Modified) manipulated between-
subjects. The primary dependent variable was the mean proportion of correct responses (i.e.,
choosing the ‘event’ item) on either the Modified Test or the Original Test.
The Event Phase (Day 1) and Final Test Phase (Day 3) were completed remotely on partici-
pants’ personal computing devices. For the Reminder Phase and Post-Event Information
Phase (Day 2) participants were tested under close supervision in three batches of approx-
imately equal size in a large university computer room. Participants were instructed to
maintain as close to a 24-hour interval between daily sessions as they could manage (time
between Day 1 end and Day 2 start: M = 22.13h, SD = 4.08h; time between Day 2 end and
Day 3 start: M = 25.08h, SD = 3.67h).
4.2.2 Results and discussion
A 2 x 2 mixed-factorial ANOVA with Post-Event Information (Misled, Control) and Final Test
(Original, Modified) as independent variables and mean proportion correct as the dependent
36Participants were strictly instructed to watch the video and read the narrative in a single sitting. Our
software monitored whether these rules were adhered to, for example by recording use of the video ‘pause’
button.
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variable indicated a significant main e ect of Post-Event Information, F (1, 57) = 43.72,
p < .001, ÷2G = .27, a significant main e ect of Final Test, F (1, 57) = 77.10, p < .001,
÷2G = .42, and a significant interaction between the two factors, F (1, 57) = 31.63, p < .001,
÷2G = .21. We therefore proceeded with pairwise comparisons between control and misled
conditions independently for the Original Test and the Modified Test (see Figure 4.3).
The misinformation e ect observed in the Original Test group was consistent with previous
studies (e.g., Loftus et al., 1989, 1978). For misled items, the proportion of correct responses
was substantially lower than performance for control items, and even fell below chance level
(50%), demonstrating that participants were strongly inclined to report misinformation rather
than event information. Furthermore, consistent with previous studies (Loftus et al., 1989;
Takarangi et al., 2006), responses in the misled condition were endorsed with higher confidence
ratings compared to responses in the control condition (see Table 4.1).
However, there was an unexpected di erence in baseline performance during the Reminder
Phase (Table 4.2). Specifically, retrieval practice performance was lower for items that were
subsequently selected for the misled condition compared to items that were subsequently
selected for the control condition. Although this di erence was not statistically significant
in the parametric analysis, a Shapiro-Wilk test suggested that the assumption of normality
could be breached (W = 0.90, p = .004), and a Wilcoxon-Signed Rank (non-parametric)
test was statistically significant (z = 5.78, p = <.001). Nevertheless, when the data were
analysed contingent on correct responding during Reminder Phase retrieval practice, overall
accuracy was higher, and a large di erence between control and misled conditions remained
(Table 4.3). Therefore, the observed misinformation e ect cannot be solely attributed to
di erences in baseline performance between the control and misled conditions.
According to the reconsolidation-overwriting hypothesis (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Hardt et al., 2010) the misinformation e ect observed in the Original Test group is at
least partially driven by the erasure of event memory traces. However, despite invoking
conditions that should disrupt memory reconsolidation, performance in the Modified Test
group indicated that the event memory traces had persisted (Figure 4.3). Consistent with
previous studies (e.g., M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), no di erence was observed between
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performance in the control and misled conditions when the Modified Test was employed.
To avoid inferential ambiguity in the interpretation of this null e ect we employed Bayes
Factors which indicated moderate evidence (BF 01 = 5.102) in favour of the null hypothesis
relative to the reconsolidation-overwriting hypothesis. Interestingly, Modified Test responses
were endorsed with higher confidence ratings for control items compared to misled items
suggesting that misinformation did have some impact on participants’ strength of belief in
the veracity of event item responses, despite not influencing their recognition accuracy (see
Table 4.1).
In the Modified Test group, Reminder Phase performance was comparable for the control
and misled conditions (Table 4.2). When Final Test performance was analysed contingent
on Reminder Phase performance overall performance was elevated, but there was still no
di erence between control and misled conditions (Table 4.3). Therefore, the absence of
a misinformation e ect cannot be attributed to a failure to reactivate the memory traces
representing the event information (a necessary trigger for reconsolidation).
In summary, Experiment 8 has demonstrated that misinformation e ects detected using the
Original Test are not indicative of reconsolidation-mediated overwriting of event memory
traces. Responses in the Modified Test reveal that those traces persist, even under conditions
that should disrupt their reconsolidation.
4.3 Experiment 9
The findings of Experiment 8 are inconsistent with the theory that reconsolidation enables the
overwriting of memory traces in the misinformation paradigm (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013;
Hardt et al., 2010). However, it has previously been suggested that performance impairments
observed on a True/False Test were indicative of a reconsolidation-overwriting e ect (J. C.
K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013). In order to examine this claim in more detail, our second
experiment aimed to (1) to replicate Chan and LaPaglia’s (2013) finding of a misinformation
e ect with the True/False Test; and (2) to ask the same participants to respond to the same
items using the Modified Test to examine whether any performance deficits detected on
the True/False Test could be attributed to overwriting. Even if the findings of Chan and
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Figure 4.3: Descriptive and inferential statistics for Experiments 8-10. Figure shows means
(black circles), 95% CIs (error bars), medians (white diamonds, often overlapping with means),
individual participant scores (small coloured circles), kernel density distributions (grey lines)
and a combined e ect size (square) estimated by a random e ects model for Reminder-only
(Practice or Subtle) Modified Test experiments.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive and inferential statistics for confidence ratings (0-100%) provided during
the Final Test Phase.






t p BF 01
1 Orig Practice 64.57(18.45) 76.00(20.32) -11.43[-18.42,-4.44] -3.32 .002 0.062
1 Mod Practice 64.38(16.11) 56.04(20.38) 8.33[0.08,16.59] 2.09 .048 0.744
2 T/F Practice 68.59(18.43) 76.23(17.77) -7.64[-12.74,-2.54] -2.99 .004 0.130
2 Mod Practice 65.84(21.48) 67.22(23.16) -1.38[-7.22,4.45] -0.47 .637 6.601
3 Mod Practice 65.58(20.79) 61.43(25.18) 4.16[-3.36,11.67] 1.12 .271 3.428
3 Mod Subtle 62.03(18.17) 61.55(20.46) 0.48[-7.46,8.41] 0.12 .904 6.083
3 Mod None 61.12(25.08) 63.77(21.83) -2.65[-9.51,4.20] -0.78 .439 4.599
Exp, Experiment. Test types: Orig = Original, T/F = True/False, Mod = Modified. BF 01, Bayes
factor quantifying evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (H 0) relative to the reconsolidation
hypothesis (H 1).








t p BF 01
1 Orig .43(.25) .34(.24) 0.09[-0.02,0.19] 1.61 .058 0.913
1 Mod .41(.23) .44(.17) -0.03[-0.14,0.08] -0.57 .713 6.794
2 Mod and T/F .45(.26) .47(.25) -0.02[-0.09,0.06] -0.41 .658 9.841
3 Mod .43(.29) .50(.27) -0.07[-0.18,0.03] -1.43 .920 13.833
Exp, Experiment. Test types: Orig = Original, Mod and T/F = Modified and
True/False, Mod = Modified. BF 01, Bayes factor quantifying evidence in favor of
the null hypothesis (H 0) relative to the reconsolidation hypothesis (H 1).
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Table 4.3: Descriptive and inferential statistics for Final Test performance
contingent on correct responses during Retrieval Practice.






t p BF 01
1 Orig 24 .93(.16) .47(.45) 0.46[0.25,0.67] 4.50 <.001 0.006
1 Mod 21 .92(.24) .93(.18) -0.01[-0.16,0.13] -0.17 .567 4.338
2 T/F 17 .91(.20) .68(.43) 0.24[-0.01,0.48] 2.06 .028 0.745
2 Mod 57 .95(.19) .89(.28) 0.06[-0.03,0.15] 1.32 .096 3.032
3 Mod 33 .87(.27) .94(.15) -0.07[-0.18,0.04] -1.25 .890 2.636
Exp, Experiment. Test types: Orig = Original, T/F = True/False, Mod =
Modified. BF 01, Bayes factor quantifying evidence in favor of the null hypothesis
(H 0) relative to the reconsolidation hypothesis (H 1).
LaPaglia (2013) are replicated here, the concurrent absence of performance deficits on the
Modified Test would suggest that the e ect observed in ExperimentCL 6 is not indicative
of reconsolidation-overwriting and is more likely attributable to other factors (Belli, 1989;
Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989).
To reduce the extent to which responses on one test might influence responses on the other
(e.g., attempting to provide consistent responses on both tests), we counter-balanced the order
of test type and introduced an inter-test ‘spot-the-di erence’ filler task (~ 3 minutes). As in
Experiment 8 (and J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013) all participants engaged in ‘Retrieval
Practice’ during the Reminder Phase in order to trigger memory reconsolidation.
4.3.1 Methods
4.3.1.1 Participants
Sixty-five first-year UCL psychology undergraduate students (52 female; 11 male; 2 unstated;
Mdn age = 18 years, age range = 18-21 years) were recruited as part of a class on research
methods (a di erent cohort to Experiment 8). 48 additional participants attempted the study
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but were rejected prior to data analysis due to failure to comply with the necessary timing
parameters (n = 36), technical issues that resulted in data loss (n = 8), or not attending to
the video or narrative (n = 4). These data exclusions resulted in unbalanced assignment to
counter-balancing conditions for experimental materials (A = 13, B = 14, C = 20, D = 18;
see Appendix E), an issue that is addressed in Experiment 10.
4.3.1.2 Design and Procedure
The experiment was a within-subjects design with one independent variable: Post-Event
Information (Control, Misled). All participants completed two types of Final Test: the
Modified Test and the True/False Test. The order of the tests was counter-balanced across
participants (True/False then Modified, n = 32; Modified then True/False, n = 33). Two
dependent variables were measured: (1) the mean proportion of correct responses on the
Modified Test; and (2) the mean hit rate – false alarm rate on the True/False Test (see
subsection 4.1.4 for details). The Event Phase (Day 1) and Final Test Phase (Day 3) were
completed remotely on participants’ personal computing devices. For the Reminder Phase
and Post-Event Information Phase (Day 2) participants were tested under close supervision in
three batches of approximately equal size in a large university computer room. Participants
were instructed to maintain as close to a 24-hour interval between daily sessions as they could
manage (time between end of Day 1 session and start of Day 2 session: M = 21.36h, SD =
3.01h; time between end of Day 2 session and start of Day 3 session: M = 25.64h, SD =
3.29h).
4.3.2 Results and discussion
We first employed 2 (Test Order: modified-statements, statements-modified) x 2 (Post-Event
Information: misled, control) mixed factorial ANOVAs to identify any influence of Test Order.
We did this separately for the two dependent variables: mean proportion correct on the
Modified Test and hit rate – false rate on the True/False Test. For Modified Test performance
there was no significant main e ect of Test Order, F (1, 63) = 0.03, p = .854, ÷2G = .00, or
interaction with Post Event Information, F (1, 63) = 0.45, p = .506, ÷2G = .00. For True/False
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Test performance the main e ect of Test Order, F (1, 63) = 3.82, p = .055, ÷2G = .03, was close
to the alpha level (– = .05). However, there was no significant interaction of Test Order with
Post Event Information, F (1, 63) = 0.55, p = .459, ÷2G = .00. Therefore, we collapsed the
remaining analyses across Test Order conditions and proceeded with pairwise comparisons
between control and misled conditions (see Figure 4.3).
The misinformation e ect observed on the True/False Test was relatively small and only 21
out of 65 participants showed performance deficits larger than zero. The di erence between
conditions was not statistically significant. As in the Original Test group of Experiment
8, responses were endorsed with significantly higher confidence ratings for control items
compared to misled items (see Table 4.1).
Although small, the observed e ect appears to be numerically consistent with the outcomes
of ExperimentCL 6 and thus constitutes an approximate replication of J. C. K. Chan &
LaPaglia (2013) original findings. However, despite having almost twice the sample size of
the original experiment, a Bayesian analysis indicated that the True/False outcomes observed
in Experiment 9 are inconclusive (BF 01 = 1.284, equivalently the data are only 0.78 times
more likely under H 1 relative to H 0). A Bayes Factor for ExperimentCL 6 (calculated using
statistics reported in the original article: t = 2.04, n = 33) indicates that the evidence in
the original experiment was also relatively inconclusive (BF 01 = 0.444, equivalently the data
were only 2.25 times more likely under H 1 relative to H 0). A meta-analytic Bayes Factor
combining the data of the two experiments (n = 98) indicates moderate support for the
alternative hypothesis (BF 01 = 0.278, equivalently the data are 3.59 times more likely under
H 1 relative to H 0).
Despite the small e ect detected on the True/False test, there was no significant di erence
between control and misled conditions when the same participants responded to the same
items on the Modified Test. This is is consistent with the findings of Experiment 8, and
demonstrates that memory impairment, and thus reconsolidation-mediated overwriting, is
not a likely cause of the performance deficits obtained using the True/False test (also see
Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989; Belli, 1989). Confidence ratings also
did not di er significantly between the control and misled conditions (see Table 4.1).
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Retrieval practice performance at the Reminder Phase (which applies to both Final Test
types) was comparable for the control and misled conditions (Table 4.2). When analysed
contingent on Reminder Phase performance, overall Final Test performance was elevated,
but maintained the same qualitative pattern for both test types (Table 4.3). Therefore, the
findings cannot be attributed to di erences in baseline performance, or a failure to reactivate
event memory traces.
4.4 Experiment 10
Experiments 8 and 9 demonstrated that misinformation e ects could be detected in a hybrid
reconsolidation-misinformation paradigm using either the Original Test or the True/False Test.
However, both experiments also showed that misinformation e ects were not detected when
the Modified Test was used. This is inconsistent with the predictions of the reconsolidation-
overwriting hypothesis and suggests that responses on the Original and True/False Tests are
influenced by factors unrelated to memory impairment.
In Experiment 10, we introduced a novel manipulation to expand upon the findings of
Experiments 8 and 9. The precise nature of the reminder phase was adjusted across three
groups as it has been suggested that certain types of reminder can be more or less e ective at
triggering reconsolidation (see Chapter 2, Forcato et al., 2009; W. C. Gordon, 1983; Hupbach
et al., 2008; Sevenster et al., 2014). As in Experiments 8 and 9, one group of participants
engaged in retrieval practice at the Reminder Phase. Retrieval practice has several practical
benefits (also see J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013). For instance, it enables the researcher to
check whether participants actually recalled the critical items, thus providing an important
manipulation check as to whether (a) the critical items have been successfully encoded
and could be successfully retrieved; and (b) that the relevant memory traces have been
‘reactivated’, and thus, presumably, started to undergo reconsolidation.
However, it has been suggested that reminder trials involving overt rehearsal of information
by the participant, or re-presentation of information by the researcher, are not appropriate in
reconsolidation studies because they (a) provide an opportunity for relearning that could
strengthen the relevant trace (W. C. Gordon, 1983); and (b) do not involve a mismatch
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between the retrieval cue and the environment (prediction error) which has been proposed
as a critical reconsolidation trigger (Forcato et al., 2009; Sevenster et al., 2014). In several
human reconsolidation studies a ‘subtle reminder’ that does not involve overt rehearsal of
specific event details has been employed which may avoid these issues (e.g., Hupbach et
al., 2007, 2008). A disadvantage of using a subtle-reminder is that one cannot ascertain
whether participants have retrieved the relevant information. This is important because
simply providing a cue is not always e ective at eliciting retrieval (Tulving, 1974), making
it unclear whether the underlying traces have actually been reactivated. The theoretical
relevance of prediction error also remains unclear because it does not always seem to be a
necessary factor to elicit reported reconsolidation e ects (e.g., Duvarci & Nader, 2004; St
Jacques & Schacter, 2013, see Chapter 2 for further discussion). Nevertheless, we included
a second ‘Subtle Reminder’ group who were simply told, “Please take a few moments to
think about the video you saw yesterday” and presented with a 30 second countdown after
which the Reminder Phase terminated. To assess whether a reminder had any impact on
performance we also included a third ‘No Reminder’ control group who did not complete the
Reminder Phase at all.
Experiment 10 also a orded an opportunity to conduct a rigorous replication of Experiments
8 and 9 (Modified Test only) whilst exerting tighter control over the spatial and temporal
context. Participants who failed to follow instructions (e.g., pausing the video) or did not
follow precise timing parameters across the three-day study were immediately excluded and
replaced to ensure balanced numbers across conditions. A subgroup participated under tightly
controlled laboratory conditions: they attended the same testing room at the same time
on each day of the study, and always interacted with the same experimenter (see Hupbach
et al., 2008). A larger sample took part via the Internet but still adhered to strict timing
parameters.
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4.4.1 Methods
4.4.1.1 Participants
One-hundred and thirty-two participants (65 female; 64 male; 3 unstated; Mdn age = 25
years; age range = 19-50 years) were recruited from the UCL mixed-occupation subject pool
(n = 36) or online crowd-sourcing platform Prolific Academic (n = 96). Participants were
randomly and evenly assigned to the three reminder conditions (n = 44 per condition) and
four counter-balancing conditions (n = 33 per condition). During testing, 100 additional
participants were immediately and automatically rejected by the experimental software due
to failure to comply with the necessary timing parameters (n = 74), or not attending to the
video/narrative (n = 26).
4.4.1.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was a 2 x 3 mixed-factorial design with Post-Event Information (Control,
Misled) manipulated within-subjects and Reminder Condition (No Reminder, Subtle Re-
minder, Retrieval Practice) manipulated between-subjects. As in Experiments 8 and 9, the
dependent variable was the mean proportion of correct responses (i.e., choosing the ‘event’
item) on the Modified Test.
All phases took place across three consecutive days (Figure 4.2). The sample recruited
from UCL attended our testing rooms in person and the online sample completed the study
remotely on their own personal computing devices.
Participants were instructed to begin each daily session at 24-hour intervals (±2 hours) and
our software enforced these timings by immediately ejecting those who missed this time
window. This a orded tightly controlled time intervals in both the laboratory group (time
between Day 1 end and Day 2 start: M = 23.78, SD = .25h; time between Day 2 end and
Day 3 start: M = 23.93h, SD = .35h) and the online group (time between Day 1 end and
Day 2 start: M = 23.49, SD = .98h; time between Day 2 end and Day 3 start: M = 23.80h,
SD = .81h).
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4.4.2 Results and discussion
We first computed a 2 (Post-Event Information: control, misled) x 3 (Reminder Condition:
No Reminder, Subtle Reminder, Retrieval Practice) ANOVA with mean proportion correct
as the dependent variable. There was no significant main e ect of Post-Event Information,
F (1, 129) = 0.78, p = .380, ÷2G = .00, no significant main e ect of Reminder Condition,
F (2, 129) = 1.19, p = .308, ÷2G = .01, and no significant interaction between the two factors,
F (2, 129) = 0.01, p = .989, ÷2G = .00. Despite the absence of any statistically significant
e ects, descriptive and inferential statistics for pairwise contrasts between control and misled
conditions are presented in Figure 4.3 to aid comparison with other experiments.
Consistent with the findings of Experiments 8 and 9, no misinformation e ects were detected
using the Modified Test either when there was No Reminder, a Subtle Reminder, or Retrieval
Practice. Furthermore, when reminder phase performance was taken into account (Retrieval
Practice condition only), overall performance was elevated but remained comparable in
the control and misled conditions (Table 4.3). There were no inter-condition di erences in
baseline performance during the Reminder Phase (Table 4.2). As in Experiment 9, there
was no significant di erence in confidence ratings between the control and misled conditions
(Table 4.1). Bayesian analysis indicated moderate support for H 0 relative to H 1 in all three
Reminder Conditions (Figure 4.3). These findings replicate the outcomes of Experiments 8
and 9 with a larger sample size, and tighter control of spatial and temporal context. They
also indicate that the absence of a misinformation e ect in those experiments cannot be
attributed to the use of a reminder that involves overt retrieval practice.
4.5 Meta-analysis
Across three experiments we have observed clear evidence that even under conditions that
should enable reconsolidation-mediated overwriting of event memory traces, it is the parame-
ters of the test-retrieval situation that determine the presence or absence of misinformation
e ects. Although performance on the Original Test and True/False Test might initially
suggest memory impairment, the absence of misinformation e ects on the Modified Test
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reveals that, after being misled, participants are capable of recognizing the event information
to the same extent as when they are not misled.
To support this conclusion, we combined Modified Test outcomes across Experiments 8-10
(excluding the Experiment 10 No Reminder group where a reconsolidation e ect was not
predicted) using both conventional and Bayesian meta-analytic approaches (Figure 4.3). A
random e ects model (k = 4) yielded a combined e ect size of -0.002, 95% CI[-0.053; 0.049]
indicating at most a negligible e ect of misleading information on recall accuracy compared
to neutral information.
For the Bayesian meta-analysis we used t values to compute a meta-analytic Bayes Factor
for each test type (Morey & Rouder, 2015). As throughout this article, we compared the null
hypothesis (H 0) of no di erence in accuracy between control and misled conditions (” = 0),
to the directional alternative hypothesis (H 1) of higher accuracy in the control condition
compared to the misled condition (” > 0; see subsection 4.1.4 for details). This analysis
indicated strong support for H 0 relative to H 1 (BF 01 = 12.082).
4.6 General discussion
It is well established that learning new information can influence an individual’s ability to
recall previously learned information (Crowder, 1976). However, these ‘retroactive interference’
e ects can often be attributed to retrieval-based factors and do not necessarily imply that
the underlying memory trace has been altered (see Chapter 1, Bouton, 2002; Tulving, 1974).
Identifying the locus of interference that causes misinformation e ects has proved to be the
subject of considerable controversy and various accounts have been proposed that entail
storage-based memory impairment (Chandler, 1989; Loftus et al., 1985), retrieval-based
memory impairment (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Chandler, 1991), or no memory impairment
at all (M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a).
The present study was motivated by renewed interested in the storage-based ‘destructive
updating’ or ‘overwriting’ hypothesis (Loftus et al., 1985) from the perspective of memory
reconsolidation theory (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hardt et al., 2010). According to
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this account, reactivating event memory traces will trigger a time-dependent reconsolidation
process during which they are vulnerable to modification through the presentation of misin-
formation. However, decades of intensive investigation has revealed that the misinformation
e ect is strongly moderated by the precise nature of the test used to measure participants’
knowledge of the event (Loftus, 2005; Zaragoza et al., 2006). A previous study that reported
reconsolidation-mediated overwriting in a misinformation paradigm (J. C. K. Chan & La-
Paglia, 2013) arguably employed a test (the True/False Test) unsuitable for the detection of
trace alteration because it does not exclude the contribution of factors unrelated to memory
impairment (Belli, 1989; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989).
In three reconsolidation-misinformation experiments, we employed an alternative assay of
participants’ event knowledge (the Modified Test; M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), which
is considered to minimize the role of such factors, thus providing a relatively ‘pure’ index of
memory impairment (either storage- or retrieval-based; see Figure 4.1). Classic misinformation
e ects were replicated with conventional tests (Original Test, True/False Test), but were not
observed with the Modified Test. This was also the case when di erent reminder protocols
were employed (Experiment 10, cf. Hupbach et al., 2008; Forcato et al., 2009). The conclusion
of ‘no impairment’ in previous Modified Test studies has always been somewhat tentative
(Zaragoza et al., 1992) because it is inherently di cult to interpret null e ects within the
NHST framework (Dienes, 2014). However, we overcame this ambiguity by using Bayes
Factors to determine the degree of evidentiary support for the null hypothesis relative to
the reconsolidation-overwriting hypothesis. Together these experiments provide compelling
evidence against the claim that reconsolidation enables the overwriting of event memories in
the misinformation paradigm (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Hardt et al., 2010).
The findings observed here do not suggest that retrieving information prior to new learning
has no influence on participants’ memory, only that it does not enable the overwriting of
event memory traces. In fact, there is considerable evidence that retrieval practice can both
enhance subsequent recall of previously acquired ‘old’ information (the “backward testing
e ect”; Tulving, 1967; Roediger & Butler, 2011) and simultaneously enhance learning of ‘new’
information (the “forward testing e ect”; Pastötter & Bäuml, 2014). The latter phenomenon
202
CHAPTER 4. RECONSOLIDATION AND THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT
has been investigated specifically in the context of the misinformation paradigm where it
is has been referred to as ‘retrieval enhanced suggestibility’ (RES; L. T. Gordon, Thomas,
& Bulevich, 2015; J. C. K. Chan et al., 2009; J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; J. C. K.
Chan & Langley, 2011). A RES e ect occurs when, relative to a group receiving no reminder,
a retrieval practice phase prior to misinformation exposure increases the likelihood that
participants’ will respond with the misleading information on a subsequent test.
It was not our intention to evaluate the RES hypothesis in the present experiments; indeed
RES e ects can only be examined with tests that allow for responding with the misled item.
RES e ects were therefore not anticipated on the Modified Test and True/False Test, which
were the focus of the present investigation37. Nevertheless, evidence obtained in recent RES
studies is consistent with the findings of the present experiments. L. T. Gordon and Thomas
(2014) measured event knowledge using the Modified-Modified-Free-Recall test (MMFR; J.
M. Barnes & Underwood, 1959) which allows participants to report details from both the
event and post-event stages. Compared to a no-reminder group, participants who performed
a retrieval practice task prior to misinformation exposure recalled more misled items and
event items. Therefore, prior retrieval of event information appears to enhance the learning
of subsequently presented misinformation, but not at the expense of participants’ ability to
recall the event information, a finding entirely consistent with the persistence hypothesis.
Outside the context of memory reconsolidation, is there remaining evidence for the overwriting
hypothesis? In the introduction we referred to a previous meta-analysis of misinformation
studies that employed the Modified Test. Payne et al. (1994) found that although in the
majority of experiments (30/44) researchers did not observe misinformation e ects, when all
cases were combined, there was a small but statistically significant di erence between the
control (M = 75.8%) and misled (M = 71.7%) conditions, t(43) = 4.65, p < .001. If accurate,
this analysis suggests that memory impairment, and thus potentially trace overwriting (see
Figure 4.1), does contribute to misinformation e ects, albeit only to a small degree. However,
the analysis approach is potentially problematic. Treating each experiment as an individual
data point and conducting a single overall t-test does not account for the precision of each
37A no-reminder control group would be required to measure RES using the Original Test in Experiment 8.
203
CHAPTER 4. RECONSOLIDATION AND THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT
e ect size estimate. Formal meta-analytic methods typically attribute greater weight to
studies with higher precision, as they more accurately estimate the magnitude of the e ect
under scrutiny (Cumming, 2012). It is possible that Payne et al. (1994) were unable to
account for precision in their analysis because standard deviations were not reported in the
majority of the original sources. Indeed, this issue has also prevented us from running our
own meta-analysis using models with appropriate precision-based weighting. However, as we
were able to obtain information about sample size from the original sources, it was possible
to make some assessment of the degree to which precision could be influencing the magnitude
of misinformation e ects in this particular set of studies.
Figure 4.4 shows a scatter plot of sample size against the magnitude of the misinformation
e ect for Experiments 8-10 and the 41 experiments38 used in the analysis by Payne et al.
(1994). Visual inspection suggests an asymmetrical distribution: moderate misinformation
e ects have been detected in experiments with smaller sample sizes, but are absent from
experiments with particularly large sample sizes. A relationship between study precision
and e ect magnitude is often quantified using Egger’s test (Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider,
& Minder, 1997) to evaluate whether the pattern of data points is indicative of selective
reporting bias. The test computes a regression of the standardized e ect size against inverse
standard error (as a proxy for study precision), weighted by the inverse of the variance.
However, because we lack the necessary statistics (SDs, SEs, or ts) to perform this test, we
have used sample size as a proxy for study precision.
A regression model (weighted by sample size; see Figure 4.4) indicates that the magnitude
of the misinformation e ect has a modest relationship with sample size (R2 = 0.12, t =
-2.41, p = 0.02). The reasons for this pattern are di cult to identify definitively, and do not
necessarily reflect selective reporting bias (Sterne & Egger, 2001). Distribution asymmetry
can also be driven by other characteristics of experiments that happen to have small samples.
Figure 4.4 does appear to indicate that larger misinformation e ects (>.1) have typically only
38Three cases used in the original analysis (Payne et al., 1994) were subgroups within experiments (Belli,
1993; Bonto & Payne, 1991). As sample size was reported at the experiment level in the original sources, we
have collapsed over these subgroups resulting in 41 rather than 44 cases overall.
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Figure 4.4: Scatterplot showing the 41 Modified Test experiments (circles) used in the
meta-analysis by Payne et al. (1994) and Experiments 8-10 (triangles) as a function of sample
size (n) and misinformation e ect (control performance minus misled performance). Black
shapes indicate between-subject designs and white shapes indicate within-subject designs.
The red line represents a weighted regression model (see main text for details). The dashed
grey line represents a zero e ect.
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been observed in between-subjects designs which are likely to be underpowered compared
to their within-subject counterparts (assuming equivalent sample size). It is worth noting
that all 5 of these between-subjects experiments were reported in two infant studies (Ceci,
Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Toglia, Ross, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1992), and similar e ects were not
observed in close replication attempts that employed a within-subjects design (Zaragoza et al.,
1992). Additionally, 7 of the experiments that observed modest and statistically significant
e ects were drawn from a line of empirical enquiry that ultimately found evidence that the
performance deficits were temporary, and therefore could not be due to trace overwriting
(Chandler, 1989, 1991, see below for further details).
In light of strong evidence supporting the null hypothesis (e.g., Experiments 8-10, M. Mc-
Closkey & Zaragoza, 1985a), we have naturally sought to identify reasons why misinformation
e ects were observed in a small number of Modified Test studies. However, the reader is
cautioned that our observations and analyses pertaining to the previous meta-analysis (Payne
et al., 1994) are necessarily exploratory (i.e., analyses were conducted after looking at the
data), and therefore do not constitute a confirmatory test of a pre-specified hypothesis (Wa-
genmakers et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the apparent relationship between e ect magnitude and
study precision precludes a straightforward interpretation of any overall e ect size estimate
one may attempt to derive from this data set, particularly if that estimate does not account
for study precision as was the case in Payne et al. (1994). Unfortunately, the absence of
statistical information in the original sources has proved a major obstacle, and it remains
an open question as to whether impairment e ects detected using the Modified Test are
reliable. In order to enable future endeavours towards cumulative science, we would strongly
encourage researchers to make their raw data publicly available in a persistent third party
repository upon publication (Morey et al., 2016). Going forward, the field might consider
conducting a pre-registered, multi-lab, Registered Replication Report (Simons et al., 2014)
to identify the degree to which memory impairment e ects can be reliably detected in the
misinformation paradigm.
It is worth repeating that even if misinformation e ects are observed using the Modified Test,
such a finding would only be consistent with the overwriting hypothesis but cannot determine
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the relative involvement of storage-based and/or retrieval-based factors (see Figure 4.1).
Furthermore, there is an unfortunate philosophical asymmetry between storage-based and
retrieval-based accounts. Given the limited methodological repertoire of the experimental
psychologist (M. J. Watkins, 1990), and our incomplete theoretical characterisation of the
memory trace (for a recent review see Josselyn, Köhler, & Frankland, 2015), storage-based
accounts cannot be directly corroborated at present. As such, only retrieval-based accounts
currently provide testable predictions, and proponents of storage-based accounts are left in the
unenviable position of claiming theory corroboration only when retrieval-based explanations
appear to have been exhausted (e.g., Melton & Irwin, 1940).
Unfortunately, the role of retrieval-based factors is not always immediately apparent. The
research line developed by Chandler39 provides a clear illustration of this issue (Chandler,
1991, also see 1993; and Windschitl, 1996). After observing retroactive interference e ects
using the Modified Test, Chandler (1989) initially concluded that her findings o ered support
for the overwriting hypothesis. However, in subsequent experiments40, Chandler (1991)
observed that the interference did not persist over a 48hr delay, a ‘spontaneous recovery’
e ect (Rescorla, 2004) that can presumably be attributed to the alleviation of some transient
inhibitory process, and demonstrates that overwriting had not occurred. It is striking that
across a variety of retroactive interference paradigms, performance deficits observed on an
initial test can often be alleviated, after waiting for a short delay, or through the provision of
additional retrieval cues (Bouton, 2002; Tulving, 1974, see Chapter 1).
The need to consider retrieval-failure explanations is especially pertinent for reconsolidation
39Chandler’s stimuli were deliberately designed to be somewhat di erent to those typically used in
misinformation studies (for details see Chandler, 1989). The ‘event’, ‘misled’, and ‘foil’ items were adjacent
sections of landscape scenes (e.g., a beach) divided into three parts. Because the scenes were fairly homogeneous,
the subsections were highly similar and not easily assigned distinctive verbal labels (unlike for instance,
“stop” sign and “yield” sign in Loftus et al., 1978). Chandler (1989) argued that this reduced discriminability
was more likely to elicit interference e ects. In addition, unlike many misinformation studies both the
event information and post-event information were presented in the same modality, likely making them less
discriminable during the Final Test Phase (also see Lindsay, 1990).
40Chandler (1991) also reported several replications from her laboratory, including a within-experiment
comparison of the short- and long-retention interval groups.
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theory, which suggests that under specific conditions ‘recovery’ from retroactive interference
can be avoided (Nader, 2003a; Nader & Hardt, 2009), a claim that has considerable ethical
and clinical ramifications (Hui & Fisher, 2014; Schwabe et al., 2014). Moreover, our review
of the literature indicates that the extant evidence for the theory is remarkably tenuous
(see Chapter 2). Although striking performance deficits have been reported in human
participants using a procedural sequence learning paradigm (Walker et al., 2003), and a
fear-conditioning paradigm (Schiller et al., 2010, 2013), these e ects were absent in several
subsequent replication attempts (e.g., Chapter 3, Hardwicke et al., 2016; Golkar et al., 2012;
Kindt & Soeter, 2013), suggesting that either the original e ects were false positives, or
the necessary conditions for reliably obtaining reconsolidation e ects have not yet been
adequately specified. Either way, future replications are to be encouraged as they are a vital
tool for verifying the reliability of previous findings, and/or identifying genuine boundary
conditions, both essential ingredients of theoretical progress. In Experiment 9, we obtained
an approximate replication of the reconsolidation e ect reported in Chan & LaPaglia (2013),
but found that it is contingent on the type of test used to assay participants’ event knowledge,
and therefore cannot be attributed to reconsolidation.
In summary, the findings of the present study have demonstrated that although exposure to
contradictory misinformation can influence performance on some types of memory test, this
cannot necessarily be attributed to reconsolidation-mediated overwriting of existing memory
traces. This does not diminish the potential implications of the misinformation e ect for
eyewitness testimony. In fact, our findings imply a degree of optimism: if event memory
traces have persisted then the information that they represent has not been irrecoverably lost.
This highlights the importance of fostering a favourable retrieval environment (Chandler &
Fisher, 1996), and critically, asking the witness the right question.
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Does memory retrieval help or hinder the correction of semantic misconceptions?
“Some beliefs...we shall probably retain while we live. Some...we may abandon tomorrow
in the face of adverse evidence.”
— Quine and Ullian, 1978
Often we are quite adept at answering general knowledge questions like “Who wrote the
novel ‘1984’?” (Orwell), “What is the capital of Peru?” (Lima), and “What is the collective
term used to describe a group of owls?” (a parliament). However, it is not uncommon for
errors to infiltrate our knowledge store. Individuals readily learn erroneous information from
a diverse range of sources, including films (Butler, Zaromb, Lyle, & Roediger, 2009), fictional
stories (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003), and even multiple-choice tests (Roediger & Marsh,
2005). In one survey of 671 university students for example (Tauber, Dunlosky, Rawson,
Rhodes, & Sitzman, 2013), it was relatively common for individuals to suggest that the
capital of Australia is Sydney (it’s Canberra), the largest desert on earth is the Sahara (it’s
Antarctica), and the name of the man who started the Reformation in Germany was Hitler
(it was Luther).
Although misconceptions can be fairly innocuous, they can also have serious detrimental
consequences at both the individual and societal level (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz,
& Cook, 2012b). For example, in 1998 a (subsequently retracted) study published in The
Lancet claimed to have identified a link between the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine and
autism. The subsequent dissemination of this misinformation was implicated in reduced
vaccination rates, and outbreaks of previously controlled diseases, a situation described as a
‘public health tragedy’ (Gust, Darling, Kennedy, & Schwartz, 2008; Poland & Spier, 2010).
In education, several surveys have revealed a high prevalence of brain-related misconceptions
(‘neuromyths’) amongst teachers, for example, “Short bouts of co-ordination exercises can
improve integration of left and right hemispheric brain function” (Dekker, Lee, Howard-
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Jones, & Jolles, 2012). This false information is often used to justify the use of discredited
educational interventions in classrooms (Howard-Jones, 2014). Despite concerns about the
harmful e ect of misconceptions, there remains a great deal to learn about methods for
e ectively ‘correcting’ or ‘updating’ erroneous ‘old’ information stored in memory with
replacement ‘new’ information.
An improved understanding might be gained through consideration of the widely reported
empirical phenomenon of ‘retroactive interference’, whereby learning of new information
perturbs the subsequent recall of previously learned old information (M. C. Anderson &
Neely, 1996; Crowder, 1976). This e ect has been intensively investigated using the A-B, A-C
paired-associate learning paradigm (for details see Chapter 1) whereby cue-target pairs (e.g.,
Horse-Leaf ; A-B) are ‘updated’ with new targets (e.g., Horse-Chair, A-C). This is broadly
analogous to replacing a semantic misconception (e.g., Capital of Australia-Sydney, A-B),
with accurate information (e.g., Capital of Australia-Canberra, A-C)41. On a subsequent test
in which participants are provided with cues and asked to respond with targets, it is typically
found that recall of the old information (B) is markedly impaired relative to a control group
who did not learn the new information (C; e.g., Underwood, 1948; Melton & Irwin, 1940).
According to this evidence then, simply providing replacement information might reduce the
impact of semantic misconceptions by impeding their subsequent recall.
A fundamental issue however, is that retroactive interference e ects are often temporary and
depend on the precise nature of the test being used to assay memory (also see Chapter 4).
With the passage of time, retroactive interference in the paired-associates paradigm will
typically diminish, and old responses can recover their dominance (Briggs, 1954; A. S. Brown,
1976; Wheeler, 1995). In addition, asking participants to provide both responses (B and C; J.
M. Barnes & Underwood, 1959), or recognise the old information (B) amongst distractors
(e.g., D, E, F; R. C. Anderson & Watts, 1971; Postman & Stark, 1969), can attenuate or even
eliminate the e ect, demonstrating that the memory traces representing the old information
41The situation will likely be substantially more complicated for semantic knowledge that is embedded
within a larger associative network and/or forms an integral part of one’s belief system/worldview (see
Lewandowsky et al., 2012b for review).
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are often intact (M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; Crowder, 1976). Similar outcomes have
been reported in paradigms involving somewhat more complex stimuli. For example, the
classic ‘misinformation e ect’ discussed in Chapter 4 can be eliminated through the use
of an appropriately designed recognition or recall test (M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a;
Zaragoza, McCloskey, & Jamis, 1987). Therefore, retroactive interference e ects appear to
reflect a temporary shift in the relative dominance of di erent cue-target associations, and do
not necessarily entail the permanent replacement of the old information. From a normative
perspective such an outcome might be deemed sub-optimal: an updating process should
ideally erase the erroneous information such that it can no longer continue to influence an
individual’s behaviour (Bjork & Bjork, 1996; Lewandowsky et al., 2012b; Seifert, 2002).
Recently, theorists have argued that the veracity and relevance of information stored in
memory is routinely maintained through the brain’s inherent capacity for neural plasticity
(Dudai, 2009; J. L. Lee, 2009). According to these accounts, the act of retrieval destabilises
existing memory traces, triggering a time-dependent molecular restabilisation process known
as ‘reconsolidation’ (for details see Chapters 1, 2, and 3; Nader & Hardt, 2009). During
this temporary period of vulnerability, there is an opportunity for existing memory traces to
be ‘updated’, ‘modified’, ‘erased’, or ‘overwritten’ when learning new information disrupts
the reconsolidation process (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Dudai, 2009; J. L. Lee, 2009;
Nader, 2003a; Schiller & Phelps, 2011). Therefore, reconsolidation theory suggests that
semantic misconceptions could be permanently impaired, or even eliminated, by retrieving
them immediately prior to learning replacement information.
Although reconsolidation theory implies that memory retrieval should help with the correction
of semantic misconceptions, a considerable body of evidence suggests that retrieval could
actually be more of a hindrance. The ‘backward testing e ect42’ (Carrier & Pashler, 1992;
Payne, 1987; Roediger & Butler, 2011) refers to the phenomenon whereby actively retrieving
information (‘retrieval practice’) from memory increases the likelihood of its successful recall
42The phenomenon is typically referred to simply as ‘the testing e ect’, however we use ‘backward testing
e ect’ (i.e., benefits of retrieval practice for previously learned old information) here to distinguish it from
the ‘forward testing e ect’ (i.e., benefits of retrieval practice for to-be-learned new information) described in
the following paragraph.
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on a subsequent test, relative to simply re-studying the same information, which in turn is
often (but not always) more beneficial than not reviewing the material at all. Contrary to
the predictions of reconsolidation theory, this evidence raises the possibility that retrieving
semantic misconceptions will actually reinforce them, rather than eliminate them.
Intriguingly, several studies indicate that prior retrieval of ‘old’ information can also enhance
the learning of subsequently presented ‘new’ information. Within the framework of the
misinformation paradigm, such e ects are termed ‘retrieval-enhanced suggestibility’ (see
Chapter 4; J. C. K. Chan et al., 2009), but the more general phenomenon has been referred to
as the ‘forward testing e ect’ (Pastötter & Bäuml, 2014; also see Tulving & Watkins, 1974).
A recent study using a misinformation paradigm and a testing procedure that assessed recall
of both old and new items found that forward and backward testing e ects are not necessarily
in conflict: retrieval practice can simultaneously enhance the subsequent recall of previously
learned old information and to-be-learned new information (L. T. Gordon & Thomas, 2014).
In summary, the forward and backward testing e ects (from herein ‘hybrid testing account’)
suggest that reviewing old information, especially through retrieval practice, has the potential
to both help and hinder the correction of semantic misconceptions: retrieval may enhance
learning of new replacement facts, but it could also reinforce the old erroneous information.
The aforementioned reconsolidation theory also suggests that retrieval will facilitate the
correction process, however it proposes that knowledge updating will be realised through the
overwriting of the memory traces representing the old information. Thus, the two accounts
make competing predictions about the persistence of semantic misconceptions after they have
been replaced with new information.
One previous study that directly addressed this conflict is especially pertinent to the current
investigation (Pashler et al., 2013). Critically, this study followed the canonical distributed
timing protocols necessary for a controlled investigation of reconsolidation theory, separating
each critical stage (training, retrieval/new learning, final test) by at least a day (see Chapter 2).
In ExperimentP 1 (n = 56), participants were first taught 36 new ‘facts’ about several
fictitious topics (Day 1). For example, participants learned that the diet of the ‘Golden-Eared
Marmoset’ mainly consists of beetles. On Day 2, participants first re-studied 12 facts, were
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tested (‘retrieval practice’) on 12 other facts, and did not review the remaining 12 facts.
Subsequently, they were told that all of the previous information they had been taught was
incorrect, and presented with replacement information for each of the facts. For example, in
the case of the Golden-Eared Marmoset, participants were told that actually their diet consists
mainly of tree sap. Finally, on Day 8, participants were asked to recall the replacement
information for each fact. They were explicitly instructed not to recall the Day 1 information.
The main finding was that accuracy on the Day 8 test (i.e., responding with the replacement
fact) was higher in the two reminder conditions (retrieval practice, restudy) compared to
the no-reminder condition (rest). In other words, consistent with both the hybrid testing
account and reconsolidation theory, updating of erroneous semantic knowledge was facilitated
by the provision of a reminder prior to learning the replacement information (although
retrieval practice did not appear to confer any additional advantage over restudy). Because
participants were explicitly discouraged from responding with the old facts, this experiment
could not ascertain the fate of the knowledge that they had apparently abandoned. According
to the hybrid testing account, this information should have been enhanced whilst according to
reconsolidation theory it should have been eliminated. Pashler et al. addressed this issue in a
second experiment (ExperimentP 2, n = 69) where participants followed a similar procedure
to ExperimentP 1, but were now asked to recall facts from both Day 1 and Day 2 on the Day
8 test. The findings replicated and extended those observed in ExperimentP 1. Recall of both
Day 1 and Day 2 facts was higher in the two reminder conditions (retrieval practice, restudy)
compared to the no-reminder condition (rest).
These findings appear to demonstrate that retrieval can facilitate learning of new replacement
facts and simultaneously reinforce previously learned old facts (also see L. T. Gordon &
Thomas, 2014). From the perspective of the hybrid testing account, it is surprising that
there was no additional enhancement gained through retrieval practice relative to restudy
in either experiment. However, this could be due to the use of a blocked design in which
all items were reviewed together (restudy and retrieval practice; block 1) before corrective
feedback was provided (block 2). This would disrupt any close connection between the review
procedure used for each old fact and the subsequent learning of a new fact. Nevertheless, the
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findings are clearly contrary to the reconsolidation-overwriting hypothesis, which predicted
an e ect in the opposite direction. In the present study, we sought to expand upon these
findings by attempting to correct genuine semantic misconceptions (rather than recently
learned fictitious facts) that individual participants had learned naturally in their day-to-day
lives (see Figure 5.1).
On Day 1, participants completed 120 general knowledge questions and their responses were
classified as “correct”, “incorrect”, or “skipped”. All of the participants’ incorrect responses,
and a subset of their correct responses, were carried forward to Day 2. During this stage,
participants cycled through the questions, and completed a reminder phase followed by a
corrective feedback phase for each item in turn (i.e., an interleaved rather than a blocked
design, cf. Pashler et al., 2013). The critical manipulation came during the reminder phase:
for some items, participants were asked to recall their previous Day 1 response (‘retrieval
practice’); for other items, they were asked to restudy their previous Day 1 response; and
for the remaining items, they simply rested. On Day 3, participants cycled through each of
the questions again (as on Day 2, these were only the items answered incorrectly on Day 1)
twice in two separate phases (blocked): firstly, in the ‘dominance phase’ they were asked
to respond to the questions with whatever answer they thought to be correct. Secondly, in
the ‘persistence phase’, they were asked to specifically provide both their previous Day 1
response, and the replacement fact they had learned on Day 2 (as in ExperimentP 2). Thus
for each item, we aimed to evaluate the extent to which there was a shift in dominance from
‘old’ to ‘new’ responses (i.e., correction/updating of semantic misconceptions), the extent
to which this entailed destructive loss or persistence of the old responses, and the extent to
which responses in both test phases were influenced by the reminder manipulation. Finally,
in order to examine potential ‘spontaneous recovery’ e ects (Wheeler, 1995), we repeated the
Day 3 testing regime on a delayed test occurring approximately 3 weeks later.
Based on both reconsolidation theory and the hybrid testing account, we expected that
memory retrieval would facilitate the updating of semantic misconceptions. Specifically,
during the dominance phase, as well as the persistence (new) phase, we expected higher
performance (responding with replacement facts) in the reminder conditions compared to the
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no-reminder condition (retrieval practice Ø restudy > rest). Note that the hybrid testing
account also implies higher performance in the retrieval practice vs restudy conditions, but
reconsolidation does not necessarily predict a di erence between these conditions as both will
presumably involve reactivation of target memory traces. The critical test on which the two
accounts o er contrasting predictions is the persistence (old) phase. Reconsolidation theory
predicts a retrieval-induced performance decrement (rest > retrieval practice Ø restudy; H 1)
whereas the hybrid testing account anticipates a retrieval-induced performance increment
(rest < restudy < retrieval practice; H 2).
5.1 Experiment 11
5.1.1 Methods
All experimental materials, data, and analysis code pertaining to this chapter have been
made publicly available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/njywe). All data
exclusions, manipulations, and measures (aside from confidence ratings) conducted during
this study are reported.
5.1.1.1 Participants
Fifty-nine participants (29 female; 30 male; age Mdn = 27 years, range = 18-39 years)
were recruited from the online crowd-sourcing platform Prolific Academic, and took part
in the experiment remotely using their own personal computing devices. All participants
reported that they spoke fluent English and met the other inclusion criteria outlined below.
Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation. The local UCL
ethics committee approved the study.
To ensure basic levels of data quality, we pre-specified a number of inclusion criteria, and
programmed our software to automatically exclude individuals who failed to comply. The
criteria were as follows (with n additional individuals who did not meet the criteria in
brackets): navigating to other web pages or software more than three times during a stage (n
= 25), starting but not completing at least stages 1-3 (n = 15), reporting during debrief that
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they had looked up question answers (n = 6), failing to complete a stage within 2 hours (n =
1), failing to provide a minimum of 9 incorrect responses during Stage 1 (n = 1), responding
incorrectly to two or more ‘catch’ trails per stage (n = 0), or failing to complete each stage
within 24hrs (+/- 3 hrs) of the previous stage (n = 0). Participants were reminded of these
criteria at the start of each stage (see Appendix H).
5.1.1.2 Materials
120 general knowledge questions and their correct answers were used as stimuli (see Ap-
pendix G). Some of these were selected because they had elicited a relatively high number of
commission errors in a previous norming study (Tauber et al., 2013), for example, “What is
the name of the largest desert of earth?”, (correct answer: ‘Antarctica’, common commission
error: ‘Sahara’). We also included several relatively straightforward questions in order to
keep participants motivated, for example, “What is the name of the horse-like animal with
black and white stripes?”, (correct answer: ‘zebra’). Additional questions were drawn from
various Internet sources.
5.1.1.3 Design
The experiment was a 3 (reminder type: rest, restudy, retrieval practice) x 2 (final test time:
Day 3, delayed) repeated-measures factorial design (see Figure 5.1). In the dominance phase
of testing, participants were asked to provide the correct response (i.e., the replacement fact)
and in the persistence phase they were specifically asked to provide their old response (i.e.,
their Day 1 response), and the replacement fact from Day 2. Therefore, the three primary
dependent variables were the proportion of correct responses during the dominance phase and
persistence phase (old and new). We also examined the proportion of intrusions, specifically,
old facts provided in the dominance phase, new facts provided for the old probe in the
persistence phase, and old facts provided for the new probe in the persistence phase.
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Figure 5.1: Study design depicting the stages of the experiment in temporal order from left
to right. Red indicates usage of questions that were responded to incorrectly during Day 1
(QI; i.e., semantic misconceptions). Blue indicates usage of a random subset of questions that
were responded to correctly during Day 1 (QC). See main text for details.
5.1.1.4 Procedure
Participants began by reading general information about the study (Appendix H) and were
informed that “We are investigating how people learn and remember information. In this
particular study we will be asking you general knowledge questions and providing you with
correcting information if you make errors.”
On Day 1 (see Figure 5.1), participants responded to 120 sequentially presented general
knowledge questions by typing their answers into a text box. No feedback was provided and
responses were untimed. Participants could skip to the next question if they did not know
the answer.
At the end of this stage, each question was classified by a computer algorithm as having been
skipped, receiving a correct response, or receiving an incorrect response. This was achieved
using a ‘string-matching’ algorithm that computed an index of similarity (0-1) between the
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correct answer and the response entered by the user43. Responses with a similarity score
greater than or equal to .8 were considered correct as this typically reflected that the response
contained some minor spelling errors but was broadly accurate.
For each participant, all of the questions that they responded to incorrectly (i.e., similarity
score < .8) were used on Day 2 and Day 3 (see Figure 5.1). In order to make the task less
onerous, these were supplemented with a randomly selected subset of the questions that had
been responded to correctly. Consequently, two-thirds of the questions used during Days 2
and 3 had been responded to incorrectly during Day 1 and the remaining third had been
responded to correctly. This ratio was approximately maintained after the questions were
randomly allocated to the three reminder conditions (see Table 5.1).
During Day 2, each trial consisted of a reminder phase (20s) followed by a corrective feedback
phase (20s). The reminder phase involved participants either being instructed to rest (Rest
condition), re-study the question and response they gave during Day 1 (Restudy condition),
or provide the response they gave during Day 1 (Retrieval Practice condition). During the
corrective feedback phase, participants were informed whether their Day 1 response was
correct or incorrect, and in the latter case, provided with the correct replacement fact.
On Day 3, there were two blocked phases of testing: (1) a ‘dominance’ phase intended
to assess whether participants had ‘updated’ their knowledge by replacing their previous
erroneous response with the replacement fact as their preferred response to each question;
and (2) a ‘persistence’ phase intended to assess whether both the erroneous and replacement
information was retrievable from the memory store. During the ‘dominance’ phase, the same
questions as used on Day 2 (i.e., items responded to incorrectly on Day1) were presented in
the same format employed during Day 1. After all of the questions had been responded to, the
‘persistence’ phase began, during which participants were asked to provide two responses to
each question: the original ‘old’ response they gave on Day 1, and the ‘new’ replacement fact
43Specifically, this was a normalized ratio of the Levenshtein edit distance, a metric which identifies the
number of “fundamental” operations (substitution, deletion, insertion, or transposition) needed to convert one
character string into another, thus providing an index of their “similarity”. The computer code is available on
the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/etd5m/).
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they were given on Day 2. All responses were untimed. Approximately 3 weeks (median = 24
days; range = 16-32 days) after they had completed the Day 3 test, a subset of participants
(n = 44) returned to take part in another ‘delayed test’. This session employed the same
procedure as Day 3.
During each stage, questions were presented in a random order. It was not possible to return
to a question once it had been skipped or a response had been submitted. Each stage also
included three ‘catch trials’ appearing at approximately one-third intervals. Participants
were simply asked to type in a 5-item code that was presented on the screen (e.g., 3RYX7).
These trials were included to deter participants from rapidly clicking the skip/submit button
in order to cycle through questions as quickly as possible without paying attention (see
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).
5.1.2 Results
5.1.2.1 Day 1
Metrics for individual questions (Qs) are available in Figure 5.2 (Qs 1-60) and Figure 5.3 (Qs
61 -120; question numbers can be matched to verbatim questions in Appendix G). Overall,
participants responded to almost half of the general knowledge questions correctly (M =
0.46, SD = 0.13; blue bars), almost a quarter incorrectly (M = 0.23, SD = 0.09; red bars),
and skipped around a third (M = 0.33, SD = 0.14; yellow bars).
As intended, the majority of participants found some questions relatively easy (e.g., “What is
the capital of France?”, Q24), whereas other questions elicited a large number of commission
errors (e.g., “What was the last name of the first European explorer to land in North
America?”, Q105). Some questions (e.g., “What is the name of the small Japanese stove
used for outdoor cooking?”) had high skip rates and may be worth excluding from future
experiments.
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Figure 5.2: Number of correct, incorrect, and skipped responses for questions 1-60 on the
Day 1 test. Verbatim questions can be matched to their numbers in Appendix G.
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Figure 5.3: Number of correct, incorrect, and skipped responses for questions 61-120 on the
Day 1 test. Verbatim questions can be matched to their numbers in Appendix G.
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Table 5.1: Item allocation across the three reminder conditions (rest,
restudy, retrieval practice) as a function of Day 1 response type (correct,
incorrect).
Reminder condition Day 1 response type Items allocated M (SD)
rest correct 5.15 (1.91)
rest incorrect 9.66 (3.77)
restudy correct 4.49 (1.78)
restudy incorrect 8.95 (3.72)
test correct 4.71 (1.80)
test incorrect 9.37 (3.70)
5.1.2.2 Day 2
For each participant, incorrect items and a subset of correct items from Day 1 (see procedure)
were carried forward to Day 2. Items (questions) were randomly assigned to the three
reminder conditions (rest, restudy, retrieval practice). Because the number of incorrect items
for a given participant was not necessarily divisible by 3, it was inevitable that the reminder
conditions were not strictly balanced. However, as shown in Table 5.1, the number of items
allocated to each condition was approximately equal.
During Day 2, participants provided responses in the retrieval practice condition which
a orded an opportunity to assess the degree to which responding was stable between Day 1
and Day 2. We used the string-matching algorithm (see Procedure) to assess the degree of
similarity between Day 2 and Day 1 responses. Responses were classified as a ‘match’ if the
similarity score was greater than or equal to .8, and ‘mismatch’ otherwise. The majority of
responses were matches (proportion ‘match’ M = 0.89, SD = 0.13) demonstrating substantial
stability between tests.
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5.1.2.3 Day 3 Test and Delayed Test
For the Day 3 Test and Delayed Test we were interested in the proportion of correct responses
(‘accuracy’), the proportion of intrusions (‘intrusions’), and whether these variables di ered
as a function of Day 2 reminder type (rest, restudy, retrieval practice) and final test time
(Day 3, Delayed; see ‘design’ section). We began by running a series of 3x2 repeated measures
ANOVAs with reminder type (rest, restudy, retrieval practice) and test time (Day 3, delayed)
as independent variables, and either accuracy or intrusions as dependent variables. These
analyses were restricted to the subset of participants who completed both test times (n = 44).
To examine the robustness of these analyses when the full sample (n = 59) was considered,
we also ran individual one-way ANOVAs for reminder type independently at each level of test
time. Data for all participants are displayed separately for the dominance phase (Figure 5.4),
and the persistence phase (new, Figure 5.5; old, Figure 5.6).
5.1.2.3.1 Dominance
Figure 5.4 (panel A) shows that the proportion of correct responses (reporting new facts) in
the dominance phase was initially quite high on the Day 3 Test across the three reminder
conditions, suggesting that participants were successful at updating their semantic miscon-
ceptions with replacement facts, regardless of Day 2 memory retrieval. However, a large
number of participants had faultless performance, suggesting that there could be a ceiling
e ect obscuring any retrieval-facilitated updating. In line with the high accuracy levels, there
were relatively few intrusions across reminder conditions (reporting old facts; panel C). On
the delayed test, the proportion of correct responses (panel B) had partly declined, and the
proportion of intrusions (panel D) had partly increased, suggesting that misconceptions had
started to recover behavioural dominance.
The reminder type by test time ANOVA with proportion of correct responses as a dependent
variable confirmed that there was no significant main e ect of reminder condition, F (2, 86) =
0.33, p = .720, ÷2G = .00, a significant main e ect of test time, F (1, 43) = 74.90, p < .001,
÷2G = .26, and no interaction between the two factors F (2, 86) = 0.58, p = .563, ÷2G = .00.
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Dominance Phase
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Figure 5.4: Proportion correct (Panels A, B) and proportion intrusions (Panels C, D) in
the dominance phase of the Day 3 and delayed tests, as a function of reminder type (rest,
restudy, retrieval practice). The dotplot shows coloured circles representing individual data
points (bin width = .01). Black circles represent means and error bars indicate 95% CIs.
Diamonds represent medians.
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Persistence (New) Phase
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Reminder type
Figure 5.5: Proportion correct (Panels A, B) and proportion intrusions (Panels C, D) in the
persistence (new) phase of the Day 3 and delayed tests, as a function of reminder type (rest,
restudy, retrieval practice). The dotplot shows coloured circles representing individual data
points (bin width = .01). Black circles represent means and error bars indicate 95% CIs.
Diamonds represent medians.
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Persistence (Old) Phase
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Figure 5.6: Proportion correct (Panels A, B) and proportion intrusions (Panels C, D) in the
persistence (old) phase of the Day 3 and delayed tests, as a function of reminder type (rest,
restudy, retrieval practice). The dotplot shows coloured circles representing individual data
points (bin width = .01). Black circles represent means and error bars indicate 95% CIs.
Diamonds represent medians.
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ANOVAs at each level of test time employing the full sample also indicated no main e ect of
reminder condition on the Day 3 test, F (2, 116) = 0.12, p = .889, ÷2G = .00, or the delayed
test, F (2, 86) = 0.67, p = .514, ÷2G = .02.
Similarly, with proportion of intrusions as a dependent variable, an ANOVA confirmed that
there was no significant main e ect of reminder condition F (2, 86) = 1.68, p = .193, ÷2G = .02,
a significant main e ect of test time, F (1, 43) = 51.65, p < .001, ÷2G = .24, and no interaction
between the two factors, F (2, 86) = 0.50, p = .608, ÷2G = .00. ANOVAs at each level of test
time employing the full sample also indicated no main e ect of reminder condition on the Day
3 test, F (2, 116) = 0.88, p = .418, ÷2G = .01, or the delayed test, F (2, 86) = 1.33, p = .269,
÷2G = .03.
5.1.2.3.2 Persistence (new)
As might be expected given the high accuracy levels observed in the dominance phase,
participants were very capable of reporting new facts when specifically asked to do so during
the persistence phase. Figure 5.5 (panel A) shows that the proportion of correct responses
(reporting new facts) was initially quite high on the Day 3 Test and had partly declined by
the delayed test (panel B). There were relatively few intrusions on the Day 3 test (reporting
old facts; panel C), and overall intrusion rates had partly increased by the delayed test. There
did not appear to be any substantial variations across the reminder conditions for either
correct responses or intrusions during either the Day 3 or delayed test.
The reminder type by test time ANOVA with proportion of correct responses as a dependent
variable confirmed that there was no significant main e ect of reminder condition, F (2, 86) =
1.14, p = .326, ÷2G = .01, a significant main e ect of test time, F (1, 43) = 39.15, p < .001,
÷2G = .19, and no interaction between the two factors F (2, 86) = 0.18, p = .837, ÷2G = .00.
ANOVAs at each level of test time employing the full sample also indicated no main e ect of
reminder condition on the Day 3 test, F (2, 116) = 0.25, p = .777, ÷2G = .00, or the delayed
test, F (2, 86) = 1.07, p = .349, ÷2G = .02.
Similarly, with proportion of intrusions as a dependent variable, an ANOVA confirmed that
there was no significant main e ect of reminder condition F (2, 86) = 2.03, p = .138, ÷2G = .02,
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a significant main e ect of test time, F (1, 43) = 16.99, p < .001, ÷2G = .12, and no interaction
between the two factors, F (2, 86) = 1.08, p = .345, ÷2G = .01. ANOVAs at each level of test
time employing the full sample also indicated no main e ect of reminder condition on the Day
3 test, F (2, 116) = 1.06, p = .351, ÷2G = .02, or the delayed test, F (2, 86) = 1.86, p = .161,
÷2G = .04.
5.1.2.3.3 Persistence (old)
Having observed knowledge updating e ects in the dominance and persistence (new) tests,
it was critical to evaluate whether the old facts had been retained in the memory system.
Performance in the persistence (old) phase on the Day 3 Test (Figure 5.6, Panel A) was
high and appeared to be influenced by reminder condition: recall of old facts was greater in
restudy and test conditions relative to the rest condition. However, as on the dominance and
persistence (new) tests, there were indications of a ceiling e ect. Performance declined by
the delayed test (Panel B), but the pattern of higher restudy/retrieval practice performance
relative to rest performance remained. Intrusion rates were very low across reminder conditions
on both the Day 3 Test (Panel C) and Delayed Test (Panel D).
The reminder type by test time ANOVA with proportion of correct responses as a dependent
variable indicated that there was a significant main e ect of reminder condition F (2, 86) =
17.85, p < .001, ÷2G = .20 and a significant main e ect of test time, F (1, 43) = 72.42, p < .001,
÷2G = .21. There was no interaction between the two factors F (2, 86) = 0.52, p = .597,
÷2G = .00. ANOVAs at each level of test time employing the full sample also indicated a
significant main e ect of reminder condition on the Day 3 test, F (2, 116) = 20.02, p < .001,
÷2G = .26, and the delayed test, F (2, 86) = 9.29, p < .001, ÷2G = .18.
We followed up with a series of pairwise comparisons between reminder conditions within
each test stage (Table 5.2). Recall that reconsolidation theory predicts a retrieval-induced
performance decrement (rest > retrieval practice Ø restudy; H 1) whereas the hybrid testing
account anticipates a retrieval-induced performance increment (rest < restudy < retrieval
practice; H 2). Given that these two hypotheses are in opposing directions, we first employed
non-directional paired t-tests to assess conventional statistical significance. As the inherent
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Table 5.2: Pairwise comparisons for proportion correct in the persistence (old) phase of the Day 3
Test and Delayed Test.
Final Test Contrast M di [95%CI] t p BF 10 [BF 01] BF 20 [BF 02]
Day 3 restudy vs. rest 0.13[0.08,0.17] 5.67 <.001 0.02[66.12] 6e+04[2e-05]
Day 3 practice vs. rest 0.10[0.05,0.15] 4.07 <.001 0.03[32.75] 309.76[3e-03]
Day 3 practice vs. restudy -0.03[-0.06,0.00] -1.88 .065 1.42[0.71] 0.05[19.08]
Delayed restudy vs. rest 0.12[0.06,0.19] 4.03 <.001 0.03[32.53] 274.16[4e-03]
Delayed practice vs. rest 0.12[0.05,0.18] 3.44 .001 0.03[29.13] 49.56[0.02]
Delayed practice vs. restudy -0.01[-0.07,0.06] -0.29 .775 0.18[5.53] 0.12[8.67]
Note. The unbracketed Bayes Factors (BF 10 and BF 20) individually express the degree of evidence
for the alternative hypotheses (H 1 and H 2) relative to the null hypothesis (H 0). The bracketed Bayes
Factors (BF 01, BF 02) are simply the reciprocal of the unbracketed Bayes Factors, and individually
express the degree of evidence for the null hypotheses relative to the alternative hypothesis.
limitations of orthodox statistics preclude a deeper understanding about the weight of evidence
for the two competing hypotheses relative to the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014), we employed
directional Bayes Factors with ‘default’ JZS priors (Cauchy distribution with r scale .707;
Rouder et al., 2009; Morey & Rouder, 2015) to compare each of the competing models (H 1,
H 2) to a third null hypotheses (H 0) with a point null prediction (rest = restudy = retrieval
practice).
These pairwise analyses clearly suggest that memory retrieval influenced performance on both
the Day 3 and Delayed Tests. Performance in the restudy conditions was significantly higher
than in the rest conditions and Bayesian analyses indicated decisive evidence in favour of H 2
relative to H 0. Similarly, performance in the test conditions was significantly higher than in
the rest conditions, and Bayesian analysis indicated strong evidence in favour of H 2 relative
to H 0. Conversely, performance in the restudy and test conditions did not di er significantly
and Bayesian analysis indicated moderate evidence in favour of H 0 relative to H 2.
The intrusions ANOVA indicated that there was no significant main e ect of reminder
condition F (2, 86) = 2.71, p = .072, ÷2G = .02, a significant main e ect of test time, F (1, 43) =
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12.04, p = .001, ÷2G = .12, and no interaction between the two factors, F (2, 86) = 0.30,
p = .742, ÷2G = .00. However, the individual ANOVAs at each level of test time and based on
the full sample did indicate a small but significant main e ect of reminder condition on the
Day 3 test, F (2, 116) = 4.00, p = .021, ÷2G = .06, but not on the delayed test, F (2, 86) = 1.68,
p = .193, ÷2G = .04.
5.1.3 Discussion
The goal of this study was to address whether memory retrieval would help or hinder the
correction of semantic misconceptions. Both the hybrid testing account and reconsolidation
theory predicted that memory retrieval would help the updating process by facilitating the
learning of replacement facts. However, reconsolidation theory also predicted that erroneous
‘old’ information would be eliminated via a process of retrieval-induced trace overwriting
(J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Dudai, 2009; J. L. Lee, 2009; Nader, 2003a; Schiller &
Phelps, 2011). In contrast, the hybrid testing account implied that old information would
be enhanced, potentially hindering the overall goal of correcting semantic misconceptions
(Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Payne, 1987; Roediger & Butler, 2011).
We began by eliciting a large number of naturally acquired semantic misconceptions (Figure 5.2
and Figure 5.3; Day 1) and then asked participants to either restudy them, retrieve them,
or simply rest, prior to providing them with corrective feedback (Day 2). On Day 3, when
participants were asked to respond to the questions again, there was clear evidence of
knowledge updating: a shift in dominance from the old erroneous information to the new
accurate information (Figure 5.4). As expected, responses on the persistence (new) test
were highly similar to performance in the dominance phase (Figure 5.5). Contrary to the
predictions of reconsolidation theory, and our expectations based on the hybrid testing
account, the reminder manipulation had no appreciable impact on participant’s performance
on the Day 3 dominance test or on the persistence (new) test. Previous observations of a
‘forward testing e ect’ (L. T. Gordon & Thomas, 2014; Pastötter & Bäuml, 2014; Szpunar,
McDermott, & Roediger, 2008) suggested that retrieval practice could enhance subsequent
encoding. A forward testing e ect also did not emerge in the experiments conducted by
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Pashler et al. (2013), as retrieval practice did not confer any additional benefit over restudy
(although recall of new facts was higher overall in the retrieval practice and restudy conditions
relative to the rest condition). It was possible that the use of a blocked design (retrieval
practice and restudy of all items took place together before a separate block of corrective
feedback) in Pashler et al. disrupted the direct connection between reminder type and new
learning. By contrast, this direct connection was maintained in the present experiment by
having participants perform the reminder and corrective feedback phases together for each
item in turn. Therefore, it is not entirely clear why a forward-testing e ect did not materialise.
One account suggests that retrieval practice is e ective because it helps to ‘segregate’ learning
material, reducing any mutual interference between competing stimuli (Pastötter & Bäuml,
2014; Szpunar et al., 2008). On these grounds, the random interleaving of reminder condition
(rest, restudy, retrieval practice) in the present experiment could have disrupted any attempts
to e ectively segregate old and new information.
In the critical persistence (old) phase, we specifically asked participants to recall the responses
they had provided on Day 1 in order to assess if they had been retained in memory. The hybrid
testing account suggested that old information will actually be reinforced by the reminder
manipulations, particularly in the retrieval practice condition. Conversely, reconsolidation
theory predicted that the old information will be overwritten, and thus eliminated. The
findings on the Day 3 test clearly demonstrated that the majority of the old information had
been retained (Figure 5.6), and also indicated that the reminder manipulations had been
e ective. Contrary to reconsolidation theory, recall of old information was enhanced in the
reminder conditions relative to the no-reminder condition. This was more consistent with our
expectations based on the hybrid testing account, however the anticipated retrieval practice
vs restudy benefit did not materialise. As in the other testing phases, this could be due to a
ceiling e ect and will require further investigation.
The phenomenon of ‘spontaneous recovery’ suggests that retroactive interference e ects can
regress (Briggs, 1954; A. S. Brown, 1976; Wheeler, 1995), and previous studies examining
semantic memory updating have reported that corrected information can begin to regain
behavioural control after some delay (e.g., Butler, Fazio, & Marsh, 2011). In anticipation of
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such e ects, we repeated the Day 3 testing regime on a delayed test approximately 3 weeks
later. Consistent with these previous studies, we found that although the new replacement
facts remained dominant on the delayed test, their influence had subsided and the number
of ‘intrusions’ from old information had increased. As on the Day 3 Test, the reminder
manipulations were only e ective in the persistence (old) phase, and continued to indicate
improved recall of old information in the reminder conditions relative to the no-reminder
condition.
Overall, this experiment has o ered some initial insight into the question of whether memory
retrieval will help or hinder the correction of semantic misconceptions. Our findings suggest
that e ective knowledge updating can occur even in the absence of memory retrieval, contrary
to claims that updating occurs within a privileged period of retrieval-induced plasticity during
memory reconsolidation (J. C. K. Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Dudai, 2009; J. L. Lee, 2009;
Nader, 2003a; Schiller & Phelps, 2011). In fact, our findings indicate that retrieval could
hinder the process of correction by reinforcing the erroneous information. This could o er
some explanation as to why attempts to correct misconceptions can sometimes result in
‘backfire e ects’, when misconceptions are reinforced rather than updated (Hart & Nisbet,
2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Seifert, 2002). Performance on the delayed test highlights
that because ‘updated’ knowledge remains in the memory store, it can begin to recover
its dominance after a short delay. Similarly, because the erroneous information has been
retained, it could influence behaviour and decision-making in ways not identified by the
memory tests used in the present investigation. The literature on the ‘continued influence
e ect’ suggests that ‘corrected’ information can continue to impact an individual’s judgments
and decision-making, even when they readily acknowledge that it is obsolete (Bjork & Bjork,
1996; Lewandowsky et al., 2012b; Seifert, 2002).
The quotation at the outset of this chapter implied that we are adaptive creatures: while
some beliefs will endure, others will be discarded when our environment signals that it is
appropriate to do so. The findings reported in this chapter, add an important caveat that we
will return to in Chapter 6: abandoned knowledge lingers in the memory store.
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The continued influence of false information stored in memory:
Exploring the role of causal coverage
“Today’s news consists of aggregates of fragments. Anyone who has taken part in any
event that has subsequently appeared in the news is aware of the gross disparity between
the actual and the reported events.”
— Buckminster Fuller, 1975
Breaking news coverage is often based on sparse evidence, speculation, or hearsay. As frag-
mented reports are collated and verified, it may transpire that some previously disseminated
information was actually incorrect. Subsequently, a retraction may be issued in order to
inform individuals that they should now disregard this false information. As discussed in
previous chapters, if erroneous information persists in the memory store, it has the potential
to impact upon an individual’s judgments, decisions, and behaviour (Bjork & Bjork, 1996;
Seifert, 2002; Lewandowsky et al., 2012b). Therefore, the ideal outcome of a retraction
message might be for erroneous information stored in memory to be ‘edited’, ‘updated’ or
‘overwritten’ (Dudai, 2009; Loftus, 1979a; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988).
Contrary to these aims, there is a sizable body of evidence indicating that individuals
continue to rely on false information, even after it has been explicitly retracted (for review,
see Lewandowsky et al., 2012b; Seifert, 2002). In an archetypal ‘continued influence’ paradigm
(e.g., Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011b; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes
& Leatherbarrow, 1988), participants are first presented with a series of short messages
resembling a news report about an event. For example, in a widely used narrative, participants
are told about a fire that has broken out at a warehouse. False information (e.g., “the
storeroom contained paint cans and gas cylinders”) is introduced early in this narrative and
then explicitly retracted towards the end (e.g., “the storeroom did not contain paint cans
and gas cylinders, it was actually empty”). This group of participants, who experience false
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information and a retraction (F+R+), is typically contrasted with a group who received
the false information without a retraction (F+R-), and a group who did not experience the
false information or the retraction (F-R-). On a series of subsequent inference questions
(e.g., “What was a possible cause of the toxic fumes?”), the number of references to false
information (e.g., “burning paint”, “the fire may have ignited the gas”) in the F+R+ group
is typically lower than in the F+R- group (indicating that the retraction was e ective), but
does not fall to the levels of the baseline F-R- condition (indicating that the retraction was
not completely e ective). In other words, false information persists and continues to influence
participants’ behaviour, despite them explicitly acknowledging that it has been retracted.
This seems contrary to the notion that information can be routinely overwritten when it is
identified as erroneous (Dudai, 2009).
The ‘real-world’ implications of the continued influence e ect (from herein ‘CIE’) are po-
tentially very serious and could have repercussions in multiple societal domains, including
the media, law, and healthcare (Lewandowsky et al., 2012b). For instance, if a jury is
instructed to disregard some aspect of evidence presented during a trial, it would clearly
be problematic if they continued to rely on that information when considering their verdict
(Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997). CIEs have also been observed when scientific articles
are retracted (Greitemeyer, 2013), when evidence disconfirms social stereotypes (Kunda &
Oleson, 1995), or when e orts are made to correct political misperceptions (Nyhan & Reifler,
2010). Attempts to derive greater insight into the phenomenon have largely been directed
toward establishing the conditions under which it does and does not arise. However, the CIE
has proved notoriously di cult to eradicate. The influence of false information is attenuated,
but rarely eliminated, when participants are given an explicit prior warning that they will
encounter false information (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010), when the retraction is
presented immediately after the false information rather than after a delay (H. M. Johnson &
Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999), when the retraction is repeated several times (Ecker
et al., 2011b), and when the retraction is provided by a trustworthy source (Guillory & Geraci,
2013). In previous chapters, we have directly examined whether an overwriting mechanism
might allow for the modification of existing knowledge. However, in this chapter, we will turn
our attention to the consequences of persistent erroneous information, and examine how its
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influence might be mitigated by factors other than overwriting.
One theoretical interpretation of the CIE is based on the assumption that participants form
internal cognitive representations called ‘mental models’ which characterise their understand-
ing of the event (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Wilkes &
Reynolds, 1999). The model is thought to represent a ‘causal chain’, or network of associative
connections, that link the false information with other details about the event. For example,
in the warehouse fire story, participants appear to form causal links between the volatile
materials and other auxiliary details reported in the narrative, such as the presence of “oily
smoke and sheets of flame”, “intense heat”, “explosions”, and “toxic fumes”. This is clearly
evident in participants’ responses to the inference questions (e.g., “Why do you think the
fire was particularly intense?” Answer: “The pressurized cylinders”; Seifert, 2002). The
intention of a retraction message is that participants should ‘edit out’ the false information
(Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). However, individuals appear to prefer mental models in
which information is mutually consistent, or ‘coherent’ (Johnson-Laird, 2012). Removing
the false information would leave a ‘causal gap’, and disrupt the coherence of their model.
This could explain why participants appear to continue to rely on a model based on false
information, despite knowing that a central link in the causal chain has been broken (H. M.
Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Seifert, 2002; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999).
The mental models theory might also o er some insight into why one of the most e ective
techniques for reducing the CIE is the provision of an alternative explanation for the event
(Ecker et al., 2010; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011a; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994;
Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999). For example, in H. M. Johnson & Seifert (1994; warehouse
fire narrative), when the retraction statement about the paint cans and gas cylinders was
accompanied by an alternative explanation suggesting that arson-related materials had been
discovered, this was more e ective at reducing CIE than providing a retraction on its own. An
alternative explanation might ‘fill the causal gap’, thereby maintaining the model’s coherence,
and reducing the need to rely on the false information (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Seifert,
2002). Critically, this could also explain why alternative explanations do not necessarily
eliminate the CIE, and why di erent alternative explanations vary in their e cacy. Some
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alternative explanations will provide better replacements for the false information because
they are able to explain more features of the original news report, a property referred to as
‘causal coverage’ (Seifert, 2002).
Consider that in the traditional warehouse fire narrative, the auxiliary details tend to reinforce
an explanatory theme that is consistent with the false information (from herein, the ‘false
theme’). For example, “oily smoke and sheets of flame”, “explosions”, and “toxic fumes”, are
all consistent with the presence of “paint cans and gas cylinders”. When asked questions such
as, “What could have caused the explosions?” participants in the retraction group (F+R+)
might continue to rely on a mental model based on false information because it provides
the most extensive causal coverage of the event compared to any alternative account they
can think of. Although participants appear to be able to generate their own explanations
for the event when asked to do so (e.g., “cigarettes”, “gas leak”, “lightening”), this does not
appear to be an e ective method for reducing the CIE (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1999). It
could be that these self-generated alternative accounts have relatively low causal coverage,
only explaining one or two features of the narrative whereas the false information provides a
plausible account of multiple features.
Similarly, when researchers provide participants with an alternative account (from herein,
‘alternative theme’), it could be more or less e ective at replacing the false information (and
therefore eliminating CIE), because of its relative causal coverage. In H. M. Johnson & Seifert
(1994) for example, the ‘arson’ alternative explanation might provide a reasonable account
for the fire, but perhaps does not explain the “oily smoke and sheets of flame”, “explosions”,
and “toxic fumes” as e ectively as the presence of paint cans and gas cylinders, which are
inherently volatile. Similarly, in Ecker et al. (2010), participants read a narrative about a
minibus crash and were falsely informed that the passengers were a group of elderly nursing
home residents. Additional auxiliary details about the event appear consistent with this
false theme: “The rescue crew also reported di culty in getting both injured and uninjured
passengers out of the minibus even though the exits were clear”, “Local television shows
live footage of uninjured passengers having problems getting up the embankment”, and
“Rescue crew can be heard remarking that the uninjured passengers were unable to help in
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the rescue e orts.” By contrast, the alternative account, o ered alongside the retraction
statement, seems to have relatively low causal coverage, “A second statement from the police
has stated that the passengers on the minibus were not elderly people but college hockey
players returning from a victory party after the state hockey final.” Therefore, although
provision of an alternative can attenuate the CIE, it may not always be completely e ective
because the false theme has greater causal coverage than the alternative theme.
In a naturally occurring ‘breaking news’ situation, one might expect that auxiliary details
reported about an event will tend to cohere around what actually happened, i.e., an ‘alternative
theme’, rather than a hypothetical scenario based on a single piece of false information
(assuming that the news agency does not have some malign intent to mislead). Consider
for example, a breaking news report about a plane crash. Soon after the crash, the news
agency receives an anonymous tip-o  and announces that the pilot was drunk before she
boarded the flight. The organisation continues reporting ‘auxiliary details’ about the event as
information becomes available: firstly, an eye witness reports seeing flames coming from one
of the aircraft’s jet engines; secondly, a reporter gets his hands on the flight checklist, which
appears to indicate that there were some problems with the engine before take-o ; and thirdly,
it is discovered that the chief mechanic is currently on holiday, leaving his inexperienced
apprentice in charge of repairs. Clearly, the false information in this scenario has fairly low
causal coverage and a plausible, coherent, alternative is readily available: the plane crashed
because of a mechanical problem with one of its engines. A retraction message stating that,
for example, the anonymous tip-o  actually came from a disgruntled ex-employee of the
airline, would leave very little reason to rely on the false information. It seems intuitive that
the availability of a plausible and coherent alternative should reduce the influence of the false
information, especially in conjunction with a retraction of the false information.
Although a number of di erent alternative accounts have been employed in CIE studies with
varying degrees of success (Ecker et al., 2010, 2011a; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes &
Reynolds, 1999), we are not aware of any systematic attempt to evaluate the causal coverage
hypothesis. Here we report an experiment that examined whether the CIE is eliminated
when an alternative theme a ords greater causal coverage of the event compared to the false
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Figure 6.1: Key structural elements of the warehouse fire narrative. The alternative theme
has greater causal coverage than the false theme. Note that Tweets 6 and 17 varied between
experiment groups (F-R-, F+R-, F+R+) and filler tweets are not shown (see Appendix K for
details).
theme. To achieve this, we adjusted the core structure of the event narrative, such that the
auxiliary details (e.g., “A warehouse worker was recently disciplined for breaching health and
safety regulations in the sta  kitchens”) supported an alternative theme more than the false
theme (Figure 6.1). We did not explicitly inform participants about the alternative theme,
but allowed them to arrive at their own conclusions, as might occur in a real world breaking
news situation. We anticipated that individuals would seek an explanatory account of the
event that maximised its causal coverage of the auxiliary details (Seifert, 2002), and therefore
expected that following retraction of the false information, the CIE would be eliminated.
We also took the opportunity to update the presentation format of the experimental materials,
delivering the narrative as a series of ‘tweets’ (see Figure 6.2) as used on the social media
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Figure 6.2: Example tweet used in Experiment 12.
platform Twitter. The spread of misinformation on social media is increasingly problematic
(Del Vicario et al., 2016). For example, during an unprecedented bout of civil unrest in
London (UK) in August 2011, rumours began to circulate on Twitter suggesting that a
tiger was on the loose in the district of Primrose Hill after rioters had liberated it from
London Zoo, the army had been deployed in the district of Bank, and the London Eye was
on fire (Procter, Vis, & Voss, 2011). Social media presents unique challenges because the
mechanisms of self-correction are less well defined and information can proliferate extremely
rapidly. Although our initial experiment closely follows the design of previous CIE studies,
there is scope for extending the Twitter-based paradigm we have developed here to address
the unique challenges of misinformation correction on social media.
To enhance the generalisability of our findings, we developed two di erent narratives that had
the same core structure (see Figure 6.1 and Appendix K for details) but di erent superficial
features. One narrative was the aforementioned warehouse fire study, and the second narrative
described the aftermath of a ‘zoo breakout’ in which a group of monkeys escaped after a
work experience student left their cage door open (false theme) or after an animal rights
activist cut a hole in the fence of their enclosure (alternative theme). Finally, we employed an
additional test phase in order to evaluate if the retraction had caused memory impairment. In
the archetypal CIE paradigm, higher performance in F+R+ vs F-R- indicates the continued
influence of false information. But the drop in performance from F+R- to F+R+ suggests
that the retraction has at least been partly successful at updating participants’ beliefs.
Consequently, we employed a forced-choice ‘modified’ recognition test (see Chapter 4; M.
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a) to assess whether false information remains stored in memory
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even if it no longer influences inferential reasoning about the event. If the information has
persisted, this would preclude the role of an overwriting or ‘destructive updating’ mechanism
(Loftus, 1979a).
In summary, the specific hypotheses under scrutiny were as follows:
Manipulation check (influence of false information)
The number of references to false information will be significantly higher in a false information
without retraction group (F+R-) relative to a no false information and no retraction baseline
group (F-R-), indicating that presence of false information successfully induced participants
to rely on the false theme (i.e., F+R- > F-R-).
Support for the null hypothesis (F+R- = F-R-) would indicate that the false information was
not e ective so it would not be possible to assess the impact of a retraction.
Hypothesis 1 (influence of retraction)
The number of references to false information will be significantly lower in a false information
with retraction group (F+R+) compared to a false information without retraction group (F+R-
), indicating that the retraction successfully reduced the influence of the false information
(i.e., F+R+ < F+R-).
Support for the null hypothesis (F+R+ = F+R-) would indicate that the retraction had no
impact at all, which would be a surprisingly strong CIE.
Hypothesis 2 (continued influence e ect)
The number of references to false information will be greater in a false information with
retraction group (FI+R+) relative to a no false information and no retraction baseline group
(FI-R-), indicating a CIE e ect (i.e., F+R+ > F-R-).
Support for the null hypothesis (F+R+ = F-R-) would indicate that the CIE has been
eliminated.
Hypothesis 3 (recognition accuracy)
(a) Accuracy on the forced-choice recognition test will be significantly higher in the retracted
false information group (F+R+) relative to the no false information and no retraction
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baseline group (F-R-), indicating the persistence of at least some false information in
memory despite the retraction (i.e., F+R+ > F-R-).
Support for the null hypothesis (F+R+ = F-R-) would be indicative of memory impairment.
(b) Accuracy on the forced-choice recognition test will be comparable between the retracted
false information group (F+R+) and the false information without retraction group
(F+R-), indicating the absence of any storage-based memory impairment caused by the
retraction (i.e., F+R+ = F+R-).




The hypotheses, methods, and analysis plan for this study were pre-registered (http://
dx.doi.org/10.17605/osf.io/x2rzh)44. All experimental materials, data, and analysis code
pertaining to this chapter have been made publicly available on the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/jc4mw). All data exclusions, manipulations, and measures conducted during
this study are reported.
6.1.1.1 Participants
6.1.1.1.1 Power-analysis
A power analysis using an e ect size for the critical F+R+ vs. F-R- contrast observed in
previous research (contrast 0 in Table 1 of Ecker et al., 2011b) suggested that 66 participants
would be required in each condition to achieve reasonable statistical power (d = 0.49, – =
0.05, 1-— = 0.80). Therefore, we intended to recruit 198 participants.
44Note that the hypotheses and analyses used here apply only to the first experiment of a planned series
and have therefore been slightly modified from the pre-registration.
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6.1.1.1.2 Stopping rule
We pre-registered a ‘stopping rule’ to constrain researcher degrees of freedom in the data
collection process (Simmons et al., 2011). Data collection was to be terminated upon reaching
the sample size specified in the power analysis, unless that target had not been reached by
28/02/2016. We slightly exceeded (n = 204) our sample size target (n = 198) as 6 additional
participants were needed in order to ensure equal counter-balancing conditions.
6.1.1.1.3 Sample demographics
Two-hundred and four participants (114 female; 90 male; age: Mdn = 25 years, range = 18-60
years) were recruited from the University College London (UCL) multi-occupation subject pool
(n = 72; https://uclpsychology.sona-systems.com/) and the online crowd-sourcing platform
Prolific Academic (n = 132; http://www.prolific.ac/). The sample recruited from UCL
attended our testing rooms in person and the online sample completed the study remotely
on their own personal computing devices. All participants reported that they spoke fluent
English and were between 18-65 years of age. They also completed all stages of the study,
finished the study within the 60 minute maximum time limit, and passed all instructional and
attentional checks (see Appendix I). These inclusion criteria were pre-registered, and all data
from participants who failed to meet these criteria were excluded and replaced. Participants
provided informed consent and received monetary compensation or course credits. The local
UCL ethics committee approved the study.
6.1.1.2 Design
The experiment employed a between-subjects design with three groups: false information with
retraction (F+R+), false information without retraction (F+R-), and no false information
or retraction (F-R-). We also employed two narratives with the same underlying structure
but di erent superficial features (warehouse fire and zoo breakout, see Materials for details)
which were counter-balanced. Thus the design had six cells: two narrative conditions, each
with three groups. Participants were randomly allocated to these cells with the contingency
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that all final cell sizes were balanced (n = 34 per cell).
The two primary dependent measures were references to the false theme and references to
the alternative theme on the inference questions. We also measured participants’ recall of
filler items, their awareness of a retraction message, and their recognition accuracy (i.e., ‘hit
rate’) for the false information.
Participants were not made aware of the explicit purpose of the study or which experimental
group they had been assigned to until the debriefing stage. Researchers involved in data
collection were aware of the purpose of the study, but were not aware of which groups
participants had been assigned to until after data collection was complete (group assignment
was handled by a computer algorithm). Group labels were also hidden during response coding
(see below).
6.1.1.3 Materials
Two narratives were developed, each with a similar underlying structure (see Appendix K)
but rather di erent superficial features. The ‘warehouse fire’ was adapted from a similar
narrative often used in research on the CIE (e.g., Ecker et al., 2011b; H. M. Johnson & Seifert,
1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988), and the ‘zoo breakout’ was novel. Each narrative
consisted of 18 short messages (each less than 140 characters) resembling individual ‘Tweets’
from the social media platform Twitter (e.g., Figure 6.2). All messages appeared to come
from a (fictional) news outlet called ‘News Today’. Both narratives elicited the CIE in a pilot
study (n = 39).
Slightly modified versions of the warehouse and zoo narratives were employed depending on
experimental group (F+R+, F+R-, F-R-). The 6th message either contained false information
(e.g., Statement from Police Detective Lucas: “A storeroom contained cans of oil paint and
pressurised gas cylinders near faulty electrical wiring”) or did not (Statement from Police
Detective Lucas: “We are working with the fire services to rapidly get the situation under
control”). The 17th message either contained a retraction message (e.g., Police Detective
Lucas has released a new statement: “the storeroom did not contain paint cans and gas
243
CHAPTER 6. CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF FALSE INFORMATION
cylinders, it was actually empty”) or did not (e.g., Police Detective Lucas has released a new
statement: “the fire is now under control and the area will soon be declared safe”).
The other messages were the same across experimental groups and either referred to general
non-causal information about the event (12x ‘filler’ details; e.g., A small crowd of onlookers
has gathered on a nearby pedestrian bridge to watch as the fire consumes the warehouse) or
referred to information that was specifically related to the cause of the event (4x ‘auxiliary
details’; e.g., A warehouse worker was recently disciplined for breaching health and safety
regulations in the sta  kitchens).
The critical departure from previous continued influence studies was to ensure that auxiliary
details in the narratives preferentially supported the alternative theme (Figure 6.1; see
Appendix K for details). In the warehouse narrative, all of the auxiliary details implied
that the fire was caused by a worker leaving a hot stove unattended in the sta  kitchen,
even though the false information suggested that the fire was caused by cans of oil paint
and pressurized gas cylinders left near faulty electrical wiring in a storeroom. In the zoo
narrative, all of the auxiliary details implied that the monkeys had escaped after an animal
rights activist cut a hole in the fence of their enclosure even though the false information
suggested that a work experience student had left their cage door open.
6.1.1.4 Procedure
Participants were told that they were taking part in a study investigating how well people
remember news information presented on the social media platform Twitter. They read a
short paragraph of instructions (Appendix J) and then responded to an instruction-attention
check (Appendix I),
Figure 6.3: Stages of the continued influence paradigm used in Experiment 12.
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The core procedure is shown in Figure 6.3. Participants were presented with a narrative
(Appendix K) in the form of a series of sequential Twitter messages (‘Tweets’; e.g., see
Figure 6.2). Depending on the participant’s experimental group, the narrative either contained
false information (F+R-, F+R+) or did not (F-R-), and either contained a retraction message
(F+R+) or did not (F+R-, F-R-). Messages appeared one at a time for a minimum of 5s
each, and no maximum time. A button had to be clicked in order to proceed to the next
message. Participants were unable to go back and view previous messages. After all of the
tweets had been presented, participants completed a 5 minute distractor task consisting of
arithmetic questions before moving on to the testing stages.
During the test stages, participants encountered separate blocks of questions presented in a
pre-defined order: inference questions (x8) and filler questions (x8; intermixed), retraction
awareness questions (x2), and a recognition test (x1). The order of questions within each
block was randomized.
In the first block of testing they were asked questions about the event described in the tweets.
Some of these questions (‘inference questions’, Appendix M: Table M.1 and Table M.2)
required them to reason about causes of the event and go beyond the information provided in
the tweets. For example, “What was the possible cause of the strong burning smell?” Other
questions (‘filler questions’, Appendix M: Table M.3 and Table M.4) were more general and
did not have a direct bearing on the causes of the event. For example, “Where did onlookers
gather to watch the fire?” A second attention check was embedded within this set of questions
(see Appendix I).
In the second block of testing, participants answered questions that assessed their awareness
of the retraction message (see Appendix M). For example, “Were you aware of any corrections
or contradictions in the messages that you read?”
In the final block of testing, participants were asked to complete a two-alternative forced choice
recognition memory test (also known as the “Modified Test”; see Chapter 4; M. McCloskey
& Zaragoza, 1985a) to assess the persistence of false information in the memory store. This
involved presentation of the false information tweet in its original form vertically adjacent to
a second message that contained novel information instead of the false information (a lure;
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Appendix L). The spatial position (top or bottom) of the tweets was counter-balanced.
6.1.1.5 Response coding
Responses were coded according to the pre-registered coding framework (see Appendix M).
In summary, for the inference questions, coders classified responses as references to the false
theme, the alternative theme, or neither. References had to be ‘causal’ in nature (see Ecker
et al., 2011a): the participant had to explicitly state, or strongly imply, that the warehouse
fire was caused by gas and oil paints/unattended hot stove or that the zoo breakout was
caused by the cage being left open by a work experience student/an activist cutting a hole in
the enclosure.
• References related to neither theme received a score of zero on both dependent measures.
• References to the false theme scored 1 on the ‘references to false information’ measure.
• References to the alternative theme scored 1 on the ‘references to alternative theme’
measure.
• If the participant made references to both themes they scored 0.5 on each measure.
The maximum score that could be achieved for each measure on each question was therefore
1, even if multiple references were made in the same response. Consequently, the maximum
score for each dependent measure for all inference questions was 8.
10% of the responses (n = 20) were joint-coded to assess the reliability of the coding framework.
As high inter-rater agreement was obtained (96%), the remaining responses were single coded.
6.1.2 Results
Statistical significance was defined at the .05 level. All Bayes Factors (BF 10; Rouder et al.,
2009) indicate the degree of evidence for the alternative hypothesis (H 1) relative to the null
hypothesis (H 0) and use a ‘default’ JZS prior (Cauchy distribution with scale r = .707).
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Reference theme alt false
Figure 6.4: Zoo narrative condition. Number of references to the false theme and the
alternative (alt) theme based on experimental group: No false information or retraction
(F-R-), false information without retraction (F+R-), and false information with retraction
(F+R+). Maximum number of references to the each theme was 8. Dotplots show coloured
circles representing indvidual data points (bin width = .05). Means are represented by black
circles (false theme) or black squares (alternative theme), and error bars represent 95% CIs.
Diamonds represent medians.
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Reference theme alt false
Figure 6.5: Warehouse narrative condition. Number of references to the false theme and
the alternative (alt) theme based on experimental group: No false information or retraction
(F-R-), false information without retraction (F+R-), and false information with retraction
(F+R+). Maximum number of references to the each theme was 8. Dotplots show coloured
circles representing indvidual data points (bin width = .05). Means are represented by black
circles (false theme) or black squares (alternative theme), and error bars represent 95% CIs.
Diamonds represent medians.
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6.1.2.1 Inference questions
A 2 x 3 between-subjects ANOVA with narrative type (Zoo, Warehouse) and experimental
group (F+R-, F+R+, F-R-) as independent variables and references to the false theme as a
dependent variable, indicated a significant main e ect of experimental group F (2, 198) = 59.12,
p < .001, ÷2G = .37, a significant main e ect of narrative type, F (1, 198) = 8.30, p = .004,
÷2G = .04 and an interaction between the two factors, F (2, 198) = 4.02, p = .019, ÷2G = .04. We
therefore proceeded with separate analyses for the zoo narrative (Figure 6.4) and warehouse
narrative (Figure 6.5).
A one-way between-subjects ANOVA with references to the false theme as a dependent
variable, indicated a significant main e ect of experimental group for both the zoo narrative,
F (2, 99) = 23.44, p < .001, ÷2G = .32, and the warehouse narrative, F (2, 99) = 35.87, p < .001,
÷2G = .42. A similar ANOVA for references to the alternative theme indicated a significant
main e ect of experimental group for the zoo narrative, F (2, 99) = 5.86, p = .004, ÷2G = .11,
and the warehouse narrative, F (2, 99) = 13.54, p < .001, ÷2G = .21. We therefore proceeded
with pairwise contrasts between all experimental groups within the zoo (Table 6.1, contrasts
1-6) and warehouse (Table 6.2, contrasts 7-12) conditions for both primary dependent variables
(references to false theme and alternative theme). Within-group contrasts between reference
themes are shown in Table 6.3 (contrasts 13-18). To aid identification in the following text,
all contrasts are referred to via the number assigned to them in the leftmost column of each
table. The Holm-Bonferroni procedure was used to correct p-values for multiple-comparisons
(see table captions for the di erent test families). As the overall pattern of findings was
similar for the zoo narrative (Figure 6.4) and warehouse narrative (Figure 6.5), they are
discussed together below, with any salient di erences explicitly noted.
6.1.2.1.1 Baseline performance (F-R-)
As expected, the baseline F-R- conditions (from which false information was absent) yielded
an extremely low number of spontaneous false theme references. Conversely, there was a
relatively high number of references to the alternative theme, suggesting that the auxiliary
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Table 6.1: Between-group pairwise contrasts for zoo narrative by reference theme (False,
Alternative).
No. Reference Theme Contrast/Prediction M di [95%CI] t p BF 10
1 False F+R- > F-R- 1.79[1.27,2.32] 6.88 <.001 6e+06
2 False F+R+ > F-R- 0.84[0.43,1.25] 4.12 <.001 414.48
3 False F+R+ < F+R- -0.96[-1.58,-0.33] -3.07 .002 23.91
4 Alternative F+R- <> F-R- -1.59[-2.56,-0.62] -3.28 .005 20.15
5 Alternative F+R+ <> F-R- -0.72[-1.72,0.28] -1.44 .156 0.60
6 Alternative F+R+ <> F+R- 0.87[0.06,1.67] 2.16 .069 1.75
Note. F-R-, No false information or retraction; F+R-, false information without retraction;
F+R+ false information with retraction; BF 10, Bayes Factor indicating the degree of evidence
for the alternative hypothesis relative to H 0; p, Holm-Bonferroni corrected p-value (test
families by reference theme).
Table 6.2: Between-group pairwise contrasts for warehouse narrative by reference theme
(False, Alternative).
No. Reference Theme Contrast/Prediction M di [95%CI] t p BF 10
7 False F+R- > F-R- 3.04[2.38,3.71] 9.21 <.001 6e+10
8 False F+R+ > F-R- 1.29[0.67,1.92] 4.19 <.001 518.26
9 False F+R+ < F+R- -1.75[-2.61,-0.89] -4.06 <.001 346.80
10 Alternative F+R- <> F-R- -2.43[-3.20,-1.66] -6.30 <.001 4e+05
11 Alternative F+R+ <> F-R- -1.18[-2.20,-0.15] -2.30 .028 2.27
12 Alternative F+R+ <> F+R- 1.25[0.26,2.24] 2.54 .028 3.65
Note. F-R-, No false information or retraction; F+R-, false information without retraction;
F+R+ false information with retraction; BF 10, Bayes Factor indicating the degree of evidence
for the alternative hypothesis relative to H 0; p, Holm-Bonferroni corrected p-value (test
families by reference theme).
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Table 6.3: Within-group pairwise contrasts between false theme and alternative theme references.
No. Narrative Group Contrast/Prediction M di [95%CI] t p BF 10
13 Warehouse F-R- Alternative <> False 4.53[3.84,5.22] 13.39 <.001 1e+12
14 Zoo F-R- Alternative <> False 4.79[3.91,5.67] 11.09 <.001 7e+09
15 Warehouse F+R- Alternative <> False -0.94[-1.98,0.10] -1.85 .074 0.84
16 Zoo F+R- Alternative <> False 1.41[0.54,2.28] 3.29 .007 14.96
17 Warehouse F+R+ Alternative <> False 2.06[0.73,3.39] 3.14 .007 10.55
18 Zoo F+R+ Alternative <> False 3.24[2.38,4.09] 7.70 <.001 2e+06
Note. F-R-, No false information or retraction; F+R-, false information without retraction;
F+R+ false information with retraction; BF 10, Bayes Factor indicating the degree of evidence
for the alternative hypothesis relative to H 0; p, Holm-Bonferroni corrected p-value (test families
by narrative).
narrative details provided a plausible alternative explanation of events. These di erences were
statistically significant and yielded strong evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis
according to a Bayes Factor (contrasts 13 and 14).
6.1.2.1.2 Influence of false information (Manipulation check, F+R- vs. F-R-)
When false information was introduced, but not retracted (F+R-), the number of false
references increased (contrasts 1 and 7) and the number of alternative references decreased
(contrasts 4 and 10). All contrasts were statistically significant and yielded strong evidence
in favour of the alternative hypothesis according to a Bayes Factor.
The within-group comparisons of alternative vs false references showed a di erent pattern
for the zoo and warehouse narratives. In the zoo condition, there were more alternative
references relative to false references, a statistically significant di erence accompanied by a
strong evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis according to a Bayes Factor (contrast
16). Conversely, in the warehouse condition there were more false references than alternative
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references, but the di erence was not statistically significant and yielded an inconclusive
Bayes Factor (contrast 15). Therefore, the false information did not appear su cient to
displace the alternative theme as the dominant explanatory account for the event in the zoo
narrative. The situation was more ambiguous for the warehouse narrative.
6.1.2.1.3 Influence of retraction (Hypothesis 1, F+R+ vs. F+R-)
In the group in which false information was retracted (F+R+), there was a decrease in the
number of false references (contrasts 3 and 9) and an increase in the number of alternative
references (contrasts 6 and 12). There were substantially more alternative references than false
references (contrasts 17 and 18). All contrasts were statistically significant. The reduction
in false references yielded strong evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis according
to a Bayes Factor. The increase in alternative references was less robust but still yielded
moderate evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the retraction message
reduced reliance on the false information as predicted and correspondingly led to increased
reliance on the alternative theme.
6.1.2.1.4 Continued influence e ect (Hypothesis 2, F+R+ vs. F-R-)
The critical question with regards to the CIE was whether the retraction was not just capable
of reducing the e ect of the false information (see above), but eliminating its impact entirely.
This required a comparison between the baseline condition (F-R-) and the retraction condition
(F+R+). A CIE was obtained: despite the retraction, the number of false references was
higher than in the baseline condition (contrasts 2 and 8). These di erences were statistically
significant and yielded very strong evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis according
to Bayes Factors.
The number of alternative theme references was slightly lower than in the baseline condition
(contrasts 5 and 11) although these di erences were not statistically significant and Bayes
Factors indicated that the data were fairly inconclusive. Overall, it is not clear if the retraction
was e ective at fully restoring reliance on the alternative theme.
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for filler scores, retraction awareness scores, and
recognition scores, across experimental groups.
Group Filler M (SD) Retraction Awareness M (SD) Recognition M (SD)
F-R- 4.96(1.82) 0.07(0.31) 0.51(0.50)
F+R- 5.15(1.93) 0.40(0.52) 0.96(0.21)
F+R+ 5.28(1.84) 1.44(0.72) 0.96(0.21)
6.1.2.2 Filler scores
Responses to the filler questions were broadly similar across experimental groups (Table 6.4).
A 2 x 3 between-subjects ANOVA with experimental group (F+R-, F+R+, F-R-) as an
independent variable and filler scores as a dependent variable, indicated no significant main
e ect of experimental group, F (2, 201) = 0.52, p = .596, ÷2G = .01.
6.1.2.3 Retraction Awareness
Retraction awareness scores suggested that participants noticed and understood the retraction
message when it was present (in F+R+; Table 6.4). Excluding participants from the F+R+
group who failed to noticed the retraction (i.e., awareness score = 0; n = 9) did not have a
substantial impact on the overall pattern of results.
6.1.2.4 Recognition (Hypothesis 3)
In a final recognition test participants were required to identify the false information tweet
against a similar lure tweet. As expected, participants who had not seen the false information
(F-R-) performed at chance levels on this test (Table 6.4). By contrast, participants who
were exposed to the false information (F+R+, F+R-), performed almost flawlessly. This was
even the case for the retraction group, highlighting that the retraction had not overwritten
the false information in the memory store.
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6.1.3 Discussion
In previous chapters, we have examined whether information stored in memory might be
updated via an overwriting mechanism. However, in the present study, we turned our
attention to other factors that might contribute to the updating of erroneous knowledge.
Specifically, we sought to evaluate whether the continued influence e ect (CIE; Seifert, 2002)
could be eliminated when a retraction message was accompanied by an alternative account
that explained more features of the event compared to the account associated with the false
information. In order ot achieve this, we ensured that all four auxiliary details presented
in the narrative were more consistent with the alternative theme than with the false theme.
According to the causal coverage hypothesis, this should prevent participants from relying on
false information after it has been retracted because a plausible and coherent replacement
account is readily available. However, despite enhancing the causal coverage of the alternative
theme, the CIE was not eliminated in this experiment.
The alternative themes we provided were clearly plausible. In the baseline conditions (F-R-)
participants made a high number of alternative theme references, and as expected, rarely
made spontaneous references to the false theme (Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5). For the group who
also received false information without a retraction, reliance of the alternative theme was
partly reduced and the number of references to false information increased (Manipulation
Check; F+R- > F-R-). Therefore, we were able to establish the necessary conditions under
which a CIE could emerge. As demonstrated previously (e.g., Ecker et al., 2011b; H. M.
Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988), the retraction message reduced
reliance on the false information (Hypothesis 1; F+R+ < F+R-). We also observed a small
recovery in reliance on the alternative theme. However, the retraction message did not
eliminate the influence of the false information: the number of false theme references was
higher in the group who experienced false information with a retraction than in the group
who never experienced the false information (Hypothesis 2; F+R+ > F-R-). Therefore, like
others (Ecker et al., 2010, 2011a; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999),
we found that making an alternative account readily available was capable of attenuating,
but not eliminating the CIE.
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Although the causal coverage manipulation did not eliminate the CIE, it could still have
enhanced the e cacy of the retraction. To evaluate this, an additional experiment should be
run in which the false theme has greater causal coverage than the alternative theme. Under
these conditions, one would expect the CIE e ect to be more pronounced because the most
plausible and coherent account of the event is based on the false information, thus introducing
greater resistance to the retraction. Nevertheless, the fact that participants continue to rely
on false information, even when it has been retracted and a plausible, coherent alternative
is readily available, suggests that other important factors also contribute to the CIE. One
candidate is a failure of ‘strategic memory processing’ (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993;
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). When individuals recall the false information, they may fail
to adequately search memory for other relevant information, such as the retraction message.
Although data from CIE studies (and the present experiment) show that participants can in
principle recall the retraction message, this does not necessarily mean that they access this
‘negation tag’ whilst retrieving the false information (Ecker et al., 2011b). This account could
explain why warning participants that they will encounter false information can attenuate
the CIE (Ecker et al., 2010): it may encourage participants to adopt more rigorous strategic
monitoring when answering the inference questions. Interestingly, in one study the dual
use of a prior warning and an alternative message still did not eliminate the CIE (Ecker et
al., 2010). However, as discussed in the introduction, this could be because the alternative
account had low causal coverage relative the false theme. Future investigations could examine
the impact of a dual manipulation involving a prior warning and an alternative account with
high casual coverage.
Despite failing to eliminate the CIE, we found that the retraction did partly reduce reliance
on the false information, as others have shown repeatedly (e.g., H. M. Johnson & Seifert,
1994; Ecker et al., 2011b; cf. Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). We sought to establish
whether this memory updating e ect entailed any storage-based impairment (Hypothesis 3;
F+R+ > F-R- and F+R+ = F+R-), as implied by a trace overwriting account (Dudai, 2009;
Loftus, 1979a; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). As expected, the F-R- group, who had not
seen either the false information tweet or the lure tweet, performed at chance levels on a
forced-choice recognition test (see Chapter 4; M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). By contrast,
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performance in the two groups who had seen the false information tweet was equivalent and
almost flawless (F+R- and F+R+). This evidence clearly demonstrates that the retraction
message had not caused any storage-based memory impairment, and stands in stark contrast
to destructive updating, editing, or overwriting accounts (Dudai, 2009; Loftus, 1979a; Wilkes
& Leatherbarrow, 1988).
An alternative explanation is that participants were able to voluntarily suppress the to-be-
forgotten false information through a process of intentional forgetting (M. C. Anderson &
Neely, 1996; R. A. Bjork, 1989; MacLeod, 1998). In an illustrative intentional forgetting
paradigm (also known as ‘directed forgetting’), participants learn a list of items (e.g., hand,
duck, horse, etc.). After each item, they are instructed to either ‘remember’ or ‘forget’45.
Subsequently, participants complete a recall test for all of the items they have seen. The
typical finding is that recall of to-be-forgotten (TBF) items is lower than for to-be-remembered
(TBR) items. An early ‘erasure’ hypothesis, posited that individuals had deleted some of the
TBF items from memory (Muther, 1965). However, this account was quickly undermined by
several studies showing that TBF materials are available in the memory store, as evidenced
by intact performance on recognition tests (e.g., Block, 1971; Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman,
1983). Therefore, individuals who accept and implement the intentions of the retraction
message in the CIE paradigm may be able to voluntarily suppress (but not overwrite) the
false information, thus avoiding its usage on the inference questions, but allowing its presence
to be revealed on a recognition test. Reducing the CIE might therefore require intentional
forgetting of the false information, but it is unclear why some participants appear to be more
successful at this than others.
Finally, an intriguing finding that warrants further discussion is that participants often made
references to both the alternative theme and the false theme. This was most evident in the
F+R- condition where participants had no reason to disregard any of the information they
had read. A close examination of participants’ responses revealed many examples where false
45Alternatively, in the list-method, one group of participants is instructed to forget the first half of a list of
items and remember the second half, whereas a second group are instructed to remember both parts of the
list (MacLeod, 1998).
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and alternative themes were referred to alongside each other (e.g., “The cage was left open
and there was a hole in the perimeter of the fence”). Some participants displayed a tendency
to generate novel ‘blended’ explanations, integrating information from both themes (e.g.,
“I think that they will find out that the man with the ‘animal rights’ shirt convinced the
work experience lads that they should free the animals”). This is consistent with evidence
that, rather than revising their beliefs, individuals often prefer to generate new explanations
that resolve inconsistencies within their mental models (Johnson-Laird, 2012). The false and
alternative themes appear to be lend themselves to this process because they are not mutually
exclusive. It is not impossible, as one participant suggested, that the warehouse fire was
caused by an incompetent worker leaving gas cylinders (false theme) next to an unattended
stove in the sta  kitchens (alternative theme). This raises a potential new hypothesis: how
would participants handle the two themes when one rendered the other impossible? For
example, returning to the scenario outlined earlier involving a plane crash and a drunken
pilot: would the alternative theme eliminate reliance on the false information if this was in
fact the maiden voyage of a new ‘pilot-less’ jet that su ered a catastrophic computer failure?
Presumably this would force participants to choose between the two accounts, rather than
attempting to blend them. Finally on this issue, it is important to note that although some
theorists have proposed that incorporating new information into memory can lead to the
creation of “blended memory representations” (e.g., Loftus et al., 1985), the present data o er
no reason to assume that the blending process involves physical amalgamation of traces (also
see M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985b). These findings could just as well reflect some ‘online’
retrieval-based synthesis of information that is currently active in memory (Johnson-Laird,
2012).
In summary, the CIE suggests that erroneous information stored in memory is not routinely
updated via an overwriting process. In the present study, we examined whether the CIE
could be eliminated via an alternative means: the provision of a readily available alternative
account that provides superior causal coverage to the false information account. Our findings
indicate that these conditions are not su cient to abolish the e ect, suggesting that the lack
of an adequate alternative explanation is not the only factor that determines the continued




“And in it all, where did the truth end and error begin?”
— Verne, Journey to the Centre of the Earth
For over a century, scientists have sought to establish how the memory system maintains
knowledge representations over time (persistence) whilst simultaneously retaining a capacity
for updating knowledge when it is outdated or erroneous (plasticity). In this thesis, I have
examined the provocative idea that memory traces can be overwritten with new information,
especially during transient periods of retrieval-induced plasticity that occur when a trace
undergoes reconsolidation (Nader & Hardt, 2009). If reconsolidation enables overwriting of
memory traces in humans, the clinical (Schwabe et al., 2014), ethical (Hui & Fisher, 2014),
and theoretical (Nader et al., 2000b) implications could be profound. Nevertheless, after
evaluating the existing evidentiary landscape (Chapter 2), and subjecting the theory to several
strong tests in our own experiments (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), it is necessary to conclude that
the extant evidence for reconsolidation-mediated memory updating is remarkably tenuous. In
this final chapter, we will summarise the main findings of the thesis and provide an integrative
discussion of key issues.
7.1 Summary and discussion of findings
In Chapter 1, we first highlighted the inherent complexity of empirical investigations into mem-
ory updating and forgetting. Three stages that intervene between learning and performance
were introduced: (re)storage, retrieval, and conversion (section 1.1). Our framework stressed
the important distinction between a latent memory trace (i.e., the physical representation
of encoded information) and ecphoric memory (i.e., the state of activity generated by the
synergistic interaction of retrieval cues and multiple reactivated memory traces; Moscovitch,
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2007; Semon, 1921; Tulving, 1983b). The e orts of memory researchers to unweave this
complex tapestry are constrained by the limitations of the technologies available to them.
For example, it is currently not possible to directly verify that a memory trace has been
modified or erased (although for promising recent developments see Josselyn et al., 2015),
and researchers must largely rely on indirect inferences based on behavioural measures (M.
J. Watkins, 1990). This issue has surfaced repeatedly in the enduring search for the loci of
forgetting (Gold & King, 1974; Gold, 2006; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; R. R. Miller &
Matzel, 2006) and remains problematic (Nader, 2006; Sara & Hars, 2006; Squire, 2006).
In early studies of retroactive interference, it was found that learning new information could
adversely influence retrieval of previously learned ‘old’ information on a subsequent memory
test (Crowder, 1976; Postman & Underwood, 1973). This was initially demonstrated in a series
of experiments conducted by Müller and Pilzecker (1900) who also observed that the disruptive
e ects of new learning appeared to diminish as the post-acquisition time-interval increased.
This temporal gradient was taken to indicate the status of a progressive stabilisation process,
‘consolidation’, necessary for the fixation of the memory trace. Subsequent investigations in
non-human animals used invasive pharmacological and electrophysiological interventions to
target the putative physiological substrates of consolidation. These studies largely confirmed
the existence of a temporal gradient across multiple species, paradigms, and intervention types
(Glickman, 1961; McGaugh, 1966). Later refinements of consolidation theory adopted a dual
trace model (Hebb, 1949; McGaugh & Dawson, 1971), in which a short-term memory (STM)
trace consisted of initial reverberatory activity in local neural circuits, and was followed
by protein-synthesis dependent structural changes at the synaptic level (long-term memory,
LTM). Critically, it was assumed that consolidation was a uni-directional process. Once the
intervention lost its e ectiveness, the trace had by definition ‘consolidated’ and was thought
to be immune to any subsequent attempts at interference.
Consolidation theory has persevered through more than a century of empirical examination,
but it is unclear if it has prevailed. A number of studies conducted during the 1960s and
1970s found that reactivating a previously consolidated memory trace could apparently
render the trace vulnerable to disruption once again (e.g., Misanin et al., 1968). These
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cue-dependent amnesia (CDA) e ects represented a serious challenge to the assumption that
amnesic agents were only e ective during a brief post-acquisition ‘consolidation window’
(Lewis, 1976; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; Riccio & Richardson, 1984). However, some
research teams had trouble replicating CDA e ects (e.g., Dawson & McGaugh, 1969) and
alternatives to consolidation theory failed to gain traction (Lewis, 1979). Nevertheless, a
more recent demonstration of CDA (Nader et al., 2000a) received considerable attention in
the neuroscience community, and the debates of the 1960s and 1970s rapidly resurfaced (see
Riccio et al., 2006; Sara & Hars, 2006). Critically, this new report of CDA was accommodated
within the consolidation framework, rather than seen as a direct challenge to it (Dudai,
2000; Nader et al., 2000b; Sara, 2000b). Reconsolidation theory suggests that reactivation
can destablise a previously consolidated trace, reinstating a state of plasticity until the
trace restabilises (‘reconsolidates’). The years following the study of Nader et al. saw
reconsolidation theory draw widespread empirical support from across species, experimental
paradigms, and intervention types (for review see Besnard et al., 2012; Nader & Hardt, 2009;
Tronson & Taylor, 2007).
However, in several respects, reconsolidation theory is undermined by the same issues that
posed di culties for the consolidation account (Chapters 1 and 2). For example, the consistent
finding that trace-dependent performance is intact on tests of STM, but not on tests of
LTM, can be reasonably accommodated in the context of protein-synthesis inhibitor (PSI)
studies (see Davis & Squire, 1984), but seems more problematic in studies administering
electroconvulsive shock (ECS) studies (see subsubsection 1.2.7.6; R. R. Miller & Springer,
1973). PSIs are thought to prevent (re)stabilisation of the LTM trace directly, but have
no e ect on the STM trace. ECS on the other hand eliminates the STM trace, which
prevents subsequent (re)stabilisation of the LTM trace (R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973; R. R.
Miller & Matzel, 2006). In consolidation studies, the finding of intact STM after only brief
acquisition-intervention delays (e.g., 10s) seems to indicate that the formation of a structural
memory representation occurs extremely rapidly (R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973).
The (re)consolidation account suggests that the disruption caused by post-acquisition and
post-reactivation interventions is permanent, because the target trace had not been allowed
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to (re)stabilise, and is consequently impaired, or even erased (Nader, 2003a). However,
many studies have found that experimentally-induced amnesia can be partially alleviated,
either spontaneously with the passage of time, or via specific ‘reminder treatments’ such as
reinstatement or renewal (see subsubsection 1.2.7.8; Spear, 1973; R. R. Miller & Springer, 1973;
Riccio & Richardson, 1984). This echoes findings from extinction and counter-conditioning
studies which have repeatedly found that superficially compelling cases of ‘unlearning’ were
not due to unlearning at all, but instead reflected retrieval-based forgetting of the target
CS-US association (see subsection 1.2.3; Bouton, 2002). Recovery e ects have been reported
on numerous occasions and appear to provide compelling evidence against a storage-based
mechanism of memory impairment. However, they have not always proved reliable in
subsequent replication attempts (e.g., Duvarci & Nader, 2004) suggesting that the conditions
under which they arise are poorly understood. Moreover, the degree to which they actually
pose a serious problem for (re)consolidation theory has been challenged by some theorists
(Gold & King, 1974; Nader & Wang, 2006; Squire, 2006).
One of the most exciting and controversial aspects of reconsolidation theory is the idea that it
represents a memory updating mechanism (Dudai, 2009; Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015; J. L.
Lee, 2009). Specifically, it has been proposed that transient ‘reconsolidation windows’ provide
an opportunity to modify or ‘overwrite’ the contents of memory traces, allowing routine
maintenance of their accuracy and relevance in a changing environment (J. L. Lee, 2009). In a
2010 article, Hardt, Einarsson, and Nader outlined how this aspect of reconsolidation could act
as a bridge between the cognitive and neurobiological approaches to memory research. They
suggested that the field of cognitive psychology is replete with demonstrations that ‘memories’
are ‘malleable’ entities citing, for instance, retroactive interference e ects in the A-B, A-C
paired-associates (Postman & Underwood, 1973) and misinformation paradigms (Loftus,
1979a). They commented on how these findings are at odds with consolidation theory, which
suggests that memory traces, once initially stabilised, remain static and fixed. Reconsolidation
theory, on the other hand, imbues memory traces with a capacity for plasticity, which can
explain how they might be updated by new learning (Hardt et al., 2010).
The problem here is that there is compelling evidence in both cases that no modification
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of memory traces has occurred. In the A-B, A-C paired-associates paradigm for example
(for details see Chapter 1), the interference e ect can be mitigated by asking participants
to provide both responses (e.g., J. M. Barnes & Underwood, 1959), diminishes over time
(e.g., Wheeler, 1995), and can even be eliminated when a recognition test is employed (e.g.,
R. C. Anderson & Watts, 1971). Similarly, in the misinformation paradigm (for details see
Chapter 4), the interference e ect can also diminish over time (Chandler, 1991), and be
eliminated (M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a) when appropriately designed recognition tests
are used. In other words, these retroactive interference e ects seem to be best characterised as
retrieval-based rather than storage-based impairments, and neither phenomenon requires that
the memory trace itself be a malleable entity (Chandler & Fisher, 1996; Crowder, 1976). More
broadly, it is well known that the inaccessibility of a memory trace (i.e., retrieval-failure) does
not necessarily reflect the unavailability of the trace (i.e., storage-failure). Many instances
of forgetting appear to be cue-dependent: that is, they can be alleviated through provision
of e ective retrieval cues (see subsection 1.2.4; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Tulving, 1974).
This is also readily apparent from the extensive empirical investigations into extinction and
counter-conditioning (mainly in non-human animals, see subsection 1.2.3; Bouton, 2002;
Bouton & Moody, 2004). The recovery e ects obtained in these studies indicate that it is
unnecessary to ‘overwrite’ or ‘unlearn’ an existing memory association in order to make
way for an association representing a conflicting behavioural response. Overall, there is
considerable evidence to suggest that when new learning leads to forgetting, or memory
updating, it does not require modification of existing memory traces.
How do studies fare when they directly test the theory of reconsolidation-mediated memory
updating? In Chapter 2, we addressed this by conducting a comprehensive review of all pub-
lished investigations of human reconsolidation that have employed behavioural interventions.
After defining ten key criteria necessary for a compelling demonstration of reconsolidation, we
systematically evaluated the extent to which these criteria were met in the current evidentiary
landscape. We also conducted a more in-depth examination of several case studies (also
see Chapters 3 and 4). Our findings indicate that studies rarely meet more than a few of
the critical criteria, and no study met more than six. As such, we concluded that there are
presently no compelling demonstrations of reconsolidation-mediated memory updating in
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human participants.
Our review also took a ‘meta-theoretical’ perspective, and examined how the field has handled
instances of theoretical success and failure (section 2.3). We suggested that frequent appeals
to unverified ‘boundary conditions’ has stalled rather than facilitated theoretical progress
because of a lack of systematic empirical verification. An immediate priority for the field
will be to establish a protocol in which reconsolidation e ects can be reliably observed. An
e ect can be considered relatively reliable when it has been estimated with high precision and
can be obtained in independent high-powered direct replication attempts. To achieve these
aims, the field will need to adjust many of its informal conventions. For example, precise
e ect size estimates will likely require larger sample sizes than are typical (see Figure 2.6)
and direct replication will only be possible if experimental materials and software programs
are made openly available for other researchers to use. The focus on repeating previous
studies may seem less exciting than the pursuit of more novel ventures, but replication is a
vital ingredient of scientific discovery because it separates signal from noise (Ioannidis, 2014).
Ultimately, systematic replication e orts will be the only way to identify genuine boundary
conditions and avoid the considerable theoretical confusion that results from the widespread
proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses.
Chapter 3 provides an example of this approach in a series of experiments intended to replicate
a prominent finding interpreted as evidence for reconsolidation-mediated memory updating
in humans (Walker et al., 2003). This particular procedural learning study met six of the
reconsolidation criteria outlined in our review, and was hailed as a ‘landmark discovery’ in the
reconsolidation community (Nader, 2003b, p. 572). However, across four direct replications
(Experiments 1-4, N = 64) and three conceptual replications involving declarative recall
(Experiments 5-7, N = 48), we did not observe the critical impairment e ects obtained in
the original study, and as such, found no evidence to support the claim that reconsolidation
enables human memory updating.
In Chapter 4, we applied a similar ‘replication battery’ approach to a case reporting
reconsolidation-mediated updating in a misinformation paradigm (J. C. K. Chan & La-
Paglia, 2013). In their study (specifically ExperimentCL 6), Chan and LaPaglia adapted
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the traditional misinformation paradigm in order to meet various reconsolidation criteria (5
were met). Specifically, after ‘witnessing an event’ (watching a video) on Day 1, participants
were given a reminder test on Day 2, immediately prior to listening to an audio narrative
describing the Day 1 video. The narrative referred to some critical items in a misleading
way (‘misled’ condition) and referred to other items in a neutral way (‘control’ condition).
Finally, participants were tested on Day 3 using a true/false recognition test. Under these
conditions, the researchers reported that performance was significantly higher for neutral
items compared to misled items, i.e., a ‘misinformation e ect’ (Loftus, 1979a) was observed.
By contrast, in a group of participants who did not complete the reminder test on Day 2, no
significant di erence between neutral and misled items was observed. It was concluded that
reconsolidation-mediated overwriting of the memory trace representing the Day 1 video had
occurred in the reminder group, but not in the no reminder group.
There are at least two important reasons to be skeptical of this conclusion. Firstly, the critical
reminder by intervention interaction was not tested (see Chapter 2, Criterion 7), and secondly,
the classic misinformation literature indicates that the e ect can be eliminated when an
appropriately designed recognition test is employed. Specifically, although misinformation
e ects are readily obtained using a forced-choice recognition test that includes the event
item and the misled item as options (the “Original Test”, Loftus et al., 1978), they can be
eliminated when the misled item is excluded as an option, and there is instead a forced-choice
between the event item and a novel foil item (the “Modified Test”, M. McCloskey & Zaragoza,
1985a). The ‘True/False’ recognition test used by Chan and LaPaglia was similar to the
Modified Test but was susceptible to influence by factors unrelated to memory impairment,
and therefore did not provide an optimal test of reconsolidation theory (see Chapter 4 for
details).
In Experiment 8, we first established that the misinformation e ect could be obtained in a
hybrid reconsolidation-misinformation paradigm when the Original Test was employed. We
asked a second group of participants to respond on the Modified Test, and found that the e ect
was eliminated, replicating earlier findings obtained under non-reconsolidation conditions (e.g.,
M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). In Experiment 9, we asked all participants to respond
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on both the True/False and Modified Tests. We found a small misinformation e ect on the
True/False Test, partially replicating the findings of Chan and LaPaglia (2013). However, as
in Experiment 8, we found that the misinformation e ect was eliminated on the Modified
Test. In other words, participants were perfectly capable of recognising the event item against
a novel lure, indicating that, contrary to reconsolidation theory, the trace representing the
event item was intact. It would seem that the type of test used at retrieval can moderate the
presence or absence of impairment, consistent with the idea that the misinformation e ect
represents a retrieval-based rather than storage-based phenomenon (Chandler & Fisher, 1996;
Zaragoza et al., 2006). Finally, in Experiment 10, we replicated the Modified Test outcomes
obtained in Experiments 8 and 9, and also found that the nature of the reminder stage (no
reminder, retrieval practice, or ‘subtle’ reminder) had no appreciable impact on final test
performance. Overall, the findings of these three experiments suggest that misinformation
e ects are not caused by reconsolidation-mediated memory updating.
One outstanding issue in this line of research concerns the broader field of misinformation
studies that have used the Modified Test outside the context of reconsolidation theory.
Although the majority of Modified Test outcomes do not indicate a reliable di erence between
misled and control conditions (as in Experiments 8-10), a small number of studies have found
misinformation e ects. In fact, an early meta-analysis suggested that when a large number
of Modified Test outcomes were considered together, a small but statistically significant
misinformation e ect could be detected (Payne et al., 1994). Therefore, it could be that
geunine impairment e ects occur, but it is unclear exactly what circumstances are necessary
(also note that the Modified Test cannot di erentiate between a retrieval- or storage-based
impairment e ect). Moreover, the meta-analytic approach employed was problematic because
it did not account for the precision of individual studies. Unfortunately, we were unable to
conduct additional analyses of our own because of an absence of detailed statistical reporting
in the original sources.
To further complicate matters, some researchers have suggested that the Modified Test may
not be su ciently sensitive to detect small impairment e ects (Belli et al., 1992; Loftus et al.,
1985). A di erence between control and misled conditions detected using the Modified Test
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is likely to be 50% smaller than any actual impairment e ect because half of the responses
made for impaired items are likely to be correct guesses (Belli et al., 1992; M. McCloskey &
Zaragoza, 1985a). Therefore, one argument against the conclusions of Chapter 4 is that the
experiments did not have su cient statistical power to detect small e ects.
There are counter-arguments to this proposal, however. For example, studies included in
the meta-analysis that had larger sample sizes tended not to find misinformation e ects (see
Figure 4.4). Furthermore, a meta-analytic Bayes Factor applied to Modified Test outcomes
in Experiments 8-10 indicated reasonably strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis
relative to the reconsolidation hypothesis (H 0 was approximately 12 times more likely than
H 1 given the data). Nevertheless, there is a degree of ambiguity about the extant evidence
that warrants further investigation. We have proposed that the field pools its resources and
expertise in a pre-registered, multi-lab, Registered Replication Report (Simons et al., 2014)
in order to identify the degree to which misinformation e ects can be reliably detected using
the Modified Test.
In Experiment 11 (Chapter 5), we examined forward/backward testing accounts and the
reconsolidation theory in the context of updating knowledge about semantic facts. Specifically,
we reasoned that if reconsolidation-mediated updating is a genuine phenomenon, then prior
retrieval of naturally occurring semantic misconceptions should facilitate their correction with
accurate information via a process of ‘overwriting’. Conversely, a substantial body of evidence
indicates that retrieval of target information can actually increase the likelihood of its recall
on a subsequent memory test (Roediger & Butler, 2011), potentially reinforcing the erroneous
knowledge. In addition, it has been reported that retrieval practice can enhance learning
of subsequently presented information (Pastötter & Bäuml, 2014), potentially facilitating
acquisition of the accurate information. As such, contrasting theoretical predictions were
available as to whether prior retrieval would help or hinder the correction of semantic
misconceptions.
We firstly elicited naturally occurring semantic misconceptions by asking participants to
respond to a large battery of ‘quiz’ style questions, for example, ‘What is the name of a
dried grape?’ (answer: ‘Raisin’). On Day 2, participants were asked to answer some of these
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questions again (i.e., retrieval practice), presented with questions along with their previous
responses (i.e., restudy), or simply rested for a short period (i.e., no reminder), immediately
prior to receiving corrective feedback. Finally, on Day 3, participants were asked to respond
to the questions again in three phases. Firstly (dominance phase), in order to examine
knowledge updating we asked them to provide what they considered to be the correct answer
to the question. Secondly (persistence-new phase), to confirm that they had learned the
corrective feedback, we specifically asked them to provide the information we had given
them on Day 2. Finally (persistence-old phase), in order to establish whether their previous
erroneous knowledge had been forgotten, we asked them to specifically provide the response
they had given us on Day 1.
Participants were highly successful at updating their knowledge, responding mostly with
the accurate information during the dominance and persistence-new phases. Contrary to
both reconsolidation and forward-testing accounts, performance during these phases was
not impacted appreciably by the reminder manipulation. In other words, prior retrieval of
erroneous knowledge was not necessary for, nor did it facilitate, updating with accurate
information. In the critical persistence-old phase, we examined whether updating following a
reminder would result in the overwriting (reconsolidation account) or enhancement (testing
account) of the erroneous knowledge. The findings clearly demonstrated that most old
knowledge had been retained. Contrary to reconsolidation theory, recall of old knowledge
was higher in the reminder (restudy, retrieval practice) conditions relative to the no reminder
(rest) condition. The pattern of results across the three phases was maintained on a three
week follow-up test indicating that both corrective feedback and previous misconceptions
had largely been retained. Interestingly, the dominance of the corrective feedback had partly
subsided and responding with misconceptions had increased by a small magnitude.
Overall, these findings provide further evidence against the reconsolidation account. Firstly,
memory updating does not appear to be restricted to privileged ‘windows of plasticity’ whilst
traces are undergoing reconsolidation. Secondly, memory retrieval, in the form of testing or
restudy, can enhance the target information rather than rendering it vulnerable to interference.
Thirdly, memory updating does not require impairment or erasure of competing information
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that already exists in the memory store. The findings of the three-week follow-up test also
provide initial evidence that abandoned knowledge can linger in the memory store and start
to recover its dominance over time. This raises the possibility that even after successfully
learning corrective feedback, erroneous information could persist, and continue to influence
an individual’s judgments and decision-making.
Nevertheless, the findings of this single experiment should be considered relatively exploratory
and await confirmation in a pre-registered, high power replication. Moreover, it will be
necessary to address the possible ceiling e ects that could have masked a performance
advantage for the retrieval practice condition relative to the restudy condition. The intriguing
observation that semantic misconceptions started to regain their dominance after a 3-week
period also warrants further scrutiny. An obvious manipulation would be to evaluate whether
this apparent regression to previous knowledge is exacerbated at longer time intervals. It
will also be interesting to evaluate whether abandoned, but lingering erroneous knowledge
can have other more subtle consequences. For example, if participants were asked to write
an essay about the target topic rather than directly answer a question about it, this might
reveal a type of continued influence e ect akin to the one observed in Experiment 12.
In Chapter 6, we turned our attention to the continued influence e ect (CIE): the phenomenon
whereby individuals continue to rely on false information even after they have been explicitly
told to discount it (Seifert, 2002). CIEs appear to demonstrate quite clearly that information
stored in memory cannot simply be overwritten even when it is clear that the information
is erroneous and requires correction. The societal repercussions of this phenomenon are
potentially very serious (Lewandowsky et al., 2012b). Consider, for example, that a jury
considering its verdict might continue to rely on false information even when a judge
has specifically instructed them to disregard it (Fein et al., 1997). A typical laboratory
demonstration of CIE involves participants reading a media report (e.g., regarding a fire at a
warehouse) during which they are exposed to some false information (e.g., ‘the storeroom
contained paint cans and gas cylinders’), which is later explicitly retracted (e.g., ‘the storeroom
did not contain paint cans and gas cylinders, it was empty’). Despite acknowledging the
retraction message, participants still tend to make references to the false information when
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responding to questions about the event (Seifert, 2002). Typically, the retraction is at least
partly e ective, it is just not su cient to eliminate the influence of the false information.
As such, CIEs appear to demonstrate that information stored in memory cannot simply be
erased even when it is clear that the information is erroneous.
The CIE has proved extremely di cult to eliminate entirely (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010). However,
one of the most e ective methods for mitigating the influence of the false information is to
provide an alternative explanatory account of the event (e.g., the warehouse fire was started
by an arsonist, H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994). In Experiment 12, we examined whether
the causal coverage of an alternative account would increase its e ectiveness, and potentially
eliminate the CIE. Specifically, we noticed that in previous studies, the false information
tends to be consistent with other details provided about the event. For example, in the
warehouse fire narrative, the presence of paints and gas cylinders (the false information) is
consistent with auxiliary details such as “oily smoke and sheets of flame”, “intense heat”,
“explosions”, and “toxic fumes”. Therefore, even if the false information is retracted, it may
still provide the most compelling account of the event, and therefore prove di cult to ignore.
We hypothesised that providing an alternative account with superior causal coverage (i.e.,
explaining more event details relative to the false information account) would eliminate the
CIE.
Our findings replicated the CIE: participants who received a retraction message made fewer
references to false information than a no-retraction group, but made more references than
a control group who had not been exposed to the false information at all. In other words,
our attempt to eliminate the CIE by providing an alternative account with high causal
coverage was not successful. Nevertheless, additional experiments will be required to ascertain
whether the high causal coverage account was more e ective than an account with lower
causal coverage. In Experiment 12, we also used a ‘modified’ recognition test with the
false information message and a novel lure as options (M. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a)
in order to examine whether the e ectiveness of the retraction could be explained by a
trace overwriting account. Our participants displayed near-perfect performance on this test,
suggesting that no destructive updating had occurred.
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7.2 Adaptive updating
Why is speculation about reconsolidation-mediated memory updating so widespread when
there appears to be such a remarkable shortfall of empirical evidence (see Chapter 2)? The
answer may lie in an unwarranted conceptual conflation of behavioural and physiological
plasticity. It seems self-evident that we can learn to change our behaviours in response to the
changing demands of our local environment. An organism that does not update its knowledge
may lose access to vital resources such as food, water, or shelter; or, for homo sapiens of
more recent times, their bank account. However, it is not necessarily the case that this
adaptive behavioural plasticity relies directly on physiological plasticity (cf. R. A. Bjork, 1978;
Dudai, 2009; Kraemer & Golding, 1997). In other words, just because a previously learned
behavioural response is ‘replaced’ by an alternative behavioural response does not require
modification of memory traces. Nevertheless, there seems to be a widespread assumption that
this is exactly how behavioural plasticity is achieved: the world around us is dynamic, and
therefore memory traces must also be dynamic if the organism is to be adaptive. From this
perspective, the concept of reconsolidation is appealing because the memory trace, previously
seen as ‘fixed’ and ‘static’ can now be imbued with ‘malleability’ and plasticity (Dudai, 2009;
Hardt et al., 2010; J. L. Lee, 2009)
But there is good reason to reject this conflation and maintain a separation between be-
havioural and physiological plasticity. A system in which memory content is overwritten when
contradictory information is encountered in the environment would arguably be disastrous.
The system would be calibrated too far in favour of plasticity at the expense of persistence
(i.e., susceptible to catastrophic interference), and would be overly sensitive to temporary
fluctuations (‘noise’) at the expense of global patterns (‘signals’) that emerge over time.
Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980, p. 1046) expressed this view clearly: “To be bu eted
about by every random piece of disconfirming data or every challenge to the evidential basis
for one’s beliefs, whether in the course of scientific inquiry or in our daily lives, will frequently
prove less adaptive then a tendency to persist in theories that have proven e ective over
time.” Therefore, in principle, it is hard to see how it a system that relies on overwriting to
update knowledge could actually operate e ectively in the natural world.
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Far more useful would be a system that maximises the persistence of traces, in order to
preserve a rich repertoire of behavioural responses that can be deployed flexibly depending on
the retrieval cues available in the current situation. The system can still achieve behavioural
plasticity by continually accumulating new traces. As documented extensively in Chapter 1,
there is considerable evidence indicating that this is precisely how the memory system
operates (see ‘occasion setting’, ‘response competition’, ‘retrieval competition’, and ‘memory-
as-discrimination’). For instance, in the counter-conditioning paradigm, an animal might first
learn that a cue (e.g., tone) signals an aversive outcome (e.g., shock), and then subsequently
learn that the same cue signals an appetitive outcome (e.g., food). Rather than overwriting
information, the animal appears to be perfectly capable of simultaneously maintaining both
associations, despite the fact that they elicit opposing behavioural responses (fear response
or appetitive response). Moreover, by manipulating the availability of retrieval cues (e.g.,
physical context), the researcher can elicit either response from the animal (Bouton & Moody,
2004).
7.3 Closing remarks
The situations in which knowledge updating is required are commonplace. Doctors need to
continuously adjust the treatments they prescribe on the basis of new evidence, jurors need
to disregard biased testimony when instructed to do so by a judge, and scientists need to
revise their theories in light of new discoveries. There can be little doubt that the memory
system has the functional capability to update. The controversial question is how it achieves
this aim.
In the 1970s it was proposed that exposure to contradictory information could lead to the
overwriting or ‘destructive updating’ of existing memory traces (Loftus, 1979b), and prior
to that, the similar concept of ‘unlearning’ had gained considerable theoretical attention
(Melton & Irwin, 1940; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Lately the embers of these old ideas
have been rekindled. Trailing the meteoric rise of reconsolidation theory, there has been
widespread speculation that memory traces become amenable to modification during transient
periods of retrieval-induced plasticity (e.g., J. L. Lee, 2009; Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015).
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However, as key criteria that ensure a robust test of the theory are rarely met in empirical
investigations, the evidentiary basis for this claim is far from compelling. Moreover, the
widespread use of ad hoc hypotheses that reduce explanatory coverage, and the absence of
systematic replication e orts needed to verify the reliability of published evidence, has merely
led to theoretical obfuscation rather than theoretical progress.
Throughout this thesis I have made several appeals to the principles of open and cumulative
science, specifically: open data, pre-registration, and direct replication. These are not
tangential issues; it is quite clear that their neglect has had tangible consequences for the
field. Openness is the pre-requisite of a scientific system that self-corrects and without it,
how will we ever know where truth ends and error begins?
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Precise operationalisation of dependent variables (Experiments 1-4)
It should be noted that the precise operationalisation of the dependent measures reported
in the original study was ambiguous: Performance measures were the number of complete
sequences achieved (‘speed’), and the number of errors made relative to the number of
complete sequences achieved (‘accuracy’). The senior author of the original research team
confirmed the following definitions. Speed was the number of complete sequences achieved
during a 30s trial plus any partial sequence the participant was completing when the trial
was terminated. For example, a participant who performed 15 complete sequences, and had
just entered two correct items when the trial terminated, would receive a speed score of 15.4
(15 + 25). Accuracy was 1 ≠ errorsspeed , where a single error was defined as any string of up to
five contiguous incorrect items that did not match the target sequence. For example, three
contiguous incorrect items would constitute a single error, but six contiguous incorrect items
would constitute two errors.
Note that, under this scheme, it is technically possible for a participant to incur a negative
accuracy score on an individual trial if error exceeds speed. This could substantially bias
between-stage comparisons, as accuracy scores should only range between 0 and 1. Across
the four experiments reported here, five trials with negative accuracy scores were identified




Additional analyses for Chapter 3
B.1 Influence of session times and participant age (Experiments 1-4)
Two minor procedural di erences between the original study and the direct replications
(participant age range and time of testing) were evaluated to see whether they influenced the
findings (see Walker & Stickgold, 2016). Time of testing in the direct replications (rounded
to the nearest hour: Mdn = 15.00 hours, SD = 1.833) di ered only slightly from Walker et al.
(13.00 hours) and was not significantly correlated with RSs (r = 0.12, p = 0.355). Therefore,
time of testing does not appear to account for the absence of a reconsolidation e ect.
Participant age in the direct replications (Mdn = 22 years, range = 18–54 years) covered a
larger range than Walker et al. (Mdn unknown, range, 18–27 years). A reanalysis of RSs for
only those participants who fell within the 18–27 age bracket (n = 48), showed that there was
still no substantial impairment [M = -2.05, SD = 10.51; t(47) = -1.35, p = 0.092]. Therefore,
participant age does not appear to account for the absence of a reconsolidation e ect.
B.2 Impact of counter-balancing (Experiments 1-4)
To establish whether the counterbalancing procedures influenced the RS, we used a series of
one-way ANOVAs separately with test order (A, B) or sequence order (X, Y) as a between-
subjects factor and RS (separately for accuracy and speed), as a dependent variable. There
was no significant main e ect of sequence order on RS accuracy, F(1,62) = 0.004, p = 0.948,
or RS speed, F(1,62) = 0.224, p = 0.638. There was also no significant main e ect of test
order on RS accuracy, F(1,62) = 0.655, p = 0.421; however, test order did influence RS speed
significantly, F(1,62) = 5.320, p = 0.024. Follow-up one-sample t tests (two-tailed) indicated
that RS speed was significantly higher than zero for test order A [RS = 7.482, SD = 13.479,
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t(35) = 3.331, p = 0.002] and did not di er significantly from zero for test order B [RS =
0.448, SD = 10.044, t(27) = 0.236, p = 0.815], confirming that there was no reconsolidation
e ect in either condition.
B.3 Impact of counter-balancing (Experiments 5-7)
To establish whether the counterbalancing procedures influenced sequence similarity scores
at the Test stage, two separate two-way ANOVAs with Experiment (5, 6, 7) and either test
order (A, B) or sequence order (X, Y) as between-subjects factors. There was no significant
main e ect of test order, F(1,42) = 0.466, p = 0.498, or interaction between test order and
experiment F(2,42) = 0.723, p = 0.491, and no main e ect of sequence order F(1,42) = 0.714,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.1: Counterbalancing conditions for Experiments 8-10.







Test instructions for Experiments 8-10.
F.1 True/False Test Instructions
“You will now be presented with a series of statements. If you think a statement accurately
represents what happened in the video, then choose the ‘TRUE’ option. If you do not think
the statement accurately represents what happened in the video, choose the ‘FALSE’ option.
After providing a response, please rate your confidence in that response on a scale from
1-100%. Once you have entered a response and made a confidence rating you should press
the ‘SUBMIT’ button.”
F.2 Original Test and Modified Test Instructions
“You will now be presented with a series of questions. For each question you will be given
two options. Choose the option you think most accurately represents what happened in the
video and then rate your confidence in that response on a scale from 1-100%. Once you have
entered a response and made a confidence rating you should press the ‘SUBMIT’ button.”
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Table G.1: Questions (1-30) and answers for Experiment 11
No. Question Correct answer
1 FOR WHICH COUNTRY IS THE YEN THE MONETARY UNIT? JAPAN
2 IN WHAT ANCIENT CITY WERE THE ‘HANGING GARDENS’ LOCATED? BABYLON
3 IN WHAT CITY IS THE TALLEST BUILDING IN THE WORLD? DUBAI
4 IN WHAT EUROPEAN CITY IS THE PARTHENON LOCATED? ATHENS
5 IN WHAT PROFESSION WAS EMMETT KELLY? CLOWN
6 IN WHICH CITY IS MICHELANGELO’S STATUE OF DAVID LOCATED? FLORENCE
7 IN WHICH CITY IS THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY LOCATED? ANNAPOLIS
8 IN WHICH COUNTRY IS ANGEL FALLS LOCATED? VENEZUELA
9 IN WHICH GAME ARE MEN CROWNED? CHECKERS
10 IN WHICH TYPE OF SKI RACE DOES THE DOWNHILL SKIER MAKE SHARP TURNS
AROUND POLES?
SLALOM
11 OF WHICH COUNTRY IS BAGHDAD THE CAPITAL? IRAQ
12 OF WHICH COUNTRY IS BUDAPEST THE CAPITAL? HUNGARY
13 OF WHICH COUNTRY IS BUENOS AIRES THE CAPITAL? ARGENTINA
14 OF WHICH COUNTRY IS NAIROBI THE CAPITAL? KENYA
15 OVER WHICH RIVER IS THE GEORGE WASHINGTON BRIDGE? HUDSON
16 THE DEEPEST PART OF THE OCEAN IS LOCATED AT WHICH TRENCH? MARIANA
17 THE GENERAL NAMED HANNIBAL WAS FROM WHAT CITY? CARTHAGE
18 WHAT ANIMAL RUNS THE FASTEST? CHEETAH
19 WHAT ARE PEOPLE CALLED WHO EXPLORE CAVES? SPELUNKERS
20 WHAT ARE PEOPLE WHO MAKE MAPS CALLED? CARTOGRAPHERS
21 WHAT BRAND OF CIGARETTE WAS FIRST TO HAVE THE FLIP-TOP BOX? MARLBORO
22 WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF AUSTRALIA? CANBERRA
23 WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF CANADA? OTTAWA
24 WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF FRANCE? PARIS
25 WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF KENTUCKY? FRANKFORT
26 WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF NEW YORK? ALBANY
27 WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF SWITZERLAND? BERN
28 WHAT IS THE HIGHEST MOUNTAIN IN SOUTH AMERICA? ACONCAGUA
29 WHAT IS THE LARGEST PLANET IN THE SOLAR SYSTEM? JUPITER
30 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE ASTRONOMERWHO PUBLISHED IN 1543 HIS THEORY
THAT THE EARTH REVOLVES AROUND THE SUN?
COPERNICUS
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Table G.2: Questions (31-60) and answers for Experiment 11
No. Question Correct answer
31 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE AUTHOR WHO WROTE ‘ROMEO AND JULIET’? SHAKESPEARE
32 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE BOY IN THE BOOK ‘TREASURE ISLAND’? HAWKINS
33 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE BROTHERS WHO FLEW THE FIRST AIRPLANE AT
KITTY HAWK?
WRIGHT
34 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE COSMONAUT WHO WAS THE FIRST PERSON TO
ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH?
GAGARIN
35 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE CRIMINAL WHO WAS KNOWN AS ‘SCARFACE’? CAPONE
36 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE FIRST FLIER TO FLY SOLO AROUND THE WORLD? POST
37 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE FIRST PERSON TO COMPLETE A SOLO FLIGHT
ACROSS THE ATLANTIC OCEAN?
LINDBERGH
38 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE FIRST PERSON TO SET FOOT ON THE MOON? ARMSTRONG
39 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE FIRST SIGNER OF THE ‘DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE’?
HANCOCK
40 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE MAN WHO BEGAN THE REFORMATION IN GER-
MANY?
LUTHER
41 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE MAN WHO INVENTED THE TELEGRAPH? MORSE
42 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THEMANWHO SHOWED THAT LIGHTNING IS ELECTRIC? FRANKLIN
43 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE MOST POPULAR PIN-UP GIRL OF WORLD WAR II? GRABLE
44 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE GULF WAR?
BUSH
45 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE SCIENTIST WHO DISCOVERED PENICILLIN? FLEMMING
46 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE SECOND UNITED STATES PRESIDENT? ADAMS
47 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE UNION GENERAL WHO DEFEATED THE CONFED-
ERATE ARMY AT THE CIVIL WAR BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG?
MEADE
48 WHAT IS THE LAST NAME OF THE VILLAINOUS CAPTAIN IN THE STORY ‘PETER PAN’? HOOK
49 WHAT IS THE LONGEST RIVER IN EUROPE? VOLGA
50 WHAT IS THE LONGEST RIVER IN SOUTH AMERICA? AMAZON
51 WHAT IS THE NAME FOR THE ASTRONOMICAL BODIES THAT ENTER THE EARTH’S
ATMOSPHERE?
METEORS
52 WHAT IS THE NAME OF A DRIED GRAPE? RAISIN
53 WHAT IS THE NAME OF A DRIED PLUM? PRUNE
54 WHAT IS THE NAME OF A GIANT OCEAN WAVE CAUSED BY AN EARTHQUAKE? TSUNAMI
55 WHAT IS THE NAME OF A NUMBER TWO WOOD IN GOLF? BRASSIE
56 WHAT IS THE NAME OF AN AIRPLANE WITHOUT AN ENGINE? GLIDER
57 WHAT IS THE NAME OF BATMAN’S BUTLER? ALFRED
58 WHAT IS THE NAME OF DEER MEAT? VENISON
59 WHAT IS THE NAME OF DOROTHY’S DOG IN ‘THE WIZARD OF OZ’? TOTO
60 WHAT IS THE NAME OF SOCRATES’ MOST FAMOUS STUDENT? PLATO
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Table G.3: Questions (61-90) and answers for Experiment 11
No. Question Correct answer
61 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE AUTOMOBILE INSTRUMENT THAT MEASURES MILEAGE? ODOMETER
62 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE BIRD THAT CANNOT FLY AND IS THE LARGEST BIRD ON
EARTH?
OSTRICH
63 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE BRIGHTEST STAR IN THE SKY EXCLUDING THE SUN? SIRIUS
64 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE CHINESE RELIGION FOUNDED BY LAO TSE? TAOISM
65 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE COMIC STRIP CHARACTER WHO EATS SPINACH TO IN-
CREASE HIS STRENGTH?
POPEYE
66 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE CRIME IN WHICH A BUILDING OR PROPERTY IS PUR-
POSELY SET ON FIRE?
ARSON
67 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE DESERT PEOPLE WHO WANDER INSTEAD OF LIVING IN
ONE PLACE?
NOMADS
68 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE FOUNTAIN IN ROME INTO WHICH COINS ARE THROWN
FOR GOOD LUCK?
TREVI
69 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE FURRY ANIMAL THAT ATTACKS COBRA SNAKES? MONGOOSE
70 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE HORSE-LIKE ANIMAL WITH BLACK ANDWHITE STRIPES? ZEBRA
71 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE INSTRUMENT USED TO MEASURE WIND SPEED? ANEMOMETER
72 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE ISLAND ON WHICH NAPOLEON WAS BORN? CORSICA
73 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE KIND OF CAT THAT SPOKE TO ALICE IN THE STORY
‘ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND’?
CHESIRE
74 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LARGEST DESERT ON EARTH? ANTARTICA
75 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LARGEST OCEAN ON EARTH? PACIFIC
76 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LIGHTEST WOOD KNOWN? BALSA
77 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LIZARD THAT CHANGES ITS COLOR TO MATCH THE
SURROUNDINGS?
CHAMELEON
78 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE LONG SLEEP SOME ANIMALS GO THROUGH DURING THE
ENTIRE WINTER?
HIBERNATION
79 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE MOLTEN ROCK THAT RUNS DOWN THE SIDE OF A VOL-
CANO DURING AN ERUPTION?
LAVA
80 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE MOUNTAIN RANGE IN WHICH MOUNT EVEREST IS LO-
CATED?
HIMALAYAS
81 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE MOUNTAIN RANGE THAT SEPARATES ASIA FROM EU-
ROPE?
URAL
82 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT USED AT SEA TO PLOT POSI-
TION BY THE STARS?
SEXTANT
83 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE OCEAN THAT IS LOCATED BETWEEN AFRICA AND AUS-
TRALIA?
INDIAN
84 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE ORGAN THAT PRODUCES INSULIN? PANCREAS
85 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE PROCESS BY WHICH PLANTS MAKE THEIR FOOD? PHOTOSYNTHESIS
86 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE REMAINS OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS THAT ARE FOUND
IN STONE?
FOSSILS
87 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE RUBBER OBJECT THAT IS HIT BACK AND FORTH BY
HOCKEY PLAYERS?
PUCK
88 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE SEVERE HEADACHE THAT RETURNS PERIODICALLY AND
OFTEN IS ACCOMPANIED BY NAUSEA?
MIGRAINE
89 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE SHORT PLEATED SKIRT WORN BY MEN IN SCOTLAND? KILT
90 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE SMALL JAPANESE STOVE USED FOR OUTDOOR COOKING? HIBACHI
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Table G.4: Questions (91-120) and answers for Experiment 11
No. Question Correct answer
91 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE SMALLEST BONE IN THE HUMAN BODY? STAPES
92 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE SPEAR LIKE OBJECT THAT IS THROWN DURING AN ATH-
LETICS COMPETITION?
JAVELIN
93 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE SUBSTANCE DERIVED FROM A WHALE THAT IS USED TO
MAKE PERFUME?
AMBERGRIS
94 WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE UNIT OF MEASUREMENT THAT REFERS TO A SIX-FOOT
DEPTH OF WATER?
FATHOM
95 WHAT IS THE ONLY WORD THAT THE RAVEN SAYS IN EDGAR ALLEN POE’S POEM
‘THE RAVEN’?
NEVERMORE
96 WHAT IS THE TERM FOR HITTING A VOLLEYBALL DOWN HARD INTO THE OPPO-
NENT’S COURT?
SPIKE
97 WHAT IS THE UNIT OF ELECTRICAL POWER THAT REFERS TO A CURRENT OF ONE
AMPERE AT ONE VOLT?
WATT
98 WHAT IS THE UNIT OF SOUND INTENSITY? DECIBEL
99 WHAT ISLAND IS THE LARGEST IN THE WORLD EXCLUDING AUSTRALIA? GREENLAND
100 WHAT KIND OF METAL IS ASSOCIATED WITH A 50TH WEDDING ANNIVERSARY? GOLD
101 WHAT KIND OF POISON DID SOCRATES TAKE AS HIS EXECUTION? HEMLOCK
102 WHAT WAS FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT’S PROFESSION? ARCHITECT
103 WHAT WAS THE CAPITAL OF WEST GERMANY PRIOR TO REUNIFICATION IN 1990? BONN
104 WHAT WAS THE LAST NAME OF BUFFALO BILL? CODY
105 WHATWAS THE LAST NAME OF THE FIRST EUROPEAN EXPLORER TO LAND IN NORTH
AMERICA?
ERIKSON
106 WHAT WAS THE NAME OF TARZAN’S GIRLFRIEND? JANE
107 WHAT WAS THE NAME OF THE APOLLO LUNAR MODULE THAT LANDED THE FIRST
MAN ON THE MOON?
EAGLE
108 WHAT WAS THE NAME OF THE SHIP ABOARD WHICH CHARLES DARWIN TRAVELLED
TO THE GALAPAGOS?
BEAGLE
109 WHAT WAS THE NAME OF THE SUPPOSEDLY UNSINKABLE SHIP THAT SUNK ON ITS
MAIDEN VOYAGE IN 1912?
TITANIC
110 WHICH COUNTRY WAS THE FIRST TO USE GUNPOWDER? CHINA
111 WHICH FLOWER IS A NATIONAL SYMBOL IN WALES? DAFFODIL
112 WHICH PLANET WAS THE LAST TO BE DISCOVERED? NEPTUNE
113 WHICH PRECIOUS GEM IS RED? RUBY
114 WHICH SPORT USES THE TERMS ‘GUTTER’ AND ‘ALLEY’? BOWLING
115 WHICH SPORT USES THE TERMS ‘STONES’ AND ‘BROOMS’? CURLING
116 WHICH TYPE OF SNAKE DO ASIAN SNAKE-CHARMERS USE? COBRA
117 WHO IS KNOWN AS ‘THE FATHER OF GEOMETRY’? EUCLID
118 WHO KILLED THE MINOTAUR ACCORDING TO GREEK MYTHOLOGY? THESEUS
119 WHO WAS THE FIRST RULER OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE? CHARLEMAGNE




Presented at the start of the study.
“We are investigating how people learn and remember information. In this particular study we
will be asking you general knowledge questions and providing you with correcting information
if you make errors.
The study is divided into three stages taking place over three consecutive days. You must
only take part in the study if you are prepared to participate on all three days. Please note
that all of the stages must be completed at the same time of day. We’ll give you a couple of
hours of leeway with this. So for example, if you started stage one at 11am, you should aim
to start stage two at 11am the following day, however in order to give you some flexibility we
will actually allow you to start the stage anytime between 9am and 1pm. The same would
apply for stage three on the third day.
If any of this is unclear, please get in touch by clicking the ‘contact us’ button at the bottom
of the screen. If you fail to complete a stage, or do not complete the stage during the allocated
times, you will be unable to take part in the rest of the study. The time required for each
stage is variable. We estimate that stage one will take approximately 30-45 minutes, stage
two will take approximately 45-60 minutes and stage three will take approximately 30-45
minutes.
Each stage is slightly di erent but will generally require you to answer a series of general
knowledge questions, for example: ‘Who invented the light bulb?’ If you provide an incorrect
answer to one of these questions, then we will teach you the correct answer. All information
provided during the study will be factual. Further instructions will be provided throughout
the study and if you encounter any problems you can contact us using the button at the
bottom of the screen.
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Please note that this is a scientific study. You must read all instructions carefully, take your
time, and give your undivided attention to the task at all times. In return, you will be
contributing valuable data to a scientific research study, and receive monetary compensation
for your time. It is absolutely vital that you do not break any of the study rules. For example,
during the study you must not look up the answers to any of the questions that we ask. The
payment you receive is not related to the number of questions that you answer correctly, but
is contingent on you strictly following the instructions we provide. Upon completion of the
study, the research team will check your responses and then send you information about how
to obtain your payment.”
H.2 Study rules
Presented at the start of each stage.
“Please read and adhere to the following rules. In order to maintain data quality participants
who do not follow these rules may face early exclusion from the study:
• Find a quiet place to do the study where you are unlikely to be distracted and where
you have a stable Internet connection. Turn o  your mobile phone, e-mail, and any
other devices/software that might distract you.
• You should set aside enough time to complete the stage in a single sitting. You must
not leave the study website during a stage. Do not use the ‘back’, ‘forward’, or ‘reload’
buttons on your browser or visit other websites during the study as doing so will cause
your data to be lost and you will be unable to continue the study.
• If you leave the study webpage you will receive a warning message. Warnings can also
be triggered by software on your computer that sends you notifications (e.g., about an
e-mail) so it is advisable to turn o  such applications for the duration of the study. If
you receive too many warnings you will be excluded from the remainder of the study.
• is absolutely vital that you do not attempt to look up the answers to the questions
until after the completion of the study. This is very important! We ask this to ensure
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that all participants receive a similar experience during the study. You should also
avoid writing down information about the questions or answers.
• Occasionally you will encounter a question that asks you to type in a short, 5-digit code.
Be careful to enter this code correctly, we are checking that you are paying attention!”
H.3 Stage 1 instructions
Presented at the start of stage 1.
“Welcome to stage 1. During this stage we will test your knowledge about general kinds of
information, for example, ‘Who invented the light bulb?’ You will be asked a question, and
you will type your best guess in the space provided below the question. The answer will
always consist of exactly one word and will never be longer than one word.
The questions vary greatly in di culty such that you will probably be able to answer some
easily, while others will be harder, and still others you may not know at all. If, after searching
your memory, you are sure you don’t know the answer, then you should click the ‘SKIP’
button.
If you think you know the answer, enter your response into the box provided. You should
also provide a rating of your confidence in that response using the slider, which ranges from
1% to 100%.
Don’t worry if you don’t know the exact spelling of a word, our software can usually work
out what you mean if you get close enough - just aim to be as accurate as you can. When
you have entered a response and provided a confidence rating, click the ‘SUBMIT’ button to
move on to the next question. When this happens you will notice that the progress bar at
the bottom of the screen changes to show how much of this stage you have completed.”
H.4 Stage 2 instructions
Presented at the start of stage 2.
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“Welcome to stage 2. During this stage we will return to some of the questions that you
answered on the stage one quiz and review the answers that you gave. Some of the questions
will be ones that you answered correctly on the stage one quiz and others will be questions
that you answered incorrectly.
If you gave the correct answer during stage 1, we will inform you of this. If you gave an
incorrect response on stage 1 then we will provide you with the correct answer which you
should try to remember.
Sometimes you will be asked to recall or restudy the responses you gave during stage 2 before
you find out whether that response was correct or incorrect. On recall trials, you will be asked
to enter your stage 1 response. On restudy trials your stage 1 response will be displayed on
the screen. Recall and restudy trials will occur regardless of whether your stage 1 response
was correct or incorrect.
You will also encounter a series of rest trials where you will be given a few moments to relax
before we continue with the study. You should not leave the screen during this time and be
ready to start the next trial.
Each trial will last for 20 seconds and you will automatically proceed to the next trial. A
timer will be displayed in the bottom right of the screen to show you how long you have left
on each trial.”
H.5 Stage 3 instructions
Presented at the start of stage 3.
“Welcome to stage 3. During this stage we will return to some of the questions that you have
encountered during the study. The stage will be divided into three parts and we will begin
with the instructions for part one.
As each question is presented search your memory hard and type in the correct answer. You
should also provide a rating of your confidence in that response using the slider, which ranges
from 1% to 100%. When you are happy with your response, click the ‘SUBMIT’ button.
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Part two will automatically follow on from part one. We will cycle through each of the
questions one final time and you should follow the on-screen instructions which will tell you
which responses you need to provide. After part two you will be asked a series of general
questions about the study and then you will be finished!”
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Instruction and attention checks for Experiment 12
Two instruction/attention checks (see Oppenheimer et al., 2009) were employed to identify
and exclude any participants who were not reading the instructions carefully or paying
attention. In the first check during the instructions stage, participants were asked how often
they use the Internet and given a series of options (Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Infrequently,
Never). Within the main instruction block, they were told to ignore this question and answer
‘Never’, a response that is technically impossible (as the participant was using the Internet to
take part in the study). In the second check during the question stage, participants were
asked “Approximately how many Twitter messages do you think you have just read?” (there
were actually 18) and told to respond with “more than 40” amongst other more realistic
options (0-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40).
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Instructions for Experiment 12
J.1 General instructions
At beginning of study.
“We are interested in how people understand and remember news reports. In this experiment
you will see a news report presented in a series of short messages in the form of ‘Tweets’
from the social media platform Twitter. The Tweets will only be presented once and you
will not be able to go back and re-read previous Tweets. Therefore you should take as long
as you need to read each Tweet. Each Tweet will appear for a minimum of 5 seconds and
then remain on screen until you click the >> button. After reading all of Tweets from this
news report you will complete a short arithmetic test. Finally, you will be asked a series of
questions about the event that you have been reading about.”
J.2 Inference question instructions
Included with each question.
“Please respond in as much detail as possible and provide reasons for your answer.”
290
Appendix K
Narratives used in Experiment 12
Message types are either filler, (no) false information, (no) retraction, or auxiliary detail.
Note that in the experiment reported here, auxiliary details were always consistent with the
alternative theme. The false theme details are for use in subsequent experiments.
K.1 Warehouse fire narrative
Message 1 [filler]: Emergency services have received a call reporting a fire at the premises of
a large warehouse located near the city’s main football stadium
Message 2 [filler]: The alarm was first raised by a security guard who saw smoke and called
the emergency services
Message 3 [filler]: The fire is already spreading rapidly. An o -duty police o cer walking
nearby was the first to reach the scene and has begun an evacuation
Message 4 [filler]: Based on a recent company audit, the warehouse stock is estimated to be
worth around one hundred thousand pounds
Message 5 [filler]: Two warehouse workers have been taken to hospital after sustaining injuries
during the fire
Message 6 [false information]: Statement from Police Detective Lucas: “A storeroom contained
cans of oil paint and pressurised gas cylinders near faulty electrical wiring”
OR: [no false information]: Statement from Police Detective Lucas: “We are working with
the fire services to rapidly get the situation under control”
Message 7 [filler]: A small crowd of onlookers has gathered on a nearby pedestrian bridge to
watch as the fire consumes the warehouse
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Message 8 [filler]: Emergency services say they are grateful that the alarm was raised
immediately after smoke was seen
Message 9 [auxiliary detail1 – false theme consistent]: There is a strong smell of burning and
firefighters are reporting thick, oily smoke, sheets of flames and an intense heat
OR: [auxiliary detail1 – alternative theme consistent]: There is a strong smell of burning but
firefighters are reporting that there is relatively little heat and most of the smoke is subsiding
Message 10 [filler]: Emergency services are reporting that the evacuation is now complete
Message 11 [auxiliary detail2 – false theme consistent]: A number of loud explosions in the
storeroom have endangered the firefighters
OR: [auxiliary detail2 – alternative theme consistent]: Despite two small explosions in the
sta  kitchen, firefighters now have the fire under control
Message 12 [filler]: The warehouse owner says he is worried the fire will destroy his stock
Message 13 [auxiliary detail3 – false theme consistent]: A firefighter has emerged from the
storeroom with what looks to be frayed electrical cables
OR: [auxiliary detail3 – alternative theme consistent]: A firefighter has emerged from the
sta  kitchens with what looks to be a burnt out saucepan
Message 14 [filler]: The warehouse workers who were taken to hospital have only sustained
minor injuries and should make a full recovery
Message 15 [auxiliary detail4 – false theme consistent]: A warehouse worker was recently
disciplined for breaching storeroom health and safety regulations regarding flammable material
storage
OR: [auxiliary detail4 – alternative theme consistent]: A warehouse worker was recently
disciplined for breaching health and safety regulations in the sta  kitchens
Message 16 [filler]: Warehouse workers who did not sustain injuries are gathered in a nearby
café waiting for news about the extent of the damage.
Message 17 [retraction]: Police Detective Lucas has released a new statement: “the storeroom
did not contain paint cans and gas cylinders, it was actually empty”
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OR: [no retraction]: Police Detective Lucas has released a new statement: “the fire is now
under control and the area will soon be declared safe”
Message 18 [filler]: The fire service is reporting that the fire has been extinguished, but all of
the warehouse stock has been destroyed
K.2 Zoo breakout narrative
Message 1 [filler]: We have received a report from the press o ce of a local zoo that a group
of Roloway monkeys have escaped from their cage
Message 2 [filler]: The alarm was first raised by a sta  member who found the cage empty
when he went to deliver the lunchtime feed
Message 3 [filler]: Security teams are taking steps to lock down the premises after being
notified of the breakout via the public tannoy system.
Message 4 [filler]: The Roloway monkeys are an endangered species imported from West
Africa and are one of the zoo’s most valuable species
Message 5 [filler]: A family visiting the zoo say they saw three monkeys rummaging through
the bins behind the zoo café and devouring a crate of lemons
Message 6 [false information]: Statement from Zoo Manager Kat Barns: “A work experience
student left the monkey cage door open this morning after the morning feed”
OR: [no false information]: Statement from Zoo Manager Kat Barns: “We are working
rapidly to locate and secure the monkeys.”
Message 7 [filler]: The zoo is one of the city’s most regularly visited tourist attractions and
recently received an award for its outstanding insect collection
Message 8 [filler]: Zoo Head of Security has praised the individual who first raised the alarm
this morning
Message 9 [auxiliary detail1 – false theme consistent]: The police recently visited the zoo to
discuss incidents of theft and anti-social behaviour amongst the work experience students
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OR: [auxiliary detail1 – alternative theme consistent]: The police recently visited the zoo
after work experience students reported seeing a suspicious individual near the zoo’s perimeter
fence
Message 10 [filler]: Zoo Head of Security has stated that his sta  rapidly locked down the
area after hearing of the breakout
Message 11 [auxiliary detail2 – false theme consistent]: Sta  members have recently raised
concerns with management about work experience students being absent from compulsory
training sessions
OR: [auxiliary detail2 – alternative theme consistent]: Sta  members have recently raised
concerns with management about the close proximity of the monkey enclosure to a perimeter
fence
Message 12 [filler]: Several Roloway monkey experts have arrived on the scene, concerned for
the safety of these valuable animals
Message 13 [auxiliary detail3 – false theme consistent]: The Zoo’s Head of Security says an
investigation into the zoo’s work experience scheme has been launched
OR: [auxiliary detail3 – alternative theme consistent]: The Zoo’s Head of Security says an
investigation has been launched after a hole was found in the zoo’s perimeter fence near the
monkey cage
Message 14 [filler]: The family who saw the monkeys behind the zoo café told our reporter
that the monkeys ate an entire crate of fruit and then quickly moved on
Message 15 [auxiliary detail4 – false theme consistent]: Police are examining CCTV footage
that shows a group of work experience students arriving for the morning shift
OR: [auxiliary detail4 – alternative theme consistent]: Police are examining CCTV footage
that shows a man wearing an “animal rights” shirt near the perimeter fence this morning
Message 16 [filler]: The police are contacting local residents by telephone, asking them not to
approach the monkeys and urging them to report any sightings
Message 17 [retraction]: Statement from Zoo Manager Kat Barns: “the monkey cage was not
294
APPENDIX K. NARRATIVES USED IN EXPERIMENT 12
left open by a work experience student, it was locked by a sta  member”
OR: [no retraction]: Zoo Manager Kat Barns has stated that most of the monkeys have been
recovered and opening hours will commence as normal tomorrow.
Message 19 [filler]: The zoo is reporting that all of the monkeys have now been located and
secured in a temporary enclosure. A full investigation is expected.
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Recognition memory tests used in Experiment 12
Instruction:
“Which of these Tweets have you seen before? You must choose one of the Tweets, even if
you cannot remember seeing either of them.”
Warehouse narrative Zoo narrative
Figure L.1: Recognition memory tests used in Experiment 12. Recognition memory test




Coding framework used in Experiment 12
M.1 Coding criteria for inference questions
Two dependent measures are being extracted from participants’ responses to the inference
questions:
• ‘References to false information’
• ‘References to alternative theme’
For each question, the coder will evaluate the participant’s response and make a judgment as
to whether it refers to the false information theme, the alternative theme, or neither.
• If the participant refers to neither theme, they will score 0 on both dependent measures.
• If the participant makes a causal reference consistent with the false information theme
they will score 1 on the ‘references to false information’ measure.
• If the participant makes a causal reference consistent with the alternative information
theme they will score 1 on the ‘references to alternative theme’ measure.
• If the participant makes causal references to both themes will score 0.5 on each measure.
The maximum score that can be achieved for each measure on each question is 1, even
if multiple references are made in the same response. Thus, the maximum score for each
measure for all inference questions is 8.
A causal reference is one in which the participant explicitly states, or strongly implies, that
the warehouse fire was caused by gas and oil paints/unattended hot stove or the zoo breakout
was caused by the cage being left open by a work experience student/an activist cutting a
hole in the enclosure.
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Table M.1: Zoo story inference questions and example responses.
Question Example false information theme an-
swer (to gain a score of 1)
Example alternative theme answer (to
gain a score of 1)
Precisely how might the CCTV
footage relate to the monkey’s escape?
The footage showed that the students
were at the zoo during the time of the
escape
The footage showed that an animal
rights activist was at the zoo during
the time of the escape
What do you think will be the outcome
of the Head of Security’s investigation?
One of the students left the cage open
when they were giving the monkeys
their morning feed
An animal rights activist cut a hole in
the fence of the monkey enclosure
How could the monkey escape have
been avoided?
If the individuals on work experi-
ence were being kept under observa-
tion,while carrying out feeding then
the enclosure wouldn’t have been left
open
If the fence was more secure then the
animal rights activist may have been
stopped
Are there any reasons why the police
might wish to interview the work ex-
perience students again?
Yes – to ask if they left the cage open
deliberately
Yes – to ask for a description of the an-
imal rights activist they saw near the
fence
Do you think zoo management should
have listened more closely to the con-
cerns of their sta ?
Yes as a work experience student was
to blame and this could have been
avoided if earlier complaints were lis-
tened to
Yes as they had noticed that the mon-
key enclosure was too close to the
perimeter fence
Who might the police consider arrest-
ing for their involvement in the mon-
key’s escape?
A student as they might have done it
on purpose
The animal rights activist as they
broke into the zoo
What responsibility does the zoo’s
Head of Security hold for the monkey
escape?
He should have been more careful when
deciding who gets employed for work
experience
The security arrangements were not
good enough to stop the animal rights
activist
How did the monkeys escape from the
zoo?
A work experience student left the cage
door open
An animal rights activist cut a hole in
the monkey enclosure
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Table M.2: Warehouse story inference questions and example responses.
Question Example false information theme an-
swer (to gain a score of 1)
Example alternative theme answer (to
gain a score of 1)
Where is the fire most likely to have
originated from?
The storeroom containing the paint
and gas cylinders
The saucepan in the sta  kitchens
What were the possible causes of the
workers’ injuries?
Inhaling toxic fumes from the oil paints
or hit by exploding gas cylinders
Touching the hot pan in the kitchen
What evidence is there of carelessness? Storing the pressurised cans and paints
near the faulty wiring
Leaving the pan unattended on the
stove
How could this fire have been avoided? Careful storage of flammable materials Not leaving saucepans unattended
In what way should the health and
safety regulations have prevented the
fire?
They gave advice about the appropri-
ate storage of flammable materials
They gave advice about cooking safely
in the sta  kitchens
Do you think any workers should be
disciplined for their role in the fire?
Yes for storing the toxic and flammable
chemicals carelessly
Yes for leaving the saucepan unat-
tended on the stove
What was the possible cause of the
strong burning smell?
From the oil paints and gas cylinders From the burnt saucepan
What was the most likely cause of the
fire?
Flammable materials – the oil paints
and gas cylinders – set on fire by the
faulty electrical wiring
The saucepan being left unattended
and catching fire
M.2 Coding criteria for filler questions
One dependent measure is being extracted from participants’ responses to the filler questions:
• ‘Recall of fillers’
For each question, the coder will evaluate the participant’s response and make a judgment as
to whether it approximates the correct answer.
• If the participant’s response is similar to the correct answer they will score 1.
• If their response is incorrect they will score 0.
The maximum score that can be achieved on each question is 1. Thus, the maximum score
for all filler questions is 8.
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Table M.3: Zoo story filler questions and correct responses.
Question Correct response
Where will the monkeys be kept until the investigation
into the escape is complete?
A temporary enclosure
Who sent reports about the missing monkeys to the
press?
The zoo’s press o ce
Why did the zoo recently receive an award? For its insect collection
How did the police contact local residents to inform
them about the monkeys’ escape?
By telephone
Who was the first to notice the monkeys were missing? A sta  member
By what method were zoo sta  alerted about the miss-
ing monkeys?
Over the main tannoy system
Which continent did the monkey’s inhabit in the wild? Africa
Which fruit were the monkeys seen eating at the rear
of the zoo café?
Lemons
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Table M.4: Warehouse story filler questions and correct responses.
Question Correct response
Who first raised the alarm? A security guard
Approximately how much was the warehouse stock
worth?
Around one hundred thousand pounds
How many warehouse workers were taken to hospital? Two
How did the first police o cer arrive on the scene? He was walking nearby
Where did onlookers gather to watch the fire? A bridge
How much of the warehouse stock was destroyed? All of the stock was destroyed
What sporting venue was the warehouse located near? Football stadium
Where did uninjured warehouse workers gather while
they waited for news about the fire?
Cafe
M.3 Coding criteria for retraction awareness questions
One dependent measure is being extracted from participants’ responses to the retraction
awareness questions: ‘Retraction awareness’.
The two questions are:
1. What was the point of the second message from the zoo’s Assistant Manager Kat Barns?
[zoo story]
OR What was the point of the second message from Police Detective Lucas? [warehouse
story]
2. Were you aware of any corrections or contradictions in the messages that you read?
Answers suggesting awareness of a retraction will receive a score of 1. There is a
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